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INTRODUCTION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND POLITICS 
IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY 
This volume is about politics, crime, and criminal justice 
in the United States. As such, it reports on some of the fruits 
of an increasing amount of research that has been devoted to this 
topic in recent years. With the exception of one analytical 
essay on crime as an issue in American politics, all of the 
articles in the volume are based on original field research. 
By "politics" is meant the relations of power and influence 
that occur between, on the one hand, those who are professionally 
involved either in the private or the public sector in the 
prevention of crime or in the processing of the accused and 
convicted and, on the other hand, those who are part of the 
complex representative decision making apparatus that is called 
the political system in this country. This political system 
includes the public as electors, their representatives in 
legislative bodies at all levels of government, and their elected 
representatives in executive positions. By adopting this rather 
conventional approach to politics, the editors avoid the concep-
tual and analytical confusion that results from the tendency to 
characterize all power and influence relations within organiza-
tions as the politics of the organization. Although this latter 
more inclusive approach may also be termed "politics" and, as 
such, has been frequently adopted in writing about the criminal 
justice system, in this volume the focus is placed on some of the 
excellent research that is being done in the area of politics and 
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criminal justice narrowly defined. The subject falls naturally 
into two categories: 1) politics and crime and 2) politics and 
criminal justice. 
Politics and Crime 
Crime involves breaking the social contract designed to make 
human relations reasonably predictable and non-threatening. 
Crime as a social issue touches deep fears, insecurities, and 
emotions in most people. It also has religious and/or ethical 
dimensions that serve to heighten the intensity of feeling. At 
the most basic level, the control of predatory crime vies with 
defense against foreign predators as the first order of business 
of any government. It is always a part of the political agenda. 
In the United States, however, crime as a policy issue has 
had periods of more or less concentration or visibility in the 
political arena. Those who say that the nation has been going 
through a period of the poli ticization of crime are suggesting 
that crime, for 
political agenda 
seriousness of 
various reasons, is now more prominent on the 
than it normally is or even than the actual 
the problem would call for. The term 
"politicization" also suggests that crime and the fear of crime 
are being used by politicians as issues in which rhetorical and 
symbolic policy initiative can enhance their popularity and elec-
tability. More radical scholars even claim that the crime issue 
is created by the ruling elite in order to mask the real problems 
of social decay, unemployment, and alienation that plague society 
(Quinney, 1973). Nevertheless, polls reveal that crime is one of 
the major concerns of the public. Interestingly, this is more so 
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with forced choice questions (i.e., "How important are the 
following problems in the United States today?") rather than 
open-ended ones--(i.e., "What are the most important problems the 
United States faces today?"). With open-ended questions other 
policy concerns (the economy, war, and peace) take precedence 
whereas with forced choice questions, crime has tended to have 
salience. Stuart Scheingold in The Politics of Law and Order 
concludes that this difference "signals a powerful current of 
suggestibility within 
suggestibility that 
(Scheingold, 1984: 44). 
the public when it comes 
can be easily exploited by 
to crime"--a 
politicians 
The seemingly intractable nature of the crime problem, 
coupled with increasing public concern because of the rising 
crime rates, has made crime a peculiarly frustrating policy 
problem for decision makers. Even more than in other policy 
areas, simple solutions are embraced with great enthusiasm, 
showered with attention and effort for a time, and then discarded 
amid bitter recriminations when the inevitable disappointment 
with the lack of clear-cut results sets in. The problem of 
overpromising and undersupporting also seems to be endemic to 
this policy area. 
There is a peculiar dilemma here. At times when crime is not 
highly visible as a political issue, the whole apparatus of crime 
control and processing of the accused and convicted falls into 
disrepair and neglect. The fairness or justice, which the 
system most basically is supposed to be engendering, becomes 
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increasingly problematical. At times when crime is highly visible 
on the political agenda, however, new problems take over. 
Increased resources for law enforcement bring the "dark figure" 
of unreported crime increasingly to light, thus making the 
increased enforcement efforts seem non-productive. The basic 
inhumanity and unfairness of the processing system receive 
greater attention and resources, but the lack of understanding of 
the causes of and solutions for crime as a social issue make 
these increased resources appear to be ineffective. The result 
is a trend toward punitiveness among policy makers, a punitive-
ness founded on feelings of frustration, anxiety, and loss of 
control. 
Politics and the Criminal Justice System 
One way to categorize the present situation in relation to 
politics and the criminal justice system would be to say that the 
country is going through a post-Progressive era in each of the 
components of the system: corrections, 
Post-Progressive means that a certain 
police, 
backlash 
and courts. 
against the 
reforms of the Progressive period in American life and politics, 
roughly the first fifty years of the Twentieth Century, is 
occurring and is resulting in renewed efforts to influence the 
system through political and public controls. 
The Progressive era, as it affected the workings of the crim-
inal justice system, was characterized by increasing reliance on 
bureaucratic solutions to policy problems. The effort was to 
downgrade politics, to emphasize the importance of training and 
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expertise, to make professionalism a rallying cry for increased 
responsibility for administrators. Concomitant with all this 
were also greater amounts of discretion delegated to the pro-
fessionals in the system. The Progressive philosophy worked 
itself out in diverse ways in the various components of the 
criminal justice system but was nevertheless evident in each one. 
Likewise, post-Progressivism has distinctive traits in each 
sector. 
In the correctional system the emphasis of Progressivism was 
on remedies tailored to the needs of individuals rather than on 
formal legal rules. The prototypical correctional structures 
were probation, parole, and juvenile courts. The essential faith 
of the Progressives was in the capability of the new disciplines 
of psychology and sociology to lead the way, not only to better 
understanding of offenders but also to better ways to deal with 
them. The vehicles for effecting these outcomes were bureau-
cratic structures in which well-trained individuals would prac-
tice the kind of discretion that would lead to individual 
programs of rehabilitation for each offender (Rothman, 1980; 
Ryerson, 1979). 
The reaction to the Progressive rehabilitative philosophy in 
corrections is well known by now. For the past fifteen years 
academics, legislators, and correctional personnel have been 
going through a major reappraisal of the goals, practices, and 
accomplishments of corrections in this country. The changes have 
emphasized greater political involvement in the system, chiefly 
through the passage of determinate sentencing laws but also 
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through legislative authorization of new prisons and through 
court initiatives on prison conditions. 
In law enforcement, although Progressivism was also manifest-
ed by a crusade to divorce the system from political control, it 
was a different kind of political control, that of big city 
machine politics that awarded police positions as a form of 
patronage and that winked at police corruption in exchange for 
police cooperation with machine goals. Progressive police 
reformers called for the kind of professionalism in which power 
was lodged predominantly in the chiefs of departments, and in 
which training, discipline, and impartiality in enforcing the law 
were stressed. This was not less a bureaucratic solution to 
policy problems but one in which discretion was designed to be 
lodged more obviously in the higher levels of the bureaucracy 
(Fogelson, 1977; Walker, 1979). 
Post-Progressivism in policing has been characterized by 
emphasis on closer ties between police and public and less social 
and occupational isolation and greater accountability of the 
police. A new professionalism, one which stresses responsible 
street-level discretionary behavior in tune to community service 
needs, is being fostered (Goldstein, 1977). 
Even 
reforms 
in the 
called 
field of court administration, 
for bureaucratic as opposed 
the Progressive 
to legalistic 
approaches to problems of delay, inefficiency, and political 
interference. The founding of the American Judicature Society, 
the development of an administrative office of the courts at the 
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federal level and then gradually in the states and the push 
toward unitary court systems within states, are all examples of 
these approaches. Again the problems were different from those 
faced by police and by corrections authorities, but the proposed 
solutions had in common the faith in merit, efficiency, and non-
political solutions to operating problems within the court 
system. 
Centralization and bureaucratization were not found to be 
cure-all s for the problems of the courts, however, which con-
tinued to be plagued by overcrowding, a sense of marginal dispen-
sation of justice, and alienation of offenders, victims, 
witnesses, and attorneys. As in the other two components of the 
criminal justice system, the recent trend in the courts has been 
toward greater accountability to the public. This has been mani-
fested by decentralization of administrative functions through 
the use of trial court administrators in some jurisdictions, 
through attempts to regularize the plea bargaining process, and 
through programs, such as victim-witness coordinator programs, 
and neighborhood justice centers aimed at decreasing alienation 
of the public and the participants in the system. 
In this dialectic of pre-Progressivism, Progressivism, and 
post-Progressivism, the talk of post-Progressivism seems prema-
ture to many professionals in the system who claim that the 
Progressive reforms themselves have not been implemented with any 
regularity or enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the post-Progressive era 
is characterized by the attempt to re-establish political 
accountability. As one of the papers in this volume explains, 
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however, a definite line is to be drawn between political 
accountability and political interference (Guyot). Post-
Progressivism is not meant to imply a return to corruption, 
political patronage, and usurpation of control of the system by 
politicians. Rather, it is meant to counter some of the effects 
of what are perceived as the irresponsible aspects of bureaucra-
tic discretion. 
The Literature of Politics, Crime, and Criminal Justice 
If post-Progressivism does in fact proclaim a greater politi-
cal responsibility of the criminal justice system, then a study 
is appropriate of the complex relationships between the actors in 
the various subsystems and political deci sian makers, including 
the public. To be sure, crime, as a major policy problem of 
federal, state, and local governments, 
ramifications. Until recent years, 
crime and criminal justice has been 
has always had political 
however, the politics of 
neglected as a field of 
scholarly endeavor. 
bably that, before 
At least one reason for this neglect is pro-
the advent of large numbers of multi-
disciplinary programs in criminal justice in the 1970s, criminal 
justice was not frequently taught or emphasized among political 
scientists, who would be those most likely to engage in such 
studies. Another reason may well be that research money until 
recently has gone largely into applied areas involving develop-
ment of base-line data and evaluation of experimental programs. 
The more basic, complex, and less controllable aspects of crimi-
nal justice policy gave way to projects that, at least in theory, 
were more amenable to results of some kind. 
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As the optimism of 
the early 1970s has given way to the frustrating realization that 
crime is a more intractable problem than had been thought by 
those who made criminal justice policy, the issue of the policy 
making process itself has come increasingly to the fore. 
This is not to say that research into the relations between 
politics and criminal justice had not been done before 1975. 
Varieties of Police Behavior, James Q. Wilson's study of the 
relation between political culture and style of policing, is an 
important example of such earlier work (Wilson, 1968). In the 
area of policing also, Leonard Ruchelman' s study of the rela-
tions between police and mayors in three cities was a noteworthy 
contribution as was Alarl Bent's study of politics and policing 
(Ruchelman, 1974; Bent, 1974). In the area of courts, Levin's 
study of political culture and judicial style is particularly 
interesting (Levin, 1977). Other works, especially those by 
historians, could be mentioned. (For a more complete summary and 
bibliography of political and criminal justice see Nagel, 
Fairchild, and Champagne ( 1983), especially the introductions to 
the various sections. 
In recent years, however, some large-scale, well-funded 
studies of the political correlates of criminal justice policy 
have appeared. At the state level, the studies of Berk and Rossi 
(1977) and of Berk, Brachman, and Lesser (1977) are noteworthy. 
Berk and Rossi used a survey method to probe state leadership 
opinion on prison reform in Washington, Illinois, and Florida. 
The fact that their research was done in the early 1970s may 
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appear to make dated their finding that the rehabilitative ideal 
has reasonably strong support among state legislators. In fact, 
the research described by Cullen et al. in the present volume 
suggests at least that legislators are not as single-minded in 
their values as might be supposed from the punitive nature of 
much recent criminal justice legislation. Berk, Brachman, and 
Lesser studied all changes in the criminal law in the state of 
California from 1960-1972. This complex study used content 
analysis, historical research, and interviews in order to develop 
a better understanding of the forces that influence the passage 
of particular laws. Their description of the cooperation among 
ostensibly competing groups and the minimal involvement of the 
public or of public opinion in the legislative process concerned 
with criminal law is based on the peculiarities of the situation 
in California. Nevertheless, it provides a benchmark for other 
studies of the law-making process in relation to criminal 
justice. 
At the urban level, the Governmental Responses to Crime 
project at Northwestern University intensively studied no less 
than ten major cities in order to develop a better understanding 
of the relation between local political cultures, local history, 
and criminal justice outcomes. This project concluded that the 
failure of crime policy is related to such factors as extreme 
fragmentation of the system, attempts to find local solutions to 
an essentially national problem, and lack of knowledge about suc-
cessful crime fighting techniques. In the meantime, responses to 
the crime problem appear to have been a factor in local politics 
in the cities studied. (Jacob, 1984). 
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Broad generalizations are impossible to make from the studies 
that have been done. No one ruling viewpoint appears to have 
developed unless it is that the policy making process in criminal 
justice is closely related to particulars of local political 
culture. In fact, one of the authors in this volume (Duffee) 
suggests just that: on the one hand, exemplary projects may not 
be replicable from one community to another, but, on the other 
hand, almost any project can work, given the political-social 
conditions hospitable to its development. 
In 
results 
any 
of 
case, more precise generalizations must await the 
further studies. 
policy areas like sentencing, 
Regional studies of particular 
for example, might prove fruitful 
in the search for more encompassing theory. One problem with the 
present literature in this field is that it tends to be specific 
to only one state or locality or else that the randomly chosen 
multiple jurisdictions have left out the possibility of finding 
strong regional regularities. 
The Contributions of this Volume 
The research described in this volume encompasses a sizeable 
number of jurisdictions and approaches to the study of politics, 
crime, and criminal justice through both single case studies and 
aggregate research. Because of the subject matter, almost half 
of the volume is concerned with legislative politics at the state 
and federal levels. In the area of institutional politics are 
three case studies, two on local politics and police and one on 
state politics and corrections. 
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The first chapter is an analysis of crime as an issue in 
American politics by Joel Rosch. Rosch argues that the ideologi-
cal parameters of the law and order debate were established in 
the latter 1960s and have determined the nature of the politics 
of crime and justice ever since. He concludes that this 
historical reality has not served well the needs of either the 
general public or the victims of crime. 
The second section of the volume is concerned with legisla-
tive politics. Albert Melone builds on his previous research on 
the American Bar Association and on federal criminal code reform 
to describe the nature of the intervention and influence prac-
ticed by the ABA in the passage of federal criminal law. Because 
of the wealth and prestige of its members, the ABA is a particu-
larly powerful interest group in the criminal justice field. One 
of the peculiarities of this policy field, however, is that the 
major interest groups in general are those of the professionals 
in the system: lawyers, police, judges, sheriffs, correctional 
personnel, etc. Clients of the system, such as offenders, 
victims, witnesses, and even the general public, are represented, 
if at all, by surrogate organizations such as the ACLU and 
various church groups. This makes for a certain imbalance in the 
competition for legislator attention. Melone's chapter provides 
valuable insight into the intricacies of interest articulation in 
relation to criminal law. 
Both Melone's chapter and the one by Cullen, Bynum, Greene, 
and Garrett challenge some stereotypes about the politics of 
criminal justice. 
of opinion among 
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Cullen et al. have found a greater diversity 
legislators than might be surmised from an 
examination of their voting records on criminal law. Melone says 
that the record of Congressional accordance with ABA preference 
on criminal code reform suggests a more mixed kind or degree of 
influence than presumed by those who think that the ABA has 
overwhelming influence in Congress. 
These two studies show that the ambiguities and complexities 
of power and influence in relation to criminal justice policy are 
in need of considerable research before a clearer understanding 
is gained of predictable patterns of behavior. 
The chapter by Anne Heinz relies on some of the data gathered 
for the Governmental Responses to Crime project for which she 
served as project director. Heinz is also building on the work 
in newspaper content analysis in the California study by Berk, 
Brachman, and Lesser. Her analysis of the nature of interest 
group involvement in criminal justice and the importance of 
newspaper opinion both as a lobbying and an agenda setting force 
is an important contribution to the development of knowledge in 
interest articulation in criminal justice. This study is 
thoroughly professional in its approach to social science as an 
increment~l science in which the findings of previous researchers 
are refined, explored further, or disproved. 
The final section of the volume turns to another form of 
criminal justice politics: the relation between ''outside'' poli-
tical forces and the bureaucratic entities that make up the 
system. 
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Two studies are included on the politics of police 
department operations plus a thought-provoking examination of the 
effect of politics on pre-release programs. David Duffee's case 
study of a Pennsylvania pre-release program and his comparison of 
it with those in several other states is rich in the development 
of the interplay between theory and practice. A disturbing 
aspect of his conclusion is that success or failure, or even the 
developing nature of a particular program, has a certain random 
quality. Nevertheless, Duffee himself sees at least typological 
regularities in the process and presents them in terms of types 
of programs and community political fields. 
If post-Progressivism involves a movement toward greater 
political accountability on the part of criminal justice agen-
cies, the line between accountability and interference becomes 
especially important if the excesses and corruptions of the 
pre-Progressive period are to be avoided. Dorothy Guyot makes an 
original and interesting contribution to the understanding of 
this border area in her case study of political attempts to 
influence the chief of one police department in the state of New 
York. Her case study is distinctive for its deve·lopment of the 
theory of accountability in relation to the ideas about evalua-
tion of police performance developed by Whitaker et al. in a 1980 
report. It is also distinctive because of her analysis of the 
relationships between the various facets of the evaluation model 
and the actual situation in Troy. 
Finally, Samuel Walker's case study of the Seattle police 
spying ordinance also tells something important about political 
accountability and criminal justice operations. 
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Walker makes 
clear that accountability cannot easily be based on coercion but 
depends upon a cooperative relationship between the parties 
involved. Walker also contributes to knowledge about a matter 
that is making headlines in other cities: official record 
keeping on non-criminal organizational or protest activities by 
citizens. The Seattle ordinance is an unusual attempt to assert 
public control over police activities through the use of an 
auditor of police case records. Walker shows the interplay of 
the elements of political ripeness, interest group involvement, 
general political culture, and institutional responsiveness in 
the successful development and implementation of political rule 
making for the regulation of a government agency. 
16 
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Introduction 
For two decades our nation has fought a "war on crime" and 
lost. Between 1968 and 1981 the federal government spent more 
than eight billion dollars on crime through the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act (L.E.A.A.), while state and local government spent 
twenty-five to thirty times more (Cronin et al., 1981). Despite 
these efforts fluctuations in crime rates still seem beyond the 
control of public policy. Gerald Chaplan, law school professor 
and former research director for L.E.A.A. summed up this failure 
in an article entitled "Losing the War on Crime" (in Cronin et 
al., 1981: 181). 
First, we have more crime than any other place in the 
world, more this year than last, and much, much more 
than we had in 1964 when Senator Goldwater became the 
first Presidential candidate to argue that the Federal 
government must do something about crime in the streets. 
Second, most of the increase occurred in the midst of 
high employment and unprecedented affluence and during a 
period when the Federal government launched a new, 
multi-billion dollar anti-crime program. 
Third, despite the persistent often clarion, calls for 
"law and order," no significant strengthening of the 
punitive or deterrence features of the criminal justice 
system took place during the past decade. 
Fourth, efforts 
causes of crime 
to understand better the 
have progressed little. 
underlying 
Even among 
19 
serious observers, the attachment 
explanations has been promiscuous, one 
to another in quick succession. 
to particular 
theory yielding 
Fifth, today virtually no one-- scholars, 
and politicians alike--dares to advance a 
promises to reduce crime substantially 
future. 
practitioners 
program which 
in the near 
A number of explanations have been offered for the failure of 
criminal justice policy. The explanations include the nature of 
crime itself (Erickson, 1966), a lack of resources and commitment 
(Reiman, 1979), weaknesses in American culture (Wilson, 1975; 
Cronin et al., 1980) and the nature of American federalism 
(Cronin, et al., 1981). Some blame stingy conservative legisla-
tures for failing to attack the "root causes" of crime (Zeisel, 
1982). Others blame liberal judges and liberal policies for 
handcuffing the police and weakening the moral bonds that used to 
restrain criminal behavior (Harris, 1970; Carrington, 1975). 
The argument of this paper is that the war on crime failed in 
part because of the way crime emerged on the American political 
agenda in the late 1960s and 1970s. What will be described as 
the "political scenario" associated with crime prevented the 
formation of coalitions to press for policies that might have 
addressed the problems faced by citizens most often victimized by 
crime. 
I 
While the issue of crime has long played a part in local 
politics in the U.S., it first began to occupy a significant 
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place in national politics during the mid 1960s (Jacob and 
Lineberry, 1982a:6). The 1964 presidential election was the 
first in which crime was a major issue on the national political 
agenda (Cronin et al., 1981; Baker, 1983). By 1968 law and 
order rhetoric had become a staple of conservative political 
campaigns. In that year it was used extensively by Richard Nixon 
in his successful presidential campaign (Baker, 1983: 38-40). 
Because street crime increased rapidly during this period the 
fact that crime became an important political issue is not 
surprising (Jacob and Lineberry, 1982a). What is curious is the 
way crime was used in political debate. 
Crime is something all groups in the political process are 
against. Conflict arises over what to do about crime and, more 
importantly for this paper, what the nature of the crime problem 
really is (Jacob and Lineberry, 1982a). Before 1960 crime 
itself was not a major concern of most citizens. For 1 i beral s 
who usually claim to speak for lower class groups, the problems 
of the criminal justice system have traditionally centered on 
concerns about due process of law and the rights of defendants 
rather than on crime control (Wilson, 1975; Stolz, 1983). 
Abuses in the criminal justice system are spoken of as the abuses 
of defendants• rights (Ryan, 1976). Discrimination is usually 
spoken of as the 
lower class groups. 
overzealous enforcement of the law against 
Prior to the 1960s when the amount of crime 
in society became a major political issue, the problem of how 
defendants were treated seemed more pressing than the problem of 
crime. 
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Since the progressive era liberal reformers have attempted to 
improve the criminal justice system by making sure the procedures 
used by the police, the courts, and corrections conformed to 
notions of fairness and due process of law. Progressive refor-
mers found gross inequalities in the workings of trial courts and 
local police agencies. Early empirical studies found evidence of 
systematic discrimination against lower class individuals and 
members of minority groups as well as evidence of widespread 
police brutality (Hofstadter, 1955; Rumble, 1968; Lowi, 1979; 
Green, 1961). 
In a series of court 
reformers called on the 
cases beginning in 
federal courts to 
the 1930s liberal 
ensure that local 
police and local courts gave equal protection to the rights of 
all defendants. After a long struggle the 1960s saw the Warren 
Court expanding federal standards of due process of law and 
applying these standards to local law enforcement agencies 
through the 14th Amendment (Baker, 1983). 
Liberals have treated the rights of defendants as if they 
were pure public goods. Giving people their rights has not been 
seen as involving zero-sum or inter-group conflict. Rights are 
not treated as if they were scarce in the sense that they have to 
be taken away from someone in order to give them to someone else. 
Expanding the rights of defendants was seen as benefiting the 
whole society without imposing costs on any particular group 
(Lowi, 1964, 1970, 1972). 
Liberals have seen crime itself as a function of failed 
social arrangements (Clark, 1970; Schur, 1969). Generations of 
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progressive criminologists have shown that crime was caused by 
poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and other aspects of 
American society. Crime was to be lowered by changes in social 
and economic policies. The idea that crime was caused by biolog-
ical or racial factors was seen as an especially dangerous one. 
If criminal activity was shown to be a natural characteristic of 
a particular group, that group might be singled out for discrim-
inatory treatment (Lindersmith and Levin, 1937). 
While there may not be enough public defenders, judges, or 
adequate jail space, liberals seek to ensure that specific 
groups, such as blacks or poor people, are not being systemati-
cally denied their rights. The challenge faced by the criminal 
justice system is to see that all of those accused of committing 
crimes are treated equally and according to due process of law. 
Opponents of the extension of due process traditionally made 
two kinds of arguments. The first was based on federalism. 
Criminal justice has traditionally been the province of local 
government. While the federal courts ought to protect citizens 
from gross and obvious violations of due process, the federal 
courts have no right to impose national standards on local law 
enforcement agencies (Harlan, 1968). 
The second argument was that the expansion of due process by 
the federal courts was imposing impossible burdens on local law 
enforcement agencies. Catching, trying, and convicting criminals 
was becoming too difficult. As long as crime remained relatively 
low, or at least was not perceived as a major social problem, the 
second argument did not attract as much attention as the first. 
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When crime began to become an important political issue in 
the 1960s, conservatives claimed that liberal policies were pre-
venting law enforcement agencies from protecting society from 
crime. Less attention was paid to questions of federalism and 
more was paid to questions about reducing crime. Conservatives 
eventually called for an increased federal role in fighting 
crime. 
For conservatives, debate about crime usually involves 
questions about scarce resources. Conservatives had tradition-
ally been more sympathetic to the idea that crime is an 
inevitable part of society and that some groups are more prone to 
crime than others (Lindersmith and Levin, 1937). If crime were 
natural to society, reducing crime could only occur by making 
catching and punishing criminals easier for law enforcement agen-
cies. Liberal policies, in particular those of the Warren Court, 
were said to protect the rights of defendants at the expense of 
everyone else. 
While conservative "law and order" campaigns proved to be 
vague about how to make people safer, they were filled with ''us" 
versus "them" rhetoric. A constant theme was one of giving 
government back to those who worked hard and paid their taxes 
(Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970). Stricter law enforcement would 
put the bad people behind bars and make the good people safe 
again. For conservatives, debate about crime involved questions 
of scarcity and group conflict. The issue of crime became one of 
whose interests were being served--those inclined to break the 
law or those who obey it. 
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Liberals talked about equality but only as it applied to 
defendants. 
would be 
Their fear was that a particular group of defendants 
treated unequally because of either prejudice or 
incorrect notions about the causes of crime. Equity questions 
were not applied to the victims of crime, except insofar as some 
criminals were spoken of as the "real victims" (Ryan, 1976). 
For conservatives, the issue of crime did not involve 
questions about equity. Instead, the focus was on making the 
society as a whole safer. Those who spoke about equity for 
defendants were seen as protecting those who broke the law. The 
problem faced by the criminal justice system was to re-establish 
a proper balance between a few bad people and the rest of 
society. Conservatives spoke about victims but the victim was 
society as a whole. No equity questions were raised about how 
any particular groups were treated, either as victims or 
defendants. 
II 
The problems of the criminal justice system in the 1960s and 
1970s, however, transcended the admittedly major difficulties 
faced by lower class defendants. There was also too much crime, 
and the burden of that crime fell disproportionately on the poor 
and on members of minority groups (Gurr, 1982). While poor 
defendants may have been denied their rights, the vast majority 
of law abiding poor people were not given adequate protection 
from crime (Wilson, 1975). 
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The degree to which the poor and members of minority groups 
suffer unequally from crime is staggering. Herbert Packer 
estimated that the urban poor were 100 times more likely to be 
the victims of violent crimes than suburbanites. Blacks as a 
group are about 12% of the population but are 55% of the murder 
victims (Carrington, 1975). In 1970, murder was the fourth 
leading cause of death among black males. 
Victimization surveys show that for all serious crimes, 
blacks report a higher rate of victimization than whites, people 
with incomes below $3,000 a greater rate than those with incomes 
above $3,000, and the unemployed two or three times the rate of 
those employed (Platt, 1981). Blacks suffer aggravated assault 
at twice the rates whites do and are twice as likely to be 
robbed. Among those robbed, twice as many blacks are injured and 
three times as many suffer serious injuries, according to the 
U.s. Department of Justice ( 1976). While violent crime in the 
U.S. went up 336% from 1965 to 1974 (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), 
according to Ted Robert Gurr, the rate at which white Americans 
were victimized remained relatively constant. There is good evi-
dence to believe that almost all the increase in murder and 
aggravated assault was experienced by black Americans (Gurr, 
1982). 
Poor people and members of minority groups clearly understood 
the degree to which they suffered unequally from crime (Scammon 
and Wattenberg, 1970). In a 1974 survey, 66% of all blacks and 
64% of those earning under $10,000 1 i sted crime as the problem 
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they would most want to see government address (Burnham, 1974). 
Even more than whites, blacks felt that more should be done to 
punish those who broke the law (Fowler, 1974). Regardless of 
race or class, crime is the issue where the greatest agreement 
occurs that more government action is appropriate and necessary 
(Burnham et al., 1974; Saunders, 1976; Brown, 1972). While 
liberals worried about the rights of defendants and conservatives 
spoke about the overall level of crime and disorder in society, 
the greatest cause of dissatisfaction with the criminal justice 
system among poor people and members of minority groups was the 
belief that their lives and property did not receive the same 
protection given to upper class groups (Campbell et al., 1976; 
Anton and Bowen, 1976; Jacob, 1971; Jacob, 1972). 
While a reduction in crime would have been in the interests 
of the lower classes, maybe equally important would have been a 
change in what Lance Bennett ( 1975:23-25; ( n. d.): 35-41) has 
called the "political scenario" associated with crime. 
Political scenarios dictate how bits of information fit 
together which bits are more significant than others, 
and which bits should be included in or excluded from a 
satisfactory conceptualization of the issue. 
We should not take the perceptual power of contextuali-
zation lightly. The ability to locate "scenic 
containers" which establish preferred configurations of 
these terms is the cornerstone of political success. 
While groups are generally expected to act in their own 
interests, how people came to understand their interests can be 
influenced by the way events takes on meaning in the course of 
political debate (Carson, 1974). To understand the anti-crime 
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policies that come out of the "war on crime," an understanding is 
necessary of how the political scenario associated with crime was 
constructed. 
III 
Barry Goldwater first used the issue of crime in the 1964 
political campaign at the urging of Richard Kleindienst (Baker, 
1983). Kleindienst and other Goldwater strategists understood 
that crime could symbolize more than people being robbed or 
assaulted. They believed that the crime issue would enable them 
to speak to the general feeling many Americans had about the 
growing disorder and perceived anarchy in American society 
(Baker, 1983). When Goldwater spoke about ''crime,'' he spoke about 
general social unrest, a permissive court, and a deteriorating 
society. He did not speak about programs to reduce the number of 
murders or robberies. He did not speak about who was victimized 
by crime. Goldwater's campaign strategists hoped to portray 
their candidate as someone who, by being tough on crime, would 
put an end to the growing chaos in American society (Cronin et 
al., 1981). This pitch was directed mostly at "middle American" 
and especially suburban voters (Cronin et al., 1981; Baker, 
1983). 
The Kerner Commission later showed that crime, civil rights, 
urban riots, and political protests were all bound together in 
the public mind. Commenting about 1964, Liva Baker (1983: 42) 
notes: " . . race and crime were often scrambled in the public 
mind, their common denominator, fear--fear of being mugged on a 
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street corner and fear of being mugged economically by the 
newcomer in the labor market." Whether Goldwater intended to use 
the public's growing concern about crime and disorder against 
those interested in civil rights, civil rights leaders came to 
understand the call for "law and order" as a call for an end to 
progress in civil rights (Cronin et al., 1981). The head of the 
N.A.A.C.P. feared the "law and order" campaigns enough to call 
for a moratorium on demonstrations during the 1964 elections 
(Cronin et al., 1981). While Goldwater lost the 1964 presiden-
tial election, he succeeded in setting the scene for debate about 
crime. During this period the issue of crime became closely 
associated with civil rights, 
and a general feeling about 
1982a). 
urban riots, life style changes, 
disorder (Jacob and Lineberry, 
The Democratic candidate, and landslide winner in the 1964 
presidential elections, Lyndon Johnson, understood Goldwater's 
use of the crime issue as a traditional conservative objection to 
the courts imposition of national standards of due process on 
local law enforcement agencies as well as an attack on progress 
made in the field of civil rights (Cronin et al., 1981). 
Consistent with traditional liberal beliefs, Johnson was uncom-
fortable with arguments about law enforcement policies designed 
to reduce crime. He preferred to talk about social programs that 
would attack the "root causes" of crime. Johnson believed that 
his "war on poverty" was the most effective way to fight crime 
(Cronin et al., 1981). When he did talk about crime, he advo-
cated programs such as increased funds for the police and more 
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training for other criminal justice workers. Johnson did not, 
however, pay as much attention to crime as Goldwater did (Baker, 
1983). 
After the 1964 election, anti-war protests, controversial 
Supreme Court decisions, and the increase in urban disorders kept 
the issue of crime (as Goldwater had defined it) a central issue 
in American politics. Between 1965 and 1967 over 100 cities 
experienced urban disorders. In 1966 the Miranda decision was 
portrayed in most popular accounts as tying the hands of law 
enforcement by allowing the guilty to go free on technicalities. 
George Wallace pointed out that the same Supreme Court that had 
ordered integration and encouraged civil rights protests was now 
bending over backward to help criminals. Wallace constantly 
raised the law and order issue in the period before the 1968 pre-
sidential elections, always linking crime with anti-war protests, 
civil rights, the Supreme Court, and liberal social programs 
(Baker, 1983; Cronin et al., 1981). 
Crime also rose dramatically, and by 1968 offenses against 
persons showed a 106% increase from 1960 (Scammon and Wattenberg, 
1970). More importantly, by 1968 over 75% of the U.S. public 
believed that law and order had broken down and that a new presi-
dent could do something about the problem (Scammon and 
Wattenberg, 1970). The effects of crime were felt most directly 
by the lower classes and especially by those living in older 
declining cities, the traditional constituency of the Democratic 
party (Jacob and Lineberry, 1982b). The Democrats continued to 
respond to the crime issue as they had in the past, advocating 
30 
programs aimed at issues such as housing, education, and discrim-
ination. While those programs may have addressed the "root 
causes" of crime, they seemed to favor those groups Goldwater, 
and later Nixon and Wallace, blamed for the breakdown of order. 
While the rise in the crime rate became most visible at the 
same time that civil rights protests were also attracting more 
attention, little evidence has been found that civil rights 
activity led to increased crime. All the evidence points in the 
other direction. Cities that had civil rights activity usually 
experienced a drop in crime during and after the protest (Fredric 
Soloman et al., 1980). However, the same news reports that 
carried stories about civil rights activity also documented the 
rise in crime (Jacob and Lineberry, 1982a; Cronin et al., 1981). 
Crime was seen as the number one problem facing America by 
48% of the population in 1965 and 63% in 1968 (Cronin et al., 
1981). Public opinion polls showed that political assassina-
tions, urban riots, civil rights protests, and anti-war protests 
were closely associated with the idea that crime was rising (even 
when it was not). Even if these events occurred thousands of 
miles away, they led people in communities that had little crime 
to become concerned about it (Rhodes, 1977). During the 1968 
presidential campaign, both George Wallace and Richard Nixon made 
"law and order" a central theme in their campaigns. While Nixon 
tried to distance himself from Wallace's harsh rhetoric linking 
crime and race, he understood that the issues were fused in the 
public mind (Cronin et al., 1981). Nixon promised to do 
something about ''crime in the streets." Like Goldwater, his cam-
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paign was pitched to suburban voters and the middle class 
Americans, the people least likely to be victimized (Cronin et 
al., 1981). In political debate, being against crime meant you 
were against the kind of people who created disorder. 
The Democrats were never able to use the crime issue as well 
as the Republicans. The various commissions appointed by Lyndon 
Johnson to look at crime focused most of their attention on "root 
causes," and, except for advocating better training for law 
enforcement officials, offered no clear solutions to the problem 
of crime (Cronin et al., 1981). They reflected what Nixon and 
Wallace were to characterize as an undue concern for the criminal 
(Sol tz, 1983). Wallace and Nixon focused on specific villains 
such as the Warren Court, a weak attorney general, and civil 
rights and anti-war protesters (Cronin et al., 1981). 
By the end of the 1960s, 81% of the public believed that law 
and order had broken down and that Communists and blacks who 
started riots were the causes of the breakdown (Cronin et al., 
1981). Civil rights marches and urban disorder increased the 
public's concern with crime (Jacob and Lineberry, 1982a). When 
crime was debated, it was more likely to be associated with 
"social issues" like school desegregation, race and ethnic rela-
tions. and civil disorders than with questions about the distri-
bution of other urban services like housing~ transportation, 
education, urban redevelopment, or even more germane topics such 
as how to deploy the police (Jacob and Lineberry, 1982a). 
In The Real Majority Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) show how 
effectively conservative politicians used the crime issue in 
3·2 
national and local elections in 1968 and 1969. Those who argued 
for law and order rarely made specific proposals about how to 
reduce crime. When they talked about crime, they talked about 
the Warren Court, political demonstrations, the youth culture, 
and a host of other social issues. Those who used the law and 
order issue attracted votes from suburban and middle neighbor-
hoods that had relatively little crime. They were able to win 
elections on the crime issue without having to talk about what 
they would do to increase the safety of those most often vic-
timized by crime (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970). 
Former Attorney General Katzenbach has argued that even if we 
had had no civil rights revolutions, no Vietnam War, no furor 
about free speech, and no Warren court, we still would have had a 
crime problem in the 1960s (Cronin et al., 1981). Most studies 
of the 
(Wilson, 
growth 
1975). 
of crime 
These 
bear out Katzenbach's observations 
events, however, did occur. They 
occurred, even as the problem of crime emerged on the national 
political agenda. Consequently, they became fused with crime in 
the public mind. They did not cause the rising crime rate, but 
they did create a political scenario that determined the way the 
problem of crime would be debated. 
IV 
Those who used the crime issue most successfully in the 1960s 
and 1970 created a political scenario where showing concern about 
crime was equated with concern about the disorder that charac-
terized that period. Crime rose, but disorder was associated 
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with civil rights, demonstrations, urban riots, and anti-war pro-
tests. While little of this disorder had to do with rise of 
murder, assault, rape, and burglary, 
fear that crime was rising (Rhodes, 
1982a). 
it contributed to people's 
1977; Jacob and Lineberry, 
How are we to understand the way crime was used in political 
campaigns? Better and fairer law enforcement could have been 
debated as a need shared by all groups in society, especially the 
poor and members of minority groups. Instead crime became an 
issue where, as James Q. Wilson (1975:81) has observed: " 
It became impossible to construct a political strategy that 
rested on finding what problems blacks and whites had in common. 
Politics, under the 'white racism' doctrine, became a zero-sum 
game--anything blacks win, whites must lose, and vice versa." 
Crime was conceptualized as an issue that involved conflict 
between those who created disorder and those who did not. Being 
against crime in the street came to mean that a politic ian was 
appealing to middle-class white voters. An anti-crime stance was 
perceived as an anti-black bias. Lower class groups voted 
against "law and order" candidates despite the fact that they 
could have benefitted the most from real reductions in crime 
(Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970). 
The crime issue had become a symbol that evoked a series of 
images. The dominant ones included the urban rioter, the civil 
rights activist, the anti-war protester, and the welfare cheat as 
well as the mugger. The courts seemed to handcuff the police, 
and liberal do-gooders seemed to coddle criminals. 
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Society 
appeared to do more and more for the criminal types and less and 
less for hard-working people who obeyed the laws. The liberal 
image of the poor defendant being denied his rights gave rise to 
less anger and political movement than the conservative picture 
of society's favoring those who created disorder over those who 
obeyed the law. For those who had the most to gain from real 
reductions in crime, neither scenario addressed the issue of 
making them safer. 
The way in which the "political scenario" of crime developed 
resulted in a discontinuity between what John Gusfield (1963) has 
called symbolic and instrumental interests of those most often 
victimized by crime. Symbolic politics is concerned with status 
and public affirmations that a particular group is right or 
morally correct (Gusfield, 1963:23). He states, "The fact of 
political victory against the enemy shows where social and polit-
ical dominances lie. The legislative victory, whatever its 
factual consequences, confers respect and approval on its 
supporters." For first Goldwater, and later Wallace and Nixon, 
being against crime meant giving the country back to the "silent 
majority" who did not riot, prate st, or break the law. The 
appeal to "law and order" and crime control, being so closely 
linked to issues of life style, was a way of telling one group of 
Americans that they were right and that the others were wrong. 
Instrumental politics refers to the allocation of material 
resources or the distribution of burdens and benefits in society. 
The heavy burden of the rise in crime during this period fell as 
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it always had on the poor and members of minority groups. The 
interests of lower class groups would have been served better by 
policies that reduced crime. 
Expanding on Gusfield's analysis, John Carson (1974) has 
argued that most public policy questions contain both symbolic 
and material aspects. 
symbolic and material 
A divergence can exist between a group's 
interests (Carson, 1974). Groups with 
similar instrumental goals may find themselves at odds because of 
the way issues take on meanings in public debate (Carson, 1974). 
Understanding the interactions between symbolic and instrumental 
aspects of political campaigns can provide insight into the out-
come of struggles over legislation. 
Law and order politics became symbolic of status politics in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The issue of crime became a debate over 
whom the law served rather than how to reduce crime. The direct 
material benefits that the largely white middle income voters 
derived from the specific policies toward crime advocated by 
Goldwater, Nixon, and Wallace were marginal at best (Harris, 
1970). Arresting demonstrators, narrowing the scope of the 
Miranda decision, and increasing the use of wiretaps have had 
little impact on either crime or the fear of crime (Harris, 1970; 
Forst, 1983). 
Crime rose but those who argued for law and order promised 
little in the way of protection from crime. Instead they offered 
policies that would, in Gusfield's words, "show where social and 
political dominance lie" (Gusfield, 1963:22). The victory of law 
and order candidates was " .symbolic of the status and power 
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of the cultures opposing each other. Legal affirmation or rejec-
tion is thus important in what it symbolizes as well or instead 
of what it controls. Even if the law was broken, it was clear 
whose law it was" (Gusfield, 1963: 67). 
For over a decade, however, the people who responded to law 
and order campaigns had seen young people and black people flaunt 
the law and traditional values. Government seemed to listen to 
those who protested and broke the law. The courts had taken 
prayer out of the schools, ordered children to be bussed, and was 
preoccupied with the rights of those who broke the law. It was 
time for the law to respond to the "good people." 
The instrumental goals of those whose candidates lost to "law 
and order" candidates, however, would have been served by poli-
cies that really established law and order. The needs of those 
who would have benefited the most from programs to reduce crime 
were not served by the way the crime issue was used in political 
campaigns. To raise the crime issue came to mean that a person 
was anti-black or anti-poor. Policies that might actually reduce 
crime in areas where people were victimized the most became next 
to impossible to develop (\o/ilson, 1983). By understanding how 
the issue of crime emerged in public debate, it becomes easier to 
understand why the policies that came out of law and order cam-
paigns had little impact on crime. 
v 
Few people disagree that the billions spent on crime by the 
federal government in response to the "law and order" campaigns 
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of the 1960s and 1970s had little impact (Cronin et al., 1981). 
A large part of this money was spent on police hardware to 
contain riots as well as training for police officers on how to 
respond to urban disorders. Where liberal policies prevailed, 
police were sent to college, better representation was given to 
defendants, and prisons were made more humane. Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s public expenditures on crime were more responsive 
to protest and urban riots than to increases in crime (Cronin et 
al., 1981). Neither the conservative interest in order nor the 
liberal concern with the rights of defendants had much of an 
impact on the problem of crime, especially as it was experienced 
by the poor. 
Debate about crime in the 1980s showed more concern about 
victims. In part this was due to the women's movement and 
heightened concern about victims of rape (Platt, 1981; Cronin et 
al., 1981). Recent research on victimization has increased 
awareness of the degree to which lower class people suffer 
disproportionately from crime (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Black 
elected officials have come to see the irony of past debates 
about crime. Newark Mayor Kenneth Gibson has noted, "The same 
people who used to campaign against strong law and order 
measures, perceiving them as a racial thing, now are actively 
petitioning City Hall for more police protection and stiffer 
penalties (in Cronin et al., 1981:119). As long as law and order 
was associated with 
lifestyle and public 
lower classes could 
Lineberry, 1982a). 
the "racial thing" and issues such as 
order, those who claimed to speak for the 
not use the issue of crime (Jacob and 
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Changing the political scenario in which crime is debated by 
no means guarantees the formation of effective anti-crime policy. 
Reducing crime is difficult. "Root causes" do not seem amenable 
to liberal social programs. Evidence is scarce that taking the 
"handcuffs" off the police and building more and bigger prisons 
will reduce crime (Wilson, 1983; Scheingold, 1983; Merry, 1981). 
The aging of the U.S. population appears to have had more of an 
impact on the crime rate than two decades of government programs 
(Blumstein, 1981). 
The most promising programs for combatting crime seem to 
involve getting citizens involved in the criminal justice pro-
cess, working with police, prosecutors, and members of their own 
communities (Muray, 1983; Hirsch, 1983; Sherman, 1983; Merry, 
1981). James Q. Wilson and George Kelling argue for programs 
that involve creating more direct contact between the police and 
law abiding citizens in high crime areas (Wilson and Kelling, 
1982). Another leading authority on American policing has gone 
so far as to argue that the police should see community 
organizing as one of their prime responsibilities (Sherman, 
1983). The poor and members of minority groups, the most likely 
victims of crime, have proven, however, to be the hardest to 
mobilize and involve in the criminal justice process (Rohe and 
Greenberg, 1984; Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams, 1984). While 
the interests of these groups would be served by real reductions 
in crime, they have had good reasons to suspect the intent of 
those who traditionally advocated ''law and order." 
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Equality has, however, proven to be a powerful symbol in 
American politics. The demand for crime control could be posed 
as a demand for social justice. An alterntive political scenario 
could unite traditional liberal ideas about equality with the 
real need people have to be protected. Like other public ser-
vices, protection from crime could be debated as a public good to 
which all citizens ought to have an equal claim. There is no 
evidence that this kind of demand would be incompatible with pro-
tecting the rights of the accused. A movement to bring about 
equal protection from crime should be appealing to those 
interested in reducing crime. 
Changing the terms of debate about crime offers no solution 
to the problem of crime. However, debating the crime issue in 
terms of how to deliver criminal justice services equally and 
effectively may make development and implementation of programs 
that reduce crime easier. 
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Despite considerable scholarly attention directed toward 
criminal justice over the last two decades, relatively little 
literature is available that investigates the legislative roles 
of interest groups in the enactment of criminal laws (Fairchild, 
1981). This is the case for both divisions of the federal system 
but especially at the national level. A previous study identi-
fied twelve groups, including the American Bar Association (ABA), 
which recurrently appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
during the 1970s offering testimony on various ill-fated legisla-
tive proposals to reform the United States Criminal Code (Melone 
and Slagter, 198 3) . Though useful in identifying what might be 
stipulated as a working criminal justice elite, the study did not 
offer sufficient insight into the dynamics of criminal law policy 
making. This paper is an attempt to remedy the shortcoming by 
concentrating on a particular interest group. 
In general, seminal thinkers such as Weber (in Gerth and 
Mills, 1946: 85), Durkheim (1958: 7-8), and Tocqueville (1945: 
275-276), admonish their readers to ponder the crucial or strate-
gic position enjoyed by attorneys in the making of public policy. 
Lawyer ubiquity in positions of political prominence is well-
documented, and conventional wisdom supports the widespread 
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observation that lawyers exercise considerable influence in a 
variety of policy making settings. In addition to generalized 
lawyer influence, the ABA is the foremost nationwide attorney 
organization possessing high status, effective organization, and 
skilled leadership. Together these salient characteristics 
establish the necessary pre-conditions for an influential or 
powerful interest group. Besides illustrating how status, 
organization, and leadership were employed, a case will be made 
that in fact the association was able to achieve many of its 
criminal code policy goals. 
The basic data for this chapter were gathered in the same 
manner as the earlier macro-focused study (Melone and Slagter, 
1983: 44-45). This involved a careful analysis of the testimony 
offered by the ABA during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on 
the Brown Commission Report (1971), S. 1 (1973), S. 1400 (1973), 
S. 1 (1975), s. 1437 (1977), S. 1722 (1979), and S. 1723 (1979). 
Because official printed congressional hearings are not uniformly 
available, testimony on code reform proposals introduced since 
1979 is not analyzed. In any event, sufficient information is 
available for the 1970s period to discover patterns and to adduce 
generalizations. The American Bar Association Reports and other 
association publications are also referenced to analyze internal 
group politics and other interactions. 
II. Policy and Access 
Ordinarily crime brings to mind murder, rape, robbery, and 
other violent behavior, but the regulation of business activity 
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deemed anti-social may be processed through the criminal justice 
system as well. Because a criminal code is a massive document, 
most interested parties probably would concern themselves with a 
few selected provisions. However, the ABA is no ordinary 
interest group. From the initial congressional testimony on code 
revision in 1971 to its final testimony in 1979, association 
representatives testified on a wide range of controversial pro-
visions. 
As might be expected, the ABA testified on such recognizable 
criminal code matters as criminal sentencing, probation, insanity 
defenses, death penalty, and bail jumping. Yet its testimony 
went far beyond those aspects of criminal law that typically 
affect low status criminal offenders. As a matter of fact, it 
was not the ABA' s Section on Criminal Law that offered initial 
testimony before the Sentate Judiciary Committee on code reform. 
Rather, business-oriented sections were the first to offer 
congressional testimony, and, indeed, these business-oriented 
sections offered repeated testimony over the years. 
Representatives of the Section on Corporation, Banking and 
Business Law, the Section on taxation, and later the Section on 
Antitrust gave extensive, detailed, well-researched, and cogent 
criticisms of various code proposals. Representatives from 
the Criminal Law Section and Section on Criminal Justice also 
gave 
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extensive testimony. Yet, the testimony of the criminal 
experts--though well-researched and presented--consumed a 
smaller fraction of testimony presented by the business-oriented 
sections. 
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Responding to specific problems, Congress wrote the criminal 
law in piecemeal fashion. This ad hoc approach to the Criminal 
Code has led to inconsistency, ambiguity, obsoleteness, and con-
fusing laws and criminal procedures. To remedy these problems, 
in 1966 Congress established the Commission on Reform of the 
Federal Criminal Code. The commission was headed by former 
California Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown and was composed of 
members of the House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and 
distinguished judges and attorneys. A fourteen-member advisory 
committee chaired by former United States Supreme Court Associate 
Justice Tom C. Clark assisted the commission. In addition, the 
commission had a highly competent professional staff. After four 
years of toil, in 1971 the commission submitted its report to 
President Nixon, who hailed the report as a " broad compre-
hensive framework in which to decide the issues involved in 
reform of the Federal Criminal Code" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 
1971: 5). 
Governor Brown and the Senate Judiciary Committee leadership 
viewed the commission's report in the same light as President 
Nixon did. They insisted that the report must be treated as 
a working proposal and not as an unalterable document (USGS, 
1971: 2, 15, 96). Yet reform proponents maintained that the 
Brown Report contained four essential features that should be 
maintained. Senator John McClellan, former Brown Commission 
member and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit tee, insisted 
that the rejection of any one of the four essential features 
would require a wholesale rewriting of the Brown reform proposal 
(USGS, 1971: 34). Two 
Senator McClellan termed 
and, indeed, subsequent 
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of the four features, or premises as 
them, were immediately con trover sial, 
bills modified or dropped the Brown 
Commission's recommendations on the treatment of federal juris-
diction and on the technique of grading. Subsequent bills intro-
duced in Congress between 1973 and 1979 may be viewed as 
responses to interest group criticism first heard with respect to 
the Brown Report. 
From the outset the ABA was actively interested and involved 
in the Brown Report and subsequent legislative proposals. Four 
manifestations of this interest and involvement merit attention. 
First, the staff director of the Brown Commission was assisted by 
Richard A. Green, project director of the ABA Standards of 
Criminal Justice. Second, when the Brown Commission published 
its study draft of its proposed code in June, 1970, the ABA 
Section on Criminal Law appointed three ad hoc committees to 
analyze the three major divisions of the study. Thus, one year 
before the commission made its final report a section of the 
association was busily studying the proposal. Two other points 
are significant. In the third place, these ad hoc ABA committees 
were linked with decision making centers of power. The ABA 
Section on Criminal Law reported to the association that it had 
established a working relationship with the United States 
Department of Justice and with the staff of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee (ABA, 1972: 786). Finally, at its 1971 annual 
meeting the ABA House of Delegates gave its endorsement to the 
principles underlying Brown Commission Report. It declared that 
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the report should serve as a working basis for legislative 
restructuring of the criminal code. Additionally, in 1971 the 
House of Delegates authorized the Section on Criminal Law to 
assist the executive and legislative branches of government to 
develop specific code reform legislation and to coordinate the 
assistance of those other ABA sections interested in 6ode reform. 
The procedure essentially required that advanced copies of testi-
mony be circulated to association officers and to the chairmen of 
the sections of the association having an interest 
code reform (ABA, 1972: 520-523). 
A. High Status and Group Effectiveness 
ABA recommendations are undoubtedly treated by 
actors with extraordinary deference. The fact 
in criminal 
legislative 
is that ABA 
representatives are high status lawyers often having high status 
individuals and organizations for clients. Many leaders, defined 
as members of the ABA's Board of Governors and House of 
Delegates, are associated with large private law firms with some 
of the most successful business enterprises in America for 
clients. For example, in 1975 60% of ABA leaders were associated 
with firms as large as nine or more (Melone, 1983: 695) as com-
pared to about 50% of all lawyers who are individual prac-
titioners (Curran, 1983: 4). Most of these ABA leaders list 
corporation or corporate finance among their specialties and 
less than 2% of them list criminal law, family law, debt collec-
tion, or other low-status specializations. Those leaders had a 
significant 34% of Fortune Magazine's top 500 industrial corpora-
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tions for clients (Melone, 1983: 694-695). The association's 
high status is a result of its performance over the years as an 
organization that is well-prepared and very helpful to the 
Congress. Consider one such example. 
Professor Emeritus Livingston Hall of the Harvard Law School 
and chairman of the ABA Committee on Reform of the Federal 
Criminal Law gave extensive testimony on its November, 1972 
written statement. He concentrated on the association's views 
of appellate review of sentences and how S. 1 should be made to 
conform to existing ABA standards (USGS, 1973a: 5364-5373). On 
June 12, 1973 this same ABA spokesman offered testimony on 
twenty-one distinct and parallel aspects of S. 1 and S. 1400. 
On such diverse issues ranging from federal jurisdiction 
to the definition of conspiracy (USGS, 1973c: 5818-5825) an 
examination of Professor Hall's testimony reveals that ABA recom-
mendations were accepted on 40.5% of the provisions found in the 
two bills, partially accepted in 11.9% of the cases, and 
rejected or not followed in 47.6% of the provisions. These 
figures would be more meaningful if they could be compared with 
success rates of other interest groups. Nevertheless, the ABA 
clearly does keep score. As Hall put it in his concluding 
remarks: " .. our committee believes that its work . .. was 
well worth the time and effort that it spent, because we are very 
pleased to see that a substantial number of our recommendations 
have been adopted in both bills" (USGS, 1973c: 5825). Members 
of Congress also viewed ABA approval as desirable. Senator Roman 
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Hruska (R. Neb.), co-sponsor of S. 1 and ranking minority member 
of the Senate subcommittee holding hearings on S; 1 and S. 1400, 
said to Professor Hall, "We are gratified at the number of 
instances when we conform to your recommendations of today. We 
will take under advisement those instances where we have not 
COnformed II (USGS 1 197 3C: 5825) • 
B. Organization and Group Effectiveness 
The ABA is organized in such a fashion that it can muster 
with relative ease outstanding expert opinion on a wide variety 
of criminal law topics. Subject specialists in antitrust, tax-
ation, corporation, business, banking, and international law, as 
well as criminal law and criminal justice, studied and made care-
fully worded recommendations to Congress on code revision. This 
was possible because the association is organized in part around 
standing committees called sections. The sections conduct 
meetings, study laws of interest, and a number have their own 
journals. Consequently, subject specialists come together regu-
larly to communicate with one another and to offer recommen-
dations on changes in the law that the association as a body 
should endorse. In the case of criminal code revision, recommen-
dations were often sifted through ad hoc and standing committees, 
then further discussed and debated in section councils, and, on 
occasion, debated and amended again by the House of Delegates, 
the ABA's chief policy making body. Given the expertise 
available through its organizational structure, it is little 
wonder that ABA recommendations were treated with great respect. 
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Consider two examples of the results of this organization. One 
such instance is provided by Mac Asbill, Jr., chairman of the 
14,000 member ABA Section on Taxation. His testimony illustrates 
how subject experts are capable of raising difficult questions, 
making others seem less than fully competent. 
The Brown proposed code would have shifted some tax crimes 
from the Internal Revenue Code to Title 18, the Criminal Code. 
According to Asbill, what would happen to those existing tax 
crimes not so shifted was not clear. For example, what would 
happen to Section 7203 relating to the willful failure to pay, 
keep records, or supply information? Would those provisions be 
repealed or would they remain as law under Title 26--the Tax 
Code? Until a satisfactory answer to this question was given, 
it would be impossible, argued Asbill, to ascertain whether the 
proposed new code would create gaps or inconsistent and 
overlapping provisions in the law (USCS, 1972: 1679). 
His initial point was one of draftsmanship. However, Asbill 
went on to argue that, whether intentional or not, many changes 
in the tax law were included in the proposed code and the 
Congress should be fully aware of such changes (USCS, 1972: 
1682) • 
Asbill questioned the Brown Commission's clarity of thought 
because it dropped deficiency as a requirement for criminal 
liability. Currently, a substantial deficiency due to fraud must 
exist in order for a person to be found guilty of tax evasion, 
but deficiency need not be a required element under the proposed 
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code. Thus, a person might be branded a tax evader if, in fact, 
he evaded no tax and reported the amount of tax actually due. 
This paradox arose because presently the willful filing of a tax 
return that is known to be false as to a material matter, though 
it is not tax evasion, is a felony even if no tax is owed. Under 
the Brown recommendations that offense, absent a deficiency, 
would become a Class A misdemeanor. This would have been so 
because under the proposed code a deficiency must be present for 
felony treatment. In rhetorical fashion Asbill asked whether the 
downgrading of the offense was really intended. He went on to 
question other provisions raising 
tended consequences (uses, 1972: 
similar queries about unin-
1683-1684) and by implication, 
the thoughtfulness of the Brown Report itself. 
Testimony was not limited to pointing out unintended con-
sequences. At one point Asbill raised a question of elementary 
logic. The Internal Revenue Code provided that all tax evasions 
are felonies, subject to the requirement of a substantial 
deficiency due to fraud. However, the proposed code would grade 
the crime of tax evasion according to the size of the 
deficiency. So, for example, if the tax deficiency exceeds $500, 
the crime is a felony; if the deficiency is $500 or less, the 
crime is a misdemeanor. Yet, the exact amount of the tax defi-
ciency in most instances cannot be known until the facts are 
established in court. Consequently, no one can know whether the 
crime would be either a felony or a misdemeanor until the trial 
is complete and the amount of the tax deficiency is, as a matter 
of law, determined (USCS, 1972: 
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1685). This logical difficulty 
in turn raises at least three serious procedural problems. 
First, should the government prosecutor proceed by way of infor-
mation or indictment? Second, how many challenges is each party 
entitled to during the course of empaneling a jury? Lastly, 
there would be no prior way to know which statute of limitations 
is applicable because, under the Brown proposal, the limitation 
period would be three years for a misdemeanor and five years for 
a felony (Uses 1972: 1685). 
At least seven other features of the proposed code were 
assailed further by Asbill. He concluded in a manner typical of 
ABA representatives. The ABA tax expert testified that his sec-
tion was anxious to work on the inside of the legislative system. 
Asbill said, "We would consider it a privilege to be called upon 
to assist the subcommittee [Criminal Laws and Procedure of the 
Committee of the Judiciary] and its staff in completing the job" 
(USCS, 1972: 1702). This legislative strategy was repeated many 
times. Through careful study and documentation the ABA puts 
itself in the position of expert advisor. Through making itself 
available to the Congress for further consultation it puts itself 
in a position to shape final policy outcomes to its liking. 
A second example of the functionality of the ABA's organiza-
tional structure is provided by testimony on two bills considered 
in 1979. The ABA was represented at the Senate hearings by 
Professor William Greenhalgh, chairman of the Criminal Justice 
Section 1 s Criminal Revision Commit tee; George C. Freeman, Jr. , 
chairman of the ABA Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section 
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ad hoc committee on Federal Criminal Code Reform; and Laurie 
Robinson, director of the ABA' s Section on Criminal Justice. 
Together they suggested that the Senate Judiciary Committee 
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•. consider the possibility of using our [ABA] good offices 
as an independent group to resolve presently existing differences 
between S. 1722 and S. 1723 [the House bill]" (USCS, 1979: 
9967). The clear implication is that the ABA, which believes in 
code reform and is widely respected for its sincerity, expert 
knowledge, and objectivity, should be called upon to play the 
role of honest broker. Why not? After all, as association 
leaders have argued, the ABA possesses expert knowledge and is 
apparently respected by key decision makers for its selfless pur-
suit of the public interest (Melone, 1977: 15-16). 
For a group to assume such a public posture requires that it 
possess internal group cohesion. Yet, the ABA was not always 
united on all aspects of proposed code reform. The comments of 
Mr. Freeman both substantiate this observation, and illustrate 
the importance group leaders attribute to a public presentation 
of internal group cohesion. Freeman remarked (USCS, 1979: 9969): 
I would like to say I don't want Bill's [William Greenhalgh] 
introductory remarks to leave you with the impression that 
the American Bar Association is still internally generally 
divided amongst the resolutions which have been adopted by 
the House of Delegates and the positions which are reflected 
in our testimony. 
I would say that 95 or 98 
unanimously supported by 
unanimously adopted by the 
percent of those resolutions were 
all the interested sections and 
ABA House of Delegates. 
In the areas where we had differences of view, largely with 
regard to sanctions for organizations and appellate review 
of sentences at the instances of the government, in those 
areas we have through further discussions considerably 
narrowed the differences within the association. 
I am pleased to report to you that the revised criminal 
standard on organizational sanctions adopted by the House of 
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Delegates was unanimously sponsored by representatives of the 
standing committee on standards of criminal justice, the 
sections of corporation, banking, and business law, antitrust 
and the respresentatives of the criminal justice section 
participated in the discussions preceding that resolution and 
was unanimously adopted by the House of Delegates. 
I would also say that on the appeal of sentences, we have 
been given instructions by the ABA not to take any position 
for or against government appeal of sentence while the matter 
is under reconsideration by the ABA. We hope to be able to 
come back to you with an association position on that in the 
near future. 
Thus Freeman assured the Senate Committee that while expert 
ABA opinion may have at one time been somewhat divided, the 
association now stood united on almost every matter affecting 
criminal code revision. In other words, the policy cues were 
clear and unequivocal. If only legislators would adopt ABA 
recommendations, this line of reasoning went, then the criminal 
code controversy could come to a happy conclusion. The experts 
had employed their specialized legal skills to aid in drafting 
reasonable legislation; now it was time for the political deci-
sion makers to permit lawyers to employ their broader political 
skills as honest brokers of political conflict. 
C. Political Skills 
High status and effective organization, though necessary, are 
not sufficient conditions for converting political demands into 
policy outcomes. Leadership must be schooled sufficiently in the 
art of interest group politics so as to know which conduct is 
likely to produce desired results. The political skills 
displayed by the ABA leadership are exemplary. 
Association spokespersons who testified before congressional 
committees were most often not specifically authorized to repre-
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sent their own views as that of the association. Nonetheless, 
they were placed in a position to influence legislation. This 
was accomplished by affording association representatives an 
opportunity to present testimony in person or in writing on every 
criminal code reform bill even though the House of Delegates did 
not pass specific resolutions authorizing particular policy 
stands. Thus, without inflicting undue internal disunity the 
association was able to present a public presence. 
ABA representatives certainly did not give the impression 
that they were hired guns for special interests. Rather, in a 
most skillful if not unique rhetorical fashion, ABA represent-
atives presented and were received as impartial experts aiding 
the Congress in obtaining a worthy goal. This posture was 
possible, given the cultural responsiveness to legal symbols. 
ABA recommendations value objective reason and are regarded as 
the voice of nonpartisanship. Legalism as an ideology places the 
ABA above politics, yet simultaneously in the midst of the 
political thicket. Therefore, the question of whose ox is being 
gored is easily deflected by appeals to the rule of law. 
A vivid example of this view is provided by Donald McDonald, 
chairman of the Section on Taxation. During his presentation of 
the section's criticisms on S.1 (1973) and S. 1400 (1973) he 
asserted: 
While the Section is composed principally of private prac-
titioners, we have avoided a defense counsel orientation. 
Our professional responsibility and representation, encom-
passing, as it does, federal taxation, concerns laws to which 
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virtually every citizen is subject. Thus, perhaps uniquely 
in our field, "justice to the individual and justice to the 
society as a whole are one and the same interest" (USCS, 
1973b: 5629). 
This happy self-concept does not necessarily nor easily translate 
into universally discernible self-evident truths. After all, bill 
authors proposed changes in the tax law that were disagreeable to 
the taxation section. Yet, this expression of the selfless pur-
suit of justice is probably not a deliberate sham. The confusion 
of value preferences for actual behavior is a common human misun-
derstanding. 
Evidence of personal interaction also exists among ABA sub-
ject specialists and Senate Judiciary Committee staff persons and 
other government officials. For example, signaling a working 
relationship with the Senate staff, Donald McDonald noted that he 
had the "· •• privilege of conferring with Mr. G. Robert Blakey 
and other members of the Staff. . and have only praise for the 
high degree of care, competence, and concern of those working on 
the Project" (USCS, 1973b: 5629). McDonald also revealed an 
ABA/ Justice Department communication dyad when, in an exchange 
with Mr. Blakey about a disputed provision of the proposed 
legislation, he said, "We still prefer, particularly in light of 
the Department of Justice's concessions in discussions with us 
(italics mine) that they do not prosecute unless there is a 
substantial deficiency, and • II ( ij SCS' 1 9 7 3 b: 56 4 4) • 
An article fiFst appearing in the ABA's Antitrust Law Journal 
and later inserted in the Senate hearings illustrates yet another 
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aspect of the ABA's political sophistication (USGS, 1974b: 
8133-8178). It is a reproduction of the proceedings of a panel 
meeting which convened at the anti trust law section's annual 
spring meeting on April 4-5, 1974. It underscores the access and 
interaction of the private bar government officials, and key 
congressional staff. 
Panel participants included Mark Crane, chief spokesman for 
the antitrust law section before the Senate Judiciary Committee; 
George W. Liebmann, a private member of the Illinois and Maryland 
bars and a section member; James T. Halverson, director, Bureau 
of Competition, Federal Trade Commission (FTC); and Paul C. 
Summitt, chief counsel, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal 
Laws and Procedures. The panel was chaired by Denis G. 
Mcinerney, chairman, Criminal Practice and Procedure Committee of 
the Antitrust Section. The two section members, Crane and 
Liebmann, presented essentially the same comments as were pre-
sented before the Senate subcommittee in 1973. The section 
leadership was able in this way to disseminate its views to sec-
tion members receiving and reading the Journal, a classic example 
of an active minority informing and educating the members of an 
organization on the salient issues of the day. 
Halverson of the Federal Trade Commission presented his views 
expressing opposition to some provisions and declaring support 
for other S. 1 and S. 1400 sections. 
Bringing FTC staff personnel together with antitrust section 
members is not uncommon. Between 1968 and 1980, 10.2% of ABA 
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Antitrust Section officers and council members were at one time 
or another during their professional careers associated with the 
FTC. During this same period, FTC officials participated in ABA 
antitrust section meetings an average of 3.6 times per year 
(Melone, 1983: 692-693). Clearly, the ABA enjoys open communica-
tion with the government regulators. To the extent that it can 
influence FTC thinking, the association is that much more 
influential. 
The presentation of Paul C. Summitt of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee illustrates not only the access to centers of political 
power enjoyed by the ABA but also the deference afforded the 
association among governmental functionaries. Summitt first 
stated 11 • the main function (of the panel) is to educate me, 
rather than for me to try to educate you. You already know the 
field" (USCS, 1974b: 8170). Summitt described the history of 
Senate staff involvement in code revision and answered some 
questions concerning the legislation. The friendly first name 
basis of the panel discussion ended with Summitt inviting letters 
from interested members of the audience to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee (Uses, 1974b: 8178). 
Another example of the use of in-house ABA publications for 
political purposes is proveded by Charles S. Maddock of the ABA 
Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law. He was not 
satisfied to rest his case before the Senate subcommittee with 
appearances in two consecutive years, and so he penned an article 
entitled, "The Proposed Criminal Code: Business Lawyer Beware." 
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This piece appeared in the April, 197 4 issue of The Business 
Lawyer, an official organ of the ABA Section on Corporation, 
Banking, and Business Law. The journal editor signaled to the 
specialist audience the importance of code reform. He wrote, 
"The position as lead article of Mr. Maddock's observations indi-
cates the importance that the editors ascribe to the issues it 
raises for all business lawyers and corporate executives" (USCS, 
1974a: 7517). 
The article itself repeats essentially the arguments made 
during congressional testimony. ABA leaders were fully cognizant 
of how to use the in-house publications to generate both internal 
group cohesion and additional support for its policy objectives. 
The article was an unequivocal call to arms beseeching business 
lawyers to make themselves familiar with the terms of the pro-
posed code and to get actively involved in making their feelings 
known within existing bar and trade associations or do so indivi-
dually (uses, 1974a: 7527-7528). A reprint of the Maddock 
article was submitted for the record to the Senate subcommittee. 
It provided the political information to members of the Senate 
that business lawyers and executives have been apprised of the 
section's policy recommendations. In brief, Maddock presented the 
party line to the membership. The members were asked to join 
with the leadership in placing demands upon the political system. 
The relevant poilitical actors were then given this important 
political intelligence to consider in their own deci sian making 
calculus. Such tactics are well-known. That the ABA employs 
such tools speaks eloquently about the leadership's understanding 
of interest group politics. 
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III. Influence 
Based upon what has already been documented clearly the ABA 
evidences high status, effective organization, and exemplary 
political skills. Deducing political influence from the 
existence of these vital characteristics is not, however, the 
same as demonstrating such influence. Preferably influence is 
demonstrated in its own right, independent of the strong evidence 
that conditions existed to make the ABA a powerful force in code 
revision. Nonetheless, demonstrating an empirical linkage is 
difficult for at least two reasons. First, no objective criteria 
exist for judging the efforts of interest groups. In other 
words, what are the bench marks for success? Is getting no bill 
passed better than having one enacted that contains objectionable 
features? Should a relatively few bill provisions favored by a 
group be singled out to determine if those provisions were writ-
ten into a bill, and if so, how should those of "lesser 
importance" be weighted? Second, the matter of influence is 
relative. By what other interest group or institution should the 
ABA' s success rate be judged? This matter is made even more 
complicated by the fact that, in the case of code reform, no two 
interest groups testified on the same number of identical provi-
sions found in each proposed bill. The lack of testimony on 
parallel provisions renders impossible comparative analysis of 
group rates except in the crudest fashion. 
The above caveats notwithstanding, a conclusion that the ABA 
was influential in the code reform debate of the 1970s seems 
64 
reasonable. Four points considered together lead to this conclu-
sion. Some have already been mentioned but bear repeating in 
this context while others provide additional empirical evidence. 
First, for a group to possess influence it must participate 
in the policy making process. . In systemic terms, groups must 
first place demands upon the system before those demands can be 
converted into policy outcomes. The ABA fulfilled this threshold 
requirement. It offered testimony at congressional hearings on 
all bills considered hy the Senate on crim,inal code revision 
during the 1970s. As previously noted, the project director of 
the ABA Standards on Criminal Justice assisted the staff director 
of the Brown Commission, the body that took four years to study 
code revision and produced the initial proposal that provided the 
basis for much of the revision debate throughout the decade. The 
association formed special ad hoc committees to study code 
reform, and it permitted section representatives to testify 
before congressional committees. In addition to those sections 
specializing in criminal law and criminal justice, subject 
specialists in business law, taxation, antitrust, and inter-
national law made congressional appearances, and most followed up 
their initial testimony with letters, documents, and additional 
testimony in person on successor bills. Moreover, through the 
use of in-house publication organs the association reached 
lawyers around the country admonishing them to make their indivi-
dual views known to policy makers. 
The acknowledgement by decision makers of interest group 
contributions to the policy making process is evidence of likely 
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group influence, though not a necessary condition for its 
existence. As such, it is a second point to be considered when 
ascertaining ABA influence. Senators and staff personnel on 
repeated occasions thanked ABA representatives for their care-
fully studied recommendations. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. 
Mass.), chairman of the Judiciary Committee, writing in that 
committee's reports to the Senate on S. 1437 (1977) and S. 1722 
( 1979) named ten organizations as providing great amounts of 
study, discussion, and preparation helpful to the committee in 
its work. He specifically named the criminal law (USGS, 1977: 
13-14; uses, 1980: 14) 1 Thus, once again, but in a different 
context, ABA contributions to code revision were acknowledged by 
a political actor in a position to know. 
The third and fourth points are best considered together. 
The third concerns the belief or self-perception of having 
influence. Probably a person who expresses feelings of efficacy 
is in possession of at least some degree of influence. Of 
course, depending upon circumstances, political actors have been 
known to feign both power and powerlessness. Sometimes honest 
self-assessments of power relationships are erroneously 
evaluated. That is why, when possible, ascertainment of 
influence independent of self-descriptions or retrospective 
interviews is preferable. Thus, the fourth and last point 
suggesting influence is the actual extent to which ABA policy 
recommendations were adopted. 
and four seem persuasive. 
Considered together, points three 
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Charles S. Maddock of the ABA Section on Corporation, 
Banking, and Business Law appeared twice before the Senate sub-
commit tee (USGS, 1972: 1642-1649; USGS, 1973d: 6652-6661). The 
second time he spent some time in comparing S. (1973) and S. 
1400 (1973) with his earlier recommendations on the Brown Report 
(1971). 
The testimony reveals that about half of the objectionable 
Brown Report features were remedied ins. 1. Those satisfactory 
provisions included organizational criminal liability, personal 
criminal liability for conduct on behalf of organizations, the 
definition of organization, and the interference with activities 
of employees and employers. However, S.1 provisions dealing with 
special sanctions for organizations, disqualification from organ-
izational functions, regulatory offenses, and securities viola-
tions remained unsatisfactory as they were in the Brown Report. 
The only satisfactory provision in S. 1400 was that relating to 
regulatory offenses. This is so because, in this instance, the 
bill did not provide for such offenses. 
At least for the case of s. 1, apparently the Maddock recom-
mendations probably had some impact on the Senate leadership 
responsible for the bill's formulation. The Moddock testimony 
alone, however, did not cause the favorable changes from the 
Brown recommendations. On the other hand Mr. Maddock apparently 
believed that his earlier testimony had some impact because he 
did say in addressing the Senate subcommittee, "We are very 
pleased to find that many of the objections that our section had 
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to the final report of the Brown Commission have been answered 
in comparable provisions of Senate Bill No. 1" (USGS, 1973d: 
6653). Causation and certainly single causes are most difficult 
to prove in any science. However, a necessary condition for a 
"causal relationship" is present; ABA testimony is followed by 
ABA recommended changes. 
Also scrutinize the written testimony submitted on S. 1 
(1975) from Mark Crane of the ABA's Criminal Practice and 
Procedure Committee of the Antitrust Section. Crane first 
thanked the Senate subcommittee and its staff for the opportunity 
two years earlier to present the views of his antitrust committee 
on the ill-fated S.1 (1973) and S. 1400 (1973) bills. He then 
went on to state, ''We are pleased that the present version of S.1 
incorporates most of the changes we suggested, and we, of course, 
reaffirm our support of those changes. This leaves only three 
provisions on which we wish to comment with respect to the pre-
sent bill'' (USGS, 1975: 233). Crane had reason to feel 
efficacious; comparing his 1973 testimony to the present, over 80 
percent of his objections were met in S.1 (1975). Of course, a 
note of caution should be sounded. Testimony on an earlier bill 
cannot with certitude be considered to cause changes in future 
bills. At the very least, though, Crane and his committee can 
claim probable impact. This may be warranted because he was the 
only person back in 1973 to offer specific testimony against S. 1 
and S. 1400 provisions affecting antitrust laws. 
The evidence of ABA influence is not all positive. Indeed, a 
case can be made that ABA fortunes were inconsistent. First 
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ponder the association's success record with respect to S. 1437 
(1977) provisions. 
When comparing ABA policies to the provisions of S. 1437, 
clearly the bill contained, from an association perspective, many 
objectionable provisions. Indeed, in testimony two years later 
on a successor bill, an ABA representative submitted for the 
record an eighteen page appendix which, in part, compared ABA 
policies with s. 1437 provisions (Uses, 1979: 9996-10014). Table 
1 contains a distillation of the relevant parts of that appendix. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Note at first that the ABA is careful to record which of its 
policy recommendations are being followed and which are being 
discarded; once again, §_ fortiori, it is evident that it "keeps 
score." Second, of the fifty-four total subjects mentioned, s. 
1437 was fully consistent with ABA policies in twenty instances, 
consistent if amended in seven cases, and inconsistent in twenty-
five instances. The association expressed no policy preference 
in two cases. Thus, close to half of all ABA policy expressions 
on or iminal code reform were in disagreement with the Senate 
passed bill. 
No objective criteria are available for judging a 50% failure 
rate as good, bad, or indifferent. For one thing, the ABA 
probably does not consider each policy position to be of equal 
importance. Thus, treating each policy position equally is 
probably misleading. For example, S. 1437 is consistent with 
long-held ABA policies concerning liability of an organization, 
attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. 
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Yet, the association 
seemed to be back to square one on the salient matters of culpa-
bility, liability of an agent for conduct of an organization, and 
antitrust offense grading. Then, too, after six or seven years 
of lobbying, the association, if truly influential, should have 
had a success rate closer to 100%. 
Although the ABA is a certainly highly visible participant in 
the policy maldng process, the fact is it cannot expect to be 
completely successful all of the time. Obviously other 
interests, individuals, institutions, and ideas place conflicting 
demands upon the political system, tugging and pulling in a 
variety of directions. That is, after all, an outstanding 
feature of the special interest process explicit in American 
pluralism. However, the ABA is not simply one of a number of 
equally powerful interest groups. It is, to be sure, more equal 
than most. A more favorable appraisal of its influence can be 
inferred from the evidence available on the next bill to be con-
sidered by the Senate in 1979. 
A comparison of 50 parallel provisions of S. 1437 (1977) and 
S. 1722 (1979) reveals that while the ABA did not backslide on S. 
1437 improvements won in testimony on earlier Senate bills, it 
was able at the same time to support many S. 1722 changes that it 
viewed as distinct improvements over the 1977 bill. 
Table 2 indicates that on balance the ABA viewed S. 1722 
(1979) as an improvement overS. 1437 (1977). Its stance on pro-
visions of the two bills changed at an absolute rate of C = .280; 
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in fourteen of fifty cases (28%) the ABA position changed. Of 
the total amount of change that could have taken place among the 
three support categories, theta (e) is equal to .223, or over 
22%. Moreover, as evidenced by the delta statistic (ll= .857), 
when the aggregate sum of the changes from support toward opposi-
tion categories is subtracted from the sum of the changes from 
opposition toward support then clearly the direction of the ABA 
change in support for the two bills was positive and close to 
perfect. 2 In other words, when the ABA changed its position on 
various bill provisions, that change was almost always toward 
support and away from disagreement. Morever, the content of the 
proposed legislation was changing, not ABA policy. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
In short, many s. 1722 provisions reflected previous ABA 
recommendations. Also some provision, though not wholly con-
sistent with association views, displayed movement toward the 
recommended course. Nonetheless, the ABA failed to get its 
recommendations accepted in a number of important matters. 
However, clearly its representatives felt their efforts made a 
difference. To interpret the evidence otherwise is difficult. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances and the rela-
tive paucity of evidence to support the null hypothesis, a 
reasonable conclusion is that the ABA exercised considerable 
influence in the criminal code revision debate during the 1970s. 
At the very least, the preponderance of the evidence points 
clearly to such a judgment. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Private governments possessing high status, effective organi-
zation, and skilled leadership are potentially powerful interest 
groups. The ABA fits the description, and its involvement in 
criminal code revision illustrates the point. 
Reading the testimony of all the groups and individuals 
offering criminal code recommendations during the 1970s leaves a 
distinct impression that some groups were better received by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee than others. Group status is a 
partial explanation. All Senate Judiciary Committee members are 
themselves lawyers, and thus ABA representatives are viewed as 
members of the same professional club. Yet, ABA representatives 
are not ordinary run-of-the-mill lawyers. By professional 
success standards, most ABA representatives offering 
congressional testimony were at the zenith of the stratified bar. 
Many were private practitioners associated in large law firms 
with some of the richest corporations in America for clients. A 
few, such as Living stan Hall of the Harvard Law School, were 
distinguished scholars. Thus, as David Truman (1958: 265) has 
pointed out, the recommendations of high status groups to govern-
ment officials may " in some instances appear less as 
demands of supplications and more as flattery of the official of 
whom a favor is asked." 
In some part, the high status enjoyed by the ABA is due to 
its effective internal organization and to the outstanding 
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political skills of its leadership. The association's influence 
is in large part attributable to the possession of these 
outstanding characteristics. 
Future research should investigate the political roles of 
other interest groups. The National Council 
Deliquency, the American Law Institute, the 
on Crime and 
Federal Public 
Defenders Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union are 
just a few that come immediately to mind. Such studies could 
help to create a deeper understanding of the dynamics underlying 
criminal justice policy making. 
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NOTES 
The other groups named by Senator Kennedy include: the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the 
New York County Lawyers Association, the National District 
Attorney's Association, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
the National Association of Attorneys General, and the Committee 
for Economic Development (USGS 1977: 14). Senator Kennedy named 
these same groups including the American Bar Association when he 
submitted the Judiciary Committee's report on the Criminal Code 
Reform Act of 1979 (USGS, 1980: 14). 
2. Rather than reporting traditional measures of association 
that convey at best ambiguious information, I have chosen to 
employ two measures first employed in a 1982 published work 
(Melone and Jones, 1982: 184-192). Theta (e) measures the magni-
tude of change and can be interpreted as the proportion of 
possible change occuring between time 1 and time 2 that is, the 
change in ABA support found in S. 1437 to that found in S. 1722. 
Delta (~) denotes the net direction of that magnitude of change. 
It reflects the proportion of the positive/negative magnitude of 
change remaining after a compensatory amount of the opposite 
magnitude that ha also occurred has been canceled. Theta (e ) 
ranges from zero (0) to one (1); zero means that no change has 
occurred, and one indicates that all possible change that could 
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have occurred did, in fact, do so. Delta (i\) varies from +1 to 
-1; zero ( 0) means that an equal amount of change occurred in 
both directions, effectively cnaceling out movements in each. 
For a detailed elaboration of these statistics see: (Jones, 
1980). 
Supportive 
General Statement of Purposes 
Liability of an Organization 
Selective Inclusion of Bars 
and Defenses 
Attempt 
Conspiracy 
Solicitation 
Espionage and Related Offenses 
Sex Offenses 
Mail and Other Fraudulent Schemes 
Mandatory Minimum for Firearms 
Crimes 
Failing to Obey a Public 
Safety Order 
Crimes in Federal Enclaves 
Presentence Reports 
Imposition of Sentence 
Maximum Terms of Imprisonment 
Post-Release Supervision and 
Additional Term of Revocation 
Multiple Sentences of Imprisonment 
Good Time Allowance 
Crime Victim Compensation 
Correction or Reduction of 
Sentence 
Child Snatching 
TABLE 1 
ABA POLICIES COMPARED TO PROVISIONS OF S. 1437 
Supportive with Amendments 
Statute of Limitations 
Immaturity 
Employment of Illegal Aliens 
Bail Jumping 
Restitution 
Offenders with Mental Disease or 
Defect 
Appellate Review of Sentence 
Opposed 
Jurisdiction 
Culpability 
Complicity, Accessories, 
and Co-conspirators 
Liability of an Agent for 
Conduct of an Organization 
Enforcement of Agency 
Subpoenas 
False Statements/Records 
Reckless Endangerment 
Consumer Fraud 
Antitrust Offense Grading 
Mandatory Minimum for Drug 
Offenses 
Marijuana Possession 
Obscenity 
Prostitution 
Authorized Sentences 
Notice of Conviction 
Probation 
Fines 
Use Immunity 
Pretrial Release 
Parole Abolition 
Special Grand Juries 
Burden of Proof for 
Affirmative Defenses 
Procedure Prior to Imposition 
of Sentence 
Sentencing Commission 
No Opinion 
Obstructing a Government 
Function by Fraud 
Modification of Term of 
Imprisonment 
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings before the Committee on the judiciary, United States Senate on S.1722 and 
5.1723, 96th Congress, 1st Session,1979, pp. 9966-10014. 
....., 
\.Jl 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF ABA POLICIES ON S. 1437 (1977) AND 
S. 1722 (1979) PROVISIONS 
s. 1437 
Supported Supported with Opposed Totals 
Amendments 
s. 1722 
Support 18 0 7 25 
(36%) (0%) (14%) (50%) 
Support with 
Amendments 1 6 6 13 
(2%) (12%) (12%) (26%) 
Oppose 0 0 12 12 
(0%) (0%) (24%) (24%) 
Totals 19 6 25 50 
(38%) (12%) (50%) (100%) 
C = Absolute change= .280 
8 =Magnitude of change= .223 
D.= Net direction of the magnitude= .857 
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LEGISLATOR IDEOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS FROM ILLINOIS 
Abstract 
80 
Despite their intimate involvement in the policy making 
process, few criminologists have empirically investigated what 
legislators think about crime and control. Through a 1982 survey 
of the Illinois legislature, the current research attempts to 
help fill this void. Contrary to popular stereotypes character-
izing politicians as uniformly conservative and "get tough" in 
their criminal justice attitudes, the data revealed that there 
was considerable ideological diversity in the sample. 
Consideration is given to the implication of this finding both 
for understanding the relationship of criminal justice ideology 
to policy and for assessing the prospects of future reform 
efforts. 
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LEGISLATOR IDEOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS FROM ILLINOIS 
Since the philosophy of individualized treatment was ini-
tially introduced into American corrections during the 
Progressive era, legislators have typically imposed only loose 
constraints on judicial and parole authorities in the sanctioning 
of offenders (Rothman, 1980). For the most part, lawmakers were 
content to pass criminal codes that carried stiff maximum 
sentences--a "loud bark"--but then to allow judges and parole 
boards to determine how severe the "bite" or "treatment" should 
actually be (Zimring, 1976: 15). Beginning in the mid-1970s, 
however, politicians in a number of states moved forcefully to 
play a more active role in controlling the fate offenders would 
be compelled to endure. Frequently in the name of "law and 
order" and of purging leniency from courts that did nothing more 
than teach the wayward that crime pays, they sought to fetter 
severely the discretionary decision making of judges and parole 
boards by passing statutes that mandated prison terms and 
abolished parole-release in favor of determinate sentences. In 
short, a concerted effort was made by legislators to effect a 
fundamental redistribution of power, transfering decision making 
away from criminal justice participants and to themselves 
(Dershowitz, 1976:79). u.s. Representative Sam Steiger 
( 1976:220, 222) captured the sentiments of many of his brethren 
when he remarked: 
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How often do we read or hear about the crime committed by a 
person on probation or who has a felony sentence suspended? 
••• If the courts are too slow in perceiving the truth of the 
present situation and continue to be guided by discredited 
sentiments, I think there is no alternative left to lawmakers 
but to turn to mandatory penalties ••• I recognize that there 
are certain problems with shackling the judges in this 
regard. However, I think the courts have left us no alter-
native. 
This campaign to reshape American crimial justice has been 
greeted by a flurry of activity assessing its merits. These 
analyses have generally involved an examination of the specifics 
of the laws passed and of their ramifications for the system 
(Blumstein et al., 1983; Casper et al., 1982; Cavender, 1982; 
Cullen and Gilbert, 1982; Goodstein, 1983; Greenberg and 
Humphries, 1980; Hussey and Lagoy, 1983; Lagoy, 1981; Lagoy and 
Kramer, 1980). Curiously, however, these works have tended to 
share a common omission. Despite the recent efforts of legisla-
tors ostensibly aimed at expanding their control within the 
criminal justice arena, current commentators have been reluctant 
systematically to investigate what legislators do in fact think 
about crime and related policy issues. Instead, they often rely, 
if implicitly, upon the assumption--commonly held by 
criminologists--that politicians are essentially unenlightened 
about criminal justice matters and uniformly punitive in their 
orientation. Mattick's (1976:294) words, though somewhat marked 
by hyperbole, are reflective of this viewpoint: 
With a few notable exceptions, legislators. • are stuck on 
dead center. • . . The spokesmen, caught up in the froth of a 
newsworthy current event, pontificate with their fund of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions about the treat-
ment of crime and criminals, and the mass media represent 
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these notions to the general public where they are taken as 
twentieth-century gospel. This completes the cycle of manu-
facturing the mass delusion that victimizes us all. 
Notably, this imagery of legislators contains flaws. At the 
very least, it begs an empirical test. More generally, it 
ignores the potential complexity of the ideology that prevails in 
political bodies. As Jacobs (1983:131) has cautioned, "many com-
mentators seem to think of the legislature as a monolith, a 
single 'mind set.• Legislators obviously differ substantially on 
criminal justice matters." Finally, this vision nourishes a 
pessimistic, if not fully cynical, attitude regarding policy 
reform: Since few progressive sentiments are present among 
legislators, American criminal justice is doomed to follow an 
agenda informed by ignorance and by "get tough" thinking that 
will do little more than fuel the crisis of escalating prison 
population. 
In this light, the current study endeavors to assess the 
criminal justice ideology of one legislative body: Illinois. 
Through a survey of state senators and representatives, we 
attempt to measure the nature of the politicians' attitudes 
toward the origin of crime, policy alternatives, the goals of 
imprisonment, prison conditions, and rehabilitation. Special 
attention is given to the extent to which the legislators embrace 
conservative or liberal stances on these issues. Similar to the 
limited research conducted previously (Berk and Rossi, 1977; 
Cullen, Gilbert, and Cullen, 1983), the data revealed con-
siderable ideological diversity among the Illinois lawmakers. 
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The implications of these findings for policy making and the 
possibility of future reform efforts are also considered. 
Methods 
Sample 
In the fall of 1982, questionnaires were sent to all 236 mem-
bers of the Illinois State Legislature. This study employed the 
TDM survey technique developed by Dillman ( 1978) which involved 
sending a postcard reminder as well as two follow-up question-
naires. In all, 101 usable surveys were returned, a response 
rate of 42.8%. This figure fell far below the 70% return 
typically secured through Dillman's survey method. Furthermore, 
the failure to obtain a higher level of returns heightens the 
potential that a response bias characterizes the sample and 
suggests that the results should be viewed with appropriate 
caution. At the same time, the present study has the advantage 
of supplying data on a population that is intimately involved in 
policy making yet infrequently researched by criminologists. 
Three factors may have contributed to the fact that a lower 
response rate was achieved than in other Dillman surveys. First, 
the study was conducted during an election year, which may have 
placed time constraints on the respondents. Second, the size of 
the Illinois Legislature was in the process of being reduced 
markedly. Possibly outgoing politicians may have not have seen 
the relevancy of expressing their opinions in a survey of 
"legislators." Third, legislators may constitute an inherently 
difficult population to survey through mailed questionnaires, 
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particularly when the researchers are not direct constituents. 
Alternatively, a more adequate response rate might be possible 
when resources permit the scheduling of interviews at the 
legislators' convenience (Berk and Rossi, 977: 15-16). 
Information on the status characteristics of the responding 
legislators was obtained. Their mean age was 50.1, 80.2% were 
male, 89.1% were white, they averaged 15.7 years of education, 
and they earned over $40,000 in annual salary. Politically, they 
had been members of the legislature a mean of 7.8 years. A 
small majority (54.5%) reported they wre Republicans, 44.5% said 
they were Democrats, and only 1% claimed to be Independents. In 
characterizing their political orientation, 1% answered extremely 
liberal, 3.1% very liberal, 12.4% liberal, 38.1% middle of the 
road, 38.1% conservative, 4.1% very conservative, and 3.1% ex-
tremely conservative. Finally, 18.8% said that they represented 
mostly rural jurisdictions, 35.6% mostly suburban jurisdictions, 
and 40.6% mostly urban jurisdictions. Taken together, then, the 
average respondent would be a relatively affluent white male 
about 50 who is moderate to conservative in political orientation 
and who has served several terms. 
Measures 
The questionnaire utilized in this research contained sixty-
four items assessing attitudes toward various aspects of crime 
and criminal sanctioning. The order in which an item appeared 
on the survey instrument was determined through random selection. 
Using an 8-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very strongly 
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disagree to 8 = very strongly agree, the respondents were asked, 
"Using the scale provided below, please state the extent to which 
you either agree or disagree with each statement." 
As mentioned above, the questionnaire was developed with the 
intention of tapping the extent to which the legislators advo-
cated conservative and/or liberal views on crime and justice. In 
constructing the items used to represent these divergent politi-
cal orientations, we were guided by existing research which had 
specified how those on the left and right differ in their 
criminal justice views (Cullen and Gilbert, 1982; Gibbons and 
Garabedian, 1974; Greene et al., 1982; Miller, 1973; Shover, 
1979). On a general level, however, it may be helpful to state 
briefly here our interpretation of the key ways in which the 
ideologies of the two political positions differ. 1 
The conservative position begins with the assumption that the 
primary goal of the criminal justice system is to protect the 
social order. They believe that a permissive society, one that 
lacks discipline, encourages illegality. When discipline breaks 
down in the legal system, people will soon learn that crime pays. 
Thus, the way to reduce the intolerably high crime rate is to 
institute laws that make crime more costly. Of course, providing 
this lesson means handing out stiff sentences in uncomfortable 
prisons to offenders. The truly wicked who prove incorrigible 
must be incapacitated until old age robs them of their criminal 
propensities. Only in this way will the streets be safe to walk. 
In contrast, the primary goal of the system for liberals is 
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to see that offenders are treated with justice and care. Those 
on the left take this position because they believe that people 
come to violate the law because they are subjected to social 
injustice: poverty, racism, and neglect. The only way to truly 
eliminate crime is to attack these root causes. Meanwhile, those 
whose social circumstances compel them to move beyond the law 
should not be punished but rather rehabilitated and their 
problems treated. Imprisonment, a great deprivation, should be 
used parsimoniously, and when it is employed, efforts should be 
made to have conditions as humane as possible. Finally, everyone 
who comes before the court should be treated equally. Unlike at 
present, the rich and powerful--who often commit the most serious 
offenses, white-collar crimes--should not escape criminal 
sanction. 
With these considerations in mind, an explanation is possible 
of how the items on the survey were grouped to assess various 
ideological dimensions. In all, four broad areas were 
distinguished: crime causation, views of crime control, support 
for imprisonment, and faith in rehabilitation. Within each area, 
several issues were examined, and liberal versus conservative 
views represented. Items were also employed that tapped a radi-
cal position on the issues. However, since none received more 
than a minimal degree of support ( 1 to 4%), these were deleted 
from the analysis. Briefly, the issues considered in the data 
are: 
1. Crime Causation: The basic comparison here was between 
the conservative view that crime is due to a breakdown of 
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discipline and the free will of offenders versus the liberal view 
that crime is a reflection of root causes and an individual's 
exposure to social disadvantage. 
issues are presented in Table 1. 
The i terns assessing these 
2. Views of Crime Control: This rubric encompasses four 
issues that relate to crime control and the operation of the 
criminal justice system. The first involves whether the solution 
to crime is in re-establishing traditional values as the right 
claims or in eliminating 
Second, attitudes toward 
and toward the liberals' 
Packer, 1968). Third, 
social injustice as the left asserts. 
the conservatives' crime control model 
due process model were inspected ( cf. 
items tapped whether the legislators 
believed that America's courts discriminate as liberal critics 
have suggested or, as those on the right would be likely to 
argue, that minorities are disproportionately represented among 
the prison population because they are more crime-prone. Fourth, 
attitudes toward victims were considered. The items relevant to 
the above concerns are reported in Table 2. 
3. Support for Imprisonment: Here, three controversies were 
entertained: support for punitive philosophies of imprisonment 
(conservative position), opposition to imprisonment (liberal 
position), and whether efforts should be made to make prisons 
more humane (liberal) or keep them painful so that offenders will 
learn that crime does not pay (conservative). Relevant items are 
contained in Table 3. 
4. Faith in Rehabilitation: Finally, a number of i terns 
were included that measured the extent to which the legislators 
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supported the traditional liberal philosophy of rehabilitation. 
Did they see it as effective and worth expanding, or were they 
prepared to cast it aside and embrace a purely punitive approach 
to sanctioning as many on the right would prefer? The legisla-
tive responses to these questions are set forth in Table 4. 
Finally, within each of the tables, we report both the mean 
score for each item listed (again, an 8-point scale was used, 
with 8 being the high or agree side) and the percentage of the 
sample that agreed with a given item. Percentage of agreement 
was computed by adding together all responses that were greater 
than or equal to 5, where 5 = not sure but probably agree, 6 = 
agree, 7 = strongly agree, and 8 = very strongly agree. 
Results 
As seen in Table 1 (items 1 to 6), the legislators in the 
sample manifested considerable support for the conservative ideas 
that a permissive society spawns lawlessness and that illegality 
occurs when offenders make free-willed judgments that crime pays 
in America (this, of course, is the thesis of the classical 
school of criminology). 
crime to be exclusively 
Significantly, however, they do not 
a by-product of the attenuation 
see 
of 
discipline in society or the courts. Approximately half also 
agreed that criminality has "root causes" in social injustices 
like poverty and denial of equal opportunity. Similarly, a 
majority endorsed the perspective of the positivist school (of. 
Radzinowicz, 1966) that individuals who break the law do so 
because they are confronted with such or iminogenic forces as 
go 
emotional problems, status frustration, and deviant peers (items 
7 to 11 ) • 
This duality in the legislators' attitudes toward the origins 
of crime--one in which legitimacy is extended to both conserva-
tive and liberal ideas--was evident again when their views of 
crime control were examined. (See Table 2.) First, although 
over 80% of the legislators agreed that re-establishing tradi-
tional values was the panacea to crime, nearly 70% also stated 
that the best way to cure the crime problem was to expand social 
programs. Second, support was found for the "crime control 
model" illuminated by Packer (1968). The legislators agreed both 
that there is a need to hire more police and build more prisons 
and that legal rights often reduce the effectiveness of law 
enforcement operations ( i terns 3, 4, 7). But again, three-fourths 
felt that regardless of the resources allocated to criminal 
justice, crime will persist if root causes are not dealt with 
(item 5), and few in the sample were prepared to cast aside "due 
process" simply to enforce order ( i tern 6). Third, almost 70% of 
the legislators concurred with the conservative position that 
prisons are full of minorities because this population is the 
most criminogenic (item 8), and 75% rejected Reiman's (1979) 
leftist notion that "the rich get richer and the poor get prison" 
(item 11). Nonetheless, about half of the politicians also 
recognized that justice was not equal before America's courts, a 
constant liberal critique (items 9, 10). Fourth, conservatives 
often link concern with victims with the punishment of offenders. 
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For instance, in a speech favoring mandatory sentences, President 
Gerald Ford (1975) remarked, "The victims are my primary 
concern." In this regard, the Illinois legislators clearly 
shared this thinking (see items 12, 13). At the same time, 
however, fully 80% supported--perhaps because Illinois has a 
victim's compensation act--the more liberal notion (Cullen and 
Gilbert, 1982:284) that the state has an obligation to provide 
direct services to the casualties of the system (item 14). 
Table 3 shows once more that conservative thinking about 
crime had considerable appeal to the legislators in the sample. 
Here, there is strong support for all punitive goals of imprison-
ment and a firm rejection of the liberal notions that prisons are 
schools of crime and that incarceration should be employed 
sparingly (items 1 to 6). Yet this belief in the appropriateness 
and efficacy of imprisonment does not mean that the legislators 
were "hard line" in every respect. Thus, they strongly (81.6%) 
endorsed community corrections, believed that prison conditions 
should be decent rather than degrading, and rejected the idea 
that inmate rights are of little importance ( i terns 7, 10, 11). 
Though they stopped short of advocating a drastic expansion of 
inmate rights (item 12) as some liberal writers have urged (cf. 
Fogel, 1979), their views of what the nature of prison life 
should entail was clearly more reformist than punitive. 
These progressive sentiments become even more apparent when 
considering the legislators' attitudes toward rehabilitation. 
First, i terns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 4 reveal that the sample 
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believed that rehabilitation is "just as important" as punishment 
as a goal of sanctioning, would support expanding treatment 
programs, and rejected the conservative idea that rehabilitation 
is little more than a "con" that inmates use to win early 
release. Second, the politicians who responded to the survey 
also rejected the conclusion popularized by Martinson (1974) that 
rehabilitation "doesn't work" (items 4, 5). This was particu-
larly true in the case of juveniles, where only 12% agreed that 
treatment "just does not work" (cf. Cullen, Golden, and Cullen, 
1983). Finally, the legislators even embraced the traditional 
liberal policy of state enforced therapy (Barnes, 1972; 
Menninger, 1968; cf. Kittrie, 1973). As indicated by items 6 to 
9, they did not see such programs as overly coercive, and they 
were prepared to tie early release from prison to an inmate's 
cure. This latter finding is somewhat surprising, given that 
Illinois is a state that passed determinate sentencing legisla-
tion during the latter part of the 1970s (Cullen, Gilbert, and 
Cullen, 1983). 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the popular stereotype of politicians as 
unenlightened about justice policy and as advocating a narrow law 
and order posture, the findings suggest that the Illinois 
legislators sampled were quite diverse in their criminal justice 
ideology. To be sure, they manifested a pronounced conservative 
strain in their thinking, trumpeting the importance of crime 
control and advocating stiff prison terms aimed at effecting 
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deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. Yet they also 
evidenced an affinity for elements of the traditional liberal 
agenda. Thus, they tended to agree that crime has causes rooted 
in social inequality, that offenders have problems that are con-
ducive to violating the law, that rehabilitation is an important 
goal of legal sanctions, that prisons should be reasonably 
humane, and that community corrections is an idea worth 
exploring. 
Notably, these results suggest an interesting puzzle. While 
the legislators' ideology was found to be diverse, Illinois has 
experienced a period since the mid-1970 s in which the expressed 
goal of the state's justice policy has been to "get tough" with 
crime (Bigman, 1979; Cullen, Gilbert, and Cullen, 1983; Kolman, 
1980; Lagoy et al., 1978). Although initially conceived of as a 
way of introducing the "justice model" into the state's correc-
tional system (Fogel, 1979), the determinate sentencing law that 
became effective in 1978 was explicitly co-opted into a measure 
aimed at crime control. Indeed, the governor insisted on calling 
the renovated code "Class X crimes" to emphasize the law and 
order quality of the new statutes. Furthermore, since the incep-
tion of the legislation, prison populations in the state have 
continued to spiral upward. If the ''Class X" code is not fully 
responsible for this trend, it has clearly been a contributing 
factor (Wingert and Zielenziger, 1981). 
These observations thus lead to the question of why Illinois 
has become a law and order state despite the existence of an 
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ideology marked by a progressive side within the legislature. 
Phrased differently, it raises the issue of the relationship of 
ideology to policy. Several factors may shed light on why the 
fit between these elements has been somewhat inconsistent in 
Illinois. 
One possibility is that only progressive legislators returned 
the questionnaire, thus creating a false image of the ideology of 
the Illinois legislature. While such a response bias cannot be 
completely ruled out, three considerations make this unlikely. 
First, the legislators in the sample, while liberal in some 
areas, nevertheless were quite prepared to endorse conservative 
policies to get tough with crime; they certainly showed no 
uniform inclination to be "easy" with offenders. Second, the 
profile of the average respondent was not that of a typical 
liberal. As mentioned above, almost 40% defined themselves as 
. 
either "middle of the road" or "conservative." Third, it is 
significant that the results of the survey are fairly consistent 
with previous research. In their study of correctional elites 
(including politicians), Berk and Rossi ( 1977) discovered that 
their respondents clearly favored rehabilitation and other 
correctional reforms. Noting that their study was conducted in 
1973, they went on to predict (fairly accurately when compared 
with the present data) that: 
If our study were to be repeated in 1977, state political 
elites would find their prison systems falling far short of 
perfection; and they would endorse a future for their prison 
systems that emphasized rehabilitation (but not as strongly) 
and a more differentiated system of treatment of offenders 
according to the crimes they had committed (1977:147). 
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In this light, a more promising interpretation than response 
bias of the disjunction between ideology and policy would be that 
questionnaires such as the one used in this study tap the per-
sonal rather than the "official" views of legislators. That is, 
politicians may well hold a complex view of crime and control in 
private but be willing to voice only a narrow, get tough position 
in public forums where the political stakes are high. This 
analysis gains credence from the research of Riley and Rose 
(1980) who reported that legislators overestimate the punitive-
ness of the public (see also, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, 
1984:10-11). Berk and Rossi ( 1977: 145) similarly captured this 
point when they concluded: 
Elite views of the future also contradict what they perceive 
to be the views of the general public. The state publics are 
seen as endorsing punitive and custodial functions for the 
correction system rejecting community-based corrections 
reforms, and endorsing a future for prisons that would empha-
size imprisonment as punishment. 
Seeing the electorate in this way is, of course, a "reality" that 
few legislators would dare to casually ignore. In turn, this 
places constraints on how "liberal" they would allow their public 
images on crime control to appear, regardless of their personal 
ideologies. 
A third approach to understanding the link between ideology 
and policy would start with the realization that the fate of any 
reform agenda is primarily determined by a relatively small 
political elite composed of influencial and interested parties 
(Berk and Rossi, 1977; Travis, 1982). As such, the ideology of 
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the "average" legislator is far less important than the views 
embraced by criminal justice elites. In the state of Illinois, 
the crucial actor was the governor who constantly trumpeted the 
determinate sentencing law as a way of cracking down on crime and 
forcefully pushed his "Class X" bill through the legislature. 
His agenda, and not what most legislators thought, was thus the 
most critical circumstance in shaping crime policy in Illinois. 
Moreover, for the everyday politician, this legislation was con-
sistent with important portions of their ideology (i.e., a belief 
in the efficacy of stiff sentences) and had the added advantage 
of voter appeal. 
something to gain 
Consequently, there was nothing to lose and 
from following the governor's lead and 
supporting a get tough crime control package. However, it is 
equally instructive that voting for "determinate sentencing" did 
not necessarily also entail a rejection of more liberal views on 
corrections; political convenience rather than a new ideology was 
the contingency at hand. This is why the legislators could 
support a law that abolished parole-release and still, legiti-
mately, say at a later date that they believed in rehabilitation 
and tying release to treatment progress. 
Finally, the possibility exists that inconsistencies in 
legislative "thinking about crime" are to be expected and, in 
turn, that the most significant factors in shaping policies are 
the prevailing structural conditions that give salience to a 
particular ideological dimension. This view begins by 
suggesting that such attitudinal complexity reflects both the 
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contradictions that are inherent in general political ideologies 
and the reality that crime is an intricate phenomenon that defies 
easy explanation or solution (Finckenauer, 1982). Confusion in 
this realm has perhaps been heightened in recent times by the 
disputes raging among criminal justice scholars who, much like 
legislators, display little consensus in their pronouncements to 
the public; indeed, academicians commonly commence discussions of 
policy by speaking 
field (Cullen and 
Thus, given those 
of the ideological "crisis" besetting their 
Gilbert, 1982; Sherman and Hawkins, 1981). 
complex, if not contradictory, beliefs about 
crime and control are to be anticipated, the key to understanding 
policy making may lie in exploring how the existing social 
context determines which particular views will be seen as most 
compelling and have the most impact on voting decisions. 
Notably, this is the thesis of radical and other commentators who 
assert that political support for the current get tough movement 
is best understood as an outgrowth of underlying economic contra-
dictions and the legitimacy crisis confronting the state, which 
make such hard line policies seem plausible and urgently needed 
(Cullen and Gilbert, 1982; Greenberg and Humphries, 1980; 
Paternoster and Bynum, 1982; Reiman and Headlee, 1981). In this 
light, the punitive tenor of Illinois' "reform" of its criminal 
code would be seen to be less a product of the conversion of all 
its legislators to a uniform ideological vision and more as a 
manifestation of a larger structural transformation that has 
conditioned policy in a similar way in states across the nation. 
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In sum, the nature of legislative crime ideology and its 
relationship to criminal justice policy is complex and escapes 
easy stereotyping or explanation. Nonetheless, the findings of 
this study do suggest some reason for optimism. Despite the 
unmistakable swing of American correctional policy in a 
repressive direction, there is reason to suspect that this has 
not been an ideologically coherent response to the perceived 
"crime problem." While punitive sentiments have undoubtedly 
fueled this movement, it is less clear that politicians are 
wedded to an exclusively get tough view of crime control. To the 
extent that ideological diversity remains, progressive reform 
agendas--especially as the current crisis in corrections 
heightens and places pressures on legislators to develop fiscally 
feasible solutions--would be greeted with support. In particular 
our analysis conceivably indicated that reforms might have the 
greatest chance of successful implementation if advocates ( 1) 
identified and then focused their efforts on political elites 
interested in criminal justice matters, (2) emphasized policies 
known to have ideological appeal among legislators (e.g. , com-
munity corrections, rehabilitation), and (3) educated lawmakers 
to the reality that the public is less punitive and more 
favorable to liberal correctional policies than they now imagine 
(Riley and Rose, 1980; Cullen, Cullen, and Wozniak, 1983). 
To be sure, some may question whether seeking to change how 
legislators think about crime is a fruitful strategy to pursue. 
Now, while we are sensitive to the position voiced most often by 
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radicals (and alluded to above) that structural arrangements 
place constraints on what policies are possible (Platt, 1969; 
Reiman, 1979), we agree with Sherman and Hawkins (1981) that what 
politicians believe about crime and criminal justice makes an 
important difference in what policies Hill ultimately prevail. 
In their words, "It may be that the 'power of doctrine over 
reality,' which some determinists have dismissed as 'imaginary,' 
is not present or not easy to di so ern in many fields of human 
activity. But in the sphere of penal practice it is clearly 
manifest" (Sherman and Hawkins, 1981:73; of. Cullen, Gilbert, and 
Cullen, 1983). Seen in this light, within the broad limits 
imposed by socio-political relationships, efforts to "educate" 
lawmakers to the merits of progressive "doctrines" may hold the 
possibility, if not the promise, of achieving meaningful reforms 
(Cullen and Wozniak, 1982). 
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Footnotes 
1
rn distinguishing liberal and conservative positions of criminal 
justice policy, no assumption is made that all political liberals 
will necessarily be "liberal" in this area, nor that all those on 
the political right will necessarily be conservative on crime-
related issues. While we suspect that there would be a clear 
tendency for general political and criminal justice ideology to 
be consistent, it remains an empirical question as to the magni-
tude of this relationship and as to the social circumstances 
under which this consistency will be strengthened or mitigated 
(cf. Bynum et al., 1984). In this regard, the recent passage of 
"get tough" laws and the concomitant escalation of prison popula-
tions clearly could not have transpired if political liberals had 
not abandoned their traditional progressive vision in favor of an 
expressly punitive criminal justice philosophy (Cullen and 
Gilbert, 1982). 
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TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH AND MEAN OF ITEMS ON CRIME CAUSATION 
Conservatives 
Breakdown of Discipline: 
1. A main reason why we have so much crime these days is because 
young people are just not taught to respect authority. 
2. Crime has increased in recent times because society has become 
too permissive. 
3. A main reason why people become criminals is that they have 
been raised in homes where there is a lack of parental discipline 
and where they are not exposed to adequate religious and moral 
training. 
Classical Theory: 
4. Most criminals know fully what they are doing when they break 
the law. 
5. Most criminals commit crimes because they know that they can 
get away with it. 
6. Most of the people who violate the law do so because they know 
that crime pays in America these days. 
Liberals 
Root Causes: 
7. A major reason why we have so much crime is because America 
still has too much poverty, racism, and social injustice. 
8. Crime is largely a product of such ills as unemployment, poor 
education, and a lack of equal opportunity. 
Positivist Theory: 
9. Many people commit crimes because they have very stressful 
emotional problems that they just can't handle. 
10. Many people are driven into crime by the frustration they feel 
when they fail repeatedly at school or can't get a job no matter 
how hard they try. 
11. People often break the law because they live in neighborhoods 
where most of their friends are getting into trouble. 
%Agreeing Mean 
63.6 4.99 
80.4 5.41 
70.5 5.06 
96.0 6.56 
66.7 4.98 
48.0 4.42 
46.0 4.23 
55.2 4.44 
50.5 4.40 
55.0 4.70 
57.9 4.57 
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TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH AND MEAN OF ITEMS ON VIEWS OF CRIME CONTROL 
A. Broad Social Control Policies 
1. Conservative: The best way to reduce crime in America is to re-establish 
the traditional values that made our country great: hard work, religion, 
respect for authority, and firm discipline in both the home and school. 
2. Liberal: The best way to reduce crime in America is to expand social 
programs that will give disadvantaged people better education, job 
training, and equal employment opportunities. 
B. Models of Criminal Justice 
Crime Control: 
3. The current crime situation suggests that we need large increases in 
the number of police and large increases in the number of prison 
facilities. 
4. Because crime now poses such a grave danger to the tranquility of 
our communities, it is imperative that we hire a lot more police and 
give them the power to catch criminals, and that we build a lot more 
prisons to house these dangerous offenders. 
5. It is an illusion to believe that simply hiring more police or building 
more prisons will reduce the crime problem. Unless we do something 
about the root causes of crime such as poverty and unemployment, 
the crime rate will remain high. 
Due Process: 
6. While giving offenders legal rights may inconvenience police and allow 
some guilty people to get off free, these rights are important because 
they prevent the government from abusing its power and because they 
protect the freedoms that Americans cherish. 
7. Criminals these days have too many legal rights because all the different 
court rulings often prevent the police from doing an effective job and 
allow a lot of guilty offenders to get off without any punishment. 
%Agreeing Mean 
84.5 5.96 
69.5 5.11 
64.0 4.96 
49.9 4.48 
76.0 5.62 
88.4 6.06 
66.3 5.13 
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TABLE 2- Continued 
C. Fairness in Sentencing 
Conservatives-Courts Are Just: 
8. The reason why our prisons are filled with poor people and members 
of minority groups is because it is these people that commit most of 
the crimes in our society. 
9. Whether a person is rich or poor, black or white, he will be treated 
equally by our courts. 
Liberals-Courts Discriminate: 
10. The reason why white-collar criminals are not sent to jail is because 
they have the money and power needed to avoid getting caught, avoid 
getting prosecuted, and to avoid getting a harsh sentence. 
11. "The rich get richer and the poor get prison'' is a fair way to characterize 
the way our criminal "justice" system works. 
D. Concern for Victims 
Conservatives-Punish the Criminals: 
12. If we really cared about crime victims, we would make sure that 
criminals were caught and given harsh punishments. 
13. We should stop viewing criminals as victims of society who deserve our 
help, and start paying more attention to the victims of these criminals. 
Liberals-Provide Services for Victims: 
14. If we really cared about crime victims, we would make sure that the 
government would give these victims the financial compensation and 
social services (e.g., counseling for a rape victim) they need to get back 
on their feet. 
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%Agreeing Mean 
69.0 5.12 
45.0 4.37 
46.5 4.30 
24.8 3.38 
67.0 5.17 
84.4 5.79 
83.7 5.76 
TABLE 3 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH AND MEAN OF ITEMS ON SUPPORT OF IMPRISONMENT 
A. Conservatives-Support for Punitive Goals 
1. Retribution: People who commit serious crimes deserve to be put away 
for a long time. 
2. Specific Deterrence: Stiffer jail sentences are needed to show criminals 
that crime doesn't pay and thus to make sure that they don't go into 
crime again. 
3. General Deterrence: Punishing criminals more harshly would reduce 
crime by setting an example and showing others in society that crime 
does not pay. 
4. Incapacitation: Even if prisons can't deter or rehabilitate,long prison 
sentences are needed so that we can keep habitual and dangerous offenders 
off our streets. 
B. Liberals-Opposition to Imprisonment 
5. Sending criminals to prison for long stays _doesn't make much sense since 
it will only increase crime because prisons are schools of crime. 
6. Prison sentences should be kept as short as is possible because depriving 
someone of their freedom is a very serious punishment in a society 
like ours. 
7. Expanding community corrections is a more reasonable approach to 
the crime problem than simply putting more and more people in our 
crowded prisons. 
C. Nature of Prison Conditions 
Conservatives-Prisons Should Be Painful 
B. While no one favors cruel and unusual punishment, prisons should 
be painful places to live in. After all, that's part of the price a 
criminal pays for committing a crime. 
9. We shouldn't worry too much about the rights of prison inmates; 
after all, they didn't worry about the rights of the innocent citizens 
they victimized. 
Liberals-Make Prisons Humane 
10. The main reason for putting offenders in prison is to deprive them 
of their liberty and not to force them to live in a degrading and 
dangerous environment. 
11. Most prisons are in horrible shape and the only humane thing to 
do is to take steps to improve living conditions for inmates. 
12. Inmates should be given all the rights that regular citizens have, 
except those that would endanger prison safety and order. 
%Agreeing Mean 
92.0 6.08 
71.7 5.28 
73.4 5.06 
91.8 6.05 
18.8 3.49 
10.8 3.00 
81.6 5.44 
37.1 4.05 
32.6 3.93 
69.8 5.05 
52.1 4.65 
24.5 3.44 
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TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH AND MEAN OF ITEMS ON FAITH IN REHABILITATION 
A. General Support 
1. Rehabilitating a criminal is just as important as making a criminal 
pay for his or her crime. 
2. I would support expanding the rehabilitation programs with criminals 
that are now being undertaken in our prisons. 
3. Because inmates are good at tricking parole boards into thinking they 
are cured, all rehabilitation programs have done in the past is to allow 
criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easily (conservative 
critique). 
B. Effectiveness of Rehabilitation: Does It Work? 
4. The rehabilitation of adult criminals just does not work. 
5. The rehabilitation of juveniles just does not work. 
C. Views of State Enforced Therapy 
6. Society has a right to try to rehabilitate criminals even if they don't 
want to be. 
7. Inmates who participate in treatment programs and who show signs of 
being rehabilitated should be released earlier from prison than inmates 
who refuse to try to better themselves. 
8. Participation in prison rehabilitation programs should be totally 
voluntary. Only those who want to be helped should be in the 
programs, and whether or not an inmate is involved in a program 
should have no influence on when he or she is released from prison. 
9. Rehabilitation and the indeterminate sentence are just tools that are 
used by prison officials to punish politically active inmates those 
inmates who protest the inhumanity of prisons or the brutality of 
guards are just kept in longer because they supposedly are not 
rehabilitated. 
%Agreeing Mean 
72.0 5.42 
84.8 5.56 
17.9 3.58 
41.4 4.24 
12.0 3.11 
68.7 5.12 
87.8 5.54 
29.3 3.88 
11.7 3.11 
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ABSTRACT 
Several recent studies of legislative lawmaking have noted an 
increased tendency to invoke governmental authority to address 
social problems in the United States. This paper proposes a 
context for interpreting changes in state legislative attention. 
Using the concept of density, it examines the structure of organ-
ized group participation in the urban policy process as a means 
of explaining legislative attention to crime, measured by the 
number of enactments to selected portions of the criminal code. 
In particular it looks at both the news dissemination function of 
urban newspapers in the development of a policy agenda and its 
interest group role of policy influence. 
The study is based on data collected in ten large American 
cities and their respective states (Atlanta, Boston, Houston, 
Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Newark, Oakland, Philadelphia, 
Phoenix, and San Jose) from 1948 to 1978. Content analysis of 
code changes in city and state provisions covering a variety of 
order maintenance offenses (disorderly conduct, drugs, and gun 
sale and possession), interviews with local knowledgeables about 
the characteristics of the changing political scene, and content 
analysis of newspaper coverage of crime form the data base. The 
analysis is organized to provide ten longitudinal tests of the 
hypotheses. 
While much more work is needed to specify the model fully, 
considerable evidence supports the idea that the level of 
interest group involvement in the urban political arena, in con-
junction with the level of news attention to the problem, plays 
an important part in stimulating legislative action. Thus, the 
newspaper influence may lie in its increasing coverage, which is 
translated into legislative action through the work of other 
groups. The state action has not been unilateral. Rather, it 
has occurred in response to the changing structure of demands 
brought to the legislative arena. 
THE STRUCTURE OF INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW: A STUDY 
OF TEN JURISDICTIONS FROM 1948-1978 
I. Introduction 
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Several recent studies have noted an increased invocation of 
governmental authority to address social problems through 
legislative lawmaking. Statutory content, whether in federal, 
state, or local criminal codes, defines the legitimate uses of 
state (i.e., public) power. The most frequent result of that 
statutory action has been to increase state involvement in the 
regulation of a wide variety of individual behaviors. See Berk 
et al. ( 1977) for a description of changes in the California 
penal code. It has also been invoked in economic life 
(Steinberg, 1982), on federal and state wage and hours legisla-
tion, and in social relations (Boli-Bennett and Meyer, 1981) on 
cross-national constitutional protections of children. However, 
the growth of governmental power is not an inevitable result of 
legislative action. Moves to decriminalize minor drug offenses 
and to restrict the power contained in judicial and administra-
tive discretion in sentencing are recent examples of legislative 
action to reduce the scope of state power or discretion. This 
paper proposes a context for interpreting changes in the level 
of governmental attentiveness to one kind of social malaise--
crime. 
Numerous case studies of the lawmaking process have empha-
sized the importance of particular groups in the lobbying 
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process. This study looks at the underlying structure of group 
participation in the development of law. In particular it looks 
at group participation in the local urban policy process as a 
precursor or 
legislatures. 
precondition for systematic attention by state 
One implication of such a view is that if the 
groups active in the local policy process change their level or 
patterns of participation, then the state legislative output will 
somehow be different. 
The research builds on data collected by the Governmental 
Responses to Crime Project at Northwestern University. The ori-
ginal project was designed to describe the changing dimensions of 
crime and the ways in which governmental agencies responded in 
the United States from 1948 to 1978. Much of the work documented 
trends in ten large American cities selected on the basis of 
variations in crime rates, demographic characteristics, region, 
and governmental expenditure patterns. The ten cities are: 
Atlanta, Boston, Houston, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Newark, 
Oakland, Philadelphia, and San Jose. The design is both 
longitudinal (31 years in the post World War II period) and com-
parative. It compares cities, states, and cities and states. 
(For descriptions of the overall project and findings, see Heinz, 
1982; Jacob and Lineberry, 1982a, 1982b). 
The data for the present paper draw on content analysis of 
state statutory changes in selected sections of criminal codes; 
reconstructed histories of the ten cities, including systematic 
ratings by knowledgeables in each city of the content of the 
political agenda; and the importance of groups in the local 
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policy decision making. Finally, the work draws on a content 
analysis of an annual random sample of newspapers in each city. 
The project conceptualizes two mechanisms for translating 
urban concerns into state legislative action. The first looks at 
the breadth and depth of group participation in the development 
of local policy. The second examines the information dissemina-
tion and agenda setting role of urban newspapers. The paper 
first discusses how the linkages may operate, drawing on 
available research. After laying out the design and data 
sources, it proceeds to test three basic hypotheses. 
II. Conceptual Issues 
A. Hypothesis 111: During a period of increased concern 
about crime, state legislatures have made criminal law reform a 
major priority. 
The variety of places in which the action may take place 
makes the study of criminal law writing interesting or difficult. 
"Action" is an appropriately vague term since the author is of 
necessity addressing a complex mix. The quintessentially local 
or discrete event constitutes a criminal event or act. It is 
local in that it involves individual actors in a specific time 
and place. However, the forces that may account for that action 
are driven by historical developments that extend beyond city 
limits (Jacob, 1984). To complicate the scene further, the 
response to the accumulating crime problems may be made at a 
number of governmental levels (Schattschneider, 1964). While 
crime may seem to epitomize urban blight, the definitions of 
crime and its punishments are made primarily by states although 
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some federal involvement and varying degrees of local involvement 
are possible. Thus, both the problem and the solution involve 
overlapping arenas of action. 
The present task is to provide some substance to the term 
"historical developments" that affect each. While the immediate 
"causes" of criminal law revisions may be as diverse as responses 
to court decisions or publicity surrounding a particular crime 
incident, the aggregation of revisions will, the author hypothe-
sizes, show continuity with patterns of urban political develop-
ment. Legislative attentiveness would be expected to increase 
over time, as crime becomes a more important urban issue. 
B. Hypothesis #2: Increased 
number of interest groups in local 
provide an important precondition for 
attention to crime problems. 
participation by a larger 
governmental policy making 
increased state legislative 
One of the characteristics of criminal law has been the 
reported domination by governmental actors of the law writing 
process. Thus, associations of district attorneys, judges, and 
police chiefs are some of the most frequently mentioned groups 
involved in code revision (Heinz, et al., 1969; Roby, 1969; Berk, 
1977; Fairchild, 1981). The importance of prosecution oriented 
groups is probably not unrelated to the general tendency to 
criminalize behavior and increase penalty severity. At first 
blush, then, a study of the sources of criminal law would seem 
to revolve around the preferences of the law enforcement 
"establishment." The actions, preferences, or needs of other 
community interests would seem of little explanatory value. 
Other research has suggested that the law writing process is 
not necessarily a closed system. Heinz et al. (1969) suggested 
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established law enforcement groups. For example, local chapters 
of the NAACP or ACLU, local bar associations, neighborhood 
groups, and civic reform groups now appear at state legislative 
committee hearings and speak out on sentencing reform, drug 
problems, and the like (McPherson, 1983; Buffum, 1983). 
Following from these formulations, changes in the pattern of 
relationships among the groups in the policy process in the urban 
scene are likely to produce changes in the state legislative 
responses (Hayes, 1981; Salisbury, 1969). 
The density of group participation is one way to concep-
tualize the structure of group involvement in the policy process 
(see Beecher et al. , 1981, for use of the concept in analysis of 
political agenda changes). By density the author is concep-
tualizing the variety of groups and their level of involvement as 
a three-dimensional space. That is, it includes information 
about the number of sectors of society that are organized and 
active in the public policy process, the intensity of that 
involvement, and the range of issues on which groups are active. 
A group system is viewed as occupying space in the policy 
process. If the space is fully occupied, each of a wide variety 
of groups would be maximally active. 
At the other extreme, if the group space were empty, no 
interests, either public or private, would be involved in making 
policy at all. Over time and place, varying portions of the 
space would be occupied. Density may be compared over time and 
jurisdiction to see how differences in the patterns of group 
participation are related to the level of legislative activity. 
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The density provides an estimation of an important external 
environmental condition in which the legislators operate. 
The concept of density may be used to describe an objective 
reality or a perceptual one. Measuring the two involves quite 
different tasks. However, the perceptual reality may play a 
strong role in determining the objective characteristics of 
participation as people act on their perceptions. Since the 
influence a group exercises is, in part, related to the impor-
tance attributed to it, the two factors are likely to be closely 
intertwined. In this paper the author is closely interested in 
the perceptual dimension since it provides the meaning in the 
political arena shared by knowledgeable observers. 2 
The crime issue is one that does not have a well-organized 
"natural" constituency such as one would find in economic regula-
tion. Action is likely to come when groups that exist for other 
reasons take up the crime issue. If the range of groups that are 
already active is small, the likelihood of success on the or ime 
issue would be expected to be small also. (Hayes, 1981; Wilson, 
1973). Because of the local nature of the perceived origins of 
crime problems and the tradition of local control, the source of 
initiations for policy solutions is likely to depend on the 
structure of the local policy scene. 
C. Hypothesis #3: Urban newspaper coverage of crime serves 
an important agenda setting function for state legislatures. 
The role of newspapers in the legislative process illustrates 
the multiple patterns of group influence. Newspapers may shape 
perceptions of the magnitude of the problem by the amount of news 
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coverage they provide. In this way news media help define the 
policy agenda. Berk et al. found a strong relationship between 
the changing crime rates and the amount of news coverage, 
pointing to the continuity between problem and agenda placement. 
Thus, newspaper coverage serves as a source for policy action in 
the state legislature. 
The local news media may also serve as important agents for 
the content of the interests of local organized groups. That is, 
group leadership in a city may develop their lobbying agenda 
from their perceptions of the content of urban problems as 
defined by urban news coverage. Thus news content becomes an 
information source for the entrepreneurial role of group leaders 
(Salisbury, 1969; Eyestone, 1978). 
In summary, one implication of the view that crime is a local 
and peculiarly urban problem is that the pressure to act is lkely 
to have its roots, not in the state house or legislative halls, 
but in the home districts. The crime issue is one that appears 
to rise or fall in part because of public concern and/or because 
of the political or bureaucratic benefits to be gained by the 
issue (Heinz, Jacob, and Lineberry, 1983). 
III. Design and Data Sources 
The research used a time-based, comparative design, examining 
trends in ten cities located in nine states. The selection of 
the ten cities was made to maximize differences in social, econo-
mic, and political development. The work used a most-different-
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systems design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The task for the 
analysis was to identify those trends within cities that 
accounted for variations across the jurisdictions. Thus, as much 
content as possible was provided to the terms "historical" and 
''cultural" differences. Each jurisdiction becomes a test of the 
hypotheses. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the different data 
sources, some general points about the larger project are in 
order. The data requirements for the larger project on which 
this paper draws were massive, costly, and certainly difficult to 
obtain. The reconstruction of complete series of data for each 
of the jurisdictions raised conceptual and methodological 
problems, particularly in the recreation of perceptual dimensions 
like policy agenda or group influence. In order to strengthen 
the subjective judgments of observers, the author tried to 
triangulate among available sources. At each step compromises 
necessarily were made among the competing interests of complete-
ness, comparability, depth, and research costs. 
A. Dependent variable: 
crime. 
state legislative attentiveness to 
The work used statutory definitions of a variety of order 
maintenance offenses--disorderly conduct, drugs, and weapons 
possession--to examine the shifting boundaries of public 
authority to control individual conduct. To accomplish this, it 
traced the ways in which the label of criminal has moved, been 
enhanced, removed, or reinforced. The work examined offenses 
that are on the periphery where less agreement is found than at 
the core of shared norms for legitimate conduct. 
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The behaviors 
are not insignificant social or law enforcement issues. They 
constitute a major portion of police work in most communities 
(see account of Chicago disorderly conduct case, Chicago Tribune, 
3/31/84; Jacob, 1984; Bittner, 1974). They perhaps more directly 
address a community's perceptions about crime problems than does 
information about murder, robbery, or rape reported daily in the 
media (Lewis, ed., 1981). Finally, because of the contextual 
base of their definitions they are useful measures of underlying 
social configurations. 
This paper used the sums of revisions adopted per legislative 
session (i.e., two years) in each jurisdiction to measure 
legislative attentiveness to crime. It did not incorporate any 
indication of the content of the change nor its subject. A revi-
sion was counted each time the definition or penalty of the 
selected offenses was changed. As a result, major code reform 
covering all offenses was weighted more heavily than discrete 
changes in a single offense. Over 400 revisions in the six 
offenses included in disorderly conduct, drugs, and weapons sale 
and possession were identified in the nine state codes. Two 
coders conducted the content analysis of the offenses using the 
Annotated Statutes. External and internal validity checks showed 
acceptable levels of data quality (Heinz, 1982). 
B. Independent variables. 
The work reported here used two independent variables, aside 
from a measure of time. The first was a summary measure of the 
concept of the perceived density of group participation in the 
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local policy process. It was based on ratings made by 
knowledgeables in each city (Beecher, 1982). Typically the 
knowledgeables were local historians, city editors, and the like, 
as well as the local field director who developed an expertise 
across all periods. The ratings were made for each mayoral 
incumbency--a variable time span--that provided a useful anchor 
for judgments across time and location. Each incumbency was 
rated by an average of three knowledgeables. They were asked to 
rate how influential each of a set of ten types of groups (labor, 
minorities, political parties, mayor, municipal employees, neigh-
borhood groups, civic or public interest (e.g., League of Women 
Voters) police chief, and the news media) were in encouraging or 
vetoing four kinds or urban policy issues: 1) economic develop-
ment, 2) minority hiring, 3) intergovernmental aid (e.g., federal 
grants), and 4) budgetary policy. The informants used a 1-7 
scale with 1 indicating that the group was of no importance at 
all and 7 meaning that the group was critical in determining the 
outcome. The average of all of the knowledgeables' ratings made 
for each group in each incumbency was then used for the sub-
sequent analysis. To obtain a summary rating of the importance 
of groups that would be sensitive to a wide range of issues as 
well as their level of involvement, the sum of the ratings across 
all four issues and ten group sectors was used. 
The summary ratings wherever possible were corroborated with 
historical sources. As evidence that increases in group density 
over time were not simply the result of better recollections of 
more recent events, the summary incumbency scores for three of 
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the ten cities showed greater participation in earlier years than 
in later times, consistent with other historical reports. 
The second independent variable estimated newspaper atten-
tiveness to crime. The indicator consisted of the proportion of 
front page articles devoted to crime (Swank et al., 1982). The 
datawere drawn from a content analysis of newspapers from nine of 
the ten cities for a random sample of dates. With these proce-
dures, 6,500 newspapers were coded to produce annual measures of 
news coverage in nine of the ten cities. (Newark's newspapers 
were omitted because of the expected overlap with New York city 
news.) 
C. File construction 
The data were organized into biennial series, matching the 
calendars of most state legislatures. The estimates of annual 
newspaper coverage of crime were summed and averaged to produce 
biennial estimates. Such a procedure served to reduce some of 
the annual variations that surrounded a trend of increased crime 
coverage over time. Biennial estimates of trends within incum-
bencies for group density were extrapolated from the incumbency 
based data. 3 
Findings 
A. Historical trends. 
In 1948 Harry Truman was president, the Chicago Cubs did not 
win the World Series, only a modest portion of the households in 
the United States had a single television, and computers and jet 
planes existed only in primitive forms. In many respects the 
world was indeed different then. By most accounts the political 
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world in 1948 was unbothered by the need to address crime 
problems. 4 For example, available measures of crime incidents 
showed relatively low rates--certainly when compared with the 
years to come. Newspapers devoted roughly one front page story 
in seven to crime. Furthermore, crime as a policy issue was 
generally not a high priority. According to knowledgeable obser-
vers, on a relatively uncrowded agenda for urban policy makers, 
crime took a back seat to a wide variety of economic issues 
(Jacob, 1984). In 1948 the range of groups positioned to 
influence urban public policy was relatively small. Based on 
estimates made by knowledgeables of the period, most interest 
group sectors (e.g., business, labor, community groups, police, 
political parties) played a minimal role in public policy deci-
sion making. 5 
From 1948 to 1950 the nine state legislatures together passed 
a total of three revisions involving any of the six selected 
offenses. Thus, in 1948, crime was not perceived to be a matter 
of urgent policy concern. The urban policy mechanisms such as 
group involvement or media coverage were not geared to the issue. 
As time passed, the relatively quiet urban agenda changed in 
response to the changing conditions and priorities. Riots, crime 
rates, poverty, racism, unemployment, corruption--by 1978 cities 
and the nation had become well aware of a number of these 
unsettling dimensions of contemporary life. State legislatures 
enacted more and more changes to their criminal codes. 6 By the 
1977-78 biennium the nine states, which had adopted a sum of 
three changes in the first sessions, passed fifty-five such 
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changes, averaging more than six revisions per state. In most of 
the jurisdictions the variety of groups perceived to be active in 
the local policy process and the importance of their contribu-
tions increased in major ways during the period. Civic groups, 
neighborhood groups, unions, business groups--their range, visi-
bility, and perceived importance to the conduct of political life 
increased significantly in most cities. The methods of con-
ducting urban policy changed, adapting to the increased legiti-
macy of the participation of numerous private and public 
interests. 
B. Testing the model. 
Assessing the utility of an urban-based model involves 
evaluating the number of tests (i.e., jurisdictions) in which 
urban conditions explain state legislative attention. The 
initial evidence provided moderate support for such a focus. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 shows the results of these tests. The R2 values indicate 
the proportion of variance in state legislative revision rates 
explained by three variables: the density of group participation 
in the local policy process, the amount of newspaper coverage of 
crime, and time. The standardized betas indicate the relative 
strength of the contributions of each independent variable after 
controlling for the effects of the others in the test. 
Over 30% of the variance in seven of the ten tests was 
explained by those three measures. When the jurisdictions were 
pooled, thereby grouping a wide variety of local historical 
experiences, the model explained over 30% of the variance. 
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1. Historical trends. 
An obvious explanation of the results is that the effects are 
artifacts of American history: what appear to be effects of 
local issues are, instead, tapping underlying national, not 
local, trends. Granting the caveats of small sample size (in 
each test sixteen biennial sessions were used) and measurement 
error in using historical reconstructions, the results are 
instructive. They indicate several points about the content of 
the historical trend toward increased legislative attentiveness 
to crime. 
In fact, in four of the ten cities (Oakland, Atlanta, 
Houston, and Philadelphia) the time dimension did not add signi-
ficantly to an understanding of the state enactment patterns over 
and above what the local variables contribute. In three more 
(San Jose, Indianapolis, and Bo stan) the historical trends were 
present but did not substantially affect the importance of the 
mobilization of urban interests as an explanatory variable in the 
conduct of state policy decisions. As an example, Figure 1 shows 
a near-perfect lock-step increase in both legislation and group 
activity, in this case for Oakland, where racial, crime, and eco-
nomic problems received increasing local attention (Graeven and 
Schonborn, 1981). The model of local political developments cap-
tures some of the content of that residual term "history" for 
a number of jurisdictions that varied tremendously in regional, 
political, social, and economic conditions. 
2. Structure of group participation. 
In four jurisdictions (Oakland, San Jose, Boston, and 
Philadelphia) the importance of local groups in explaining state 
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politics produced relatively strong, positive relationships (see 
the positive betas, all above .40), as hypothesized. 
In three others (Phoenix, Minneapolis, and Newark), what had 
been a positive relationship between characteristics of organized 
interests and state legislative activity turned to a negative one 
with the introduction of historical trends. Plots of the trends 
in state enactments and local group developments indicated that 
in each of the three cities group participation, while increasing 
over time along with enactments, tended to precede state enact-
ment increases. Minneapolis showed the process most clearly. 
Particularly in the latter half of the period, increased group 
activity in the city was followed a session later by an increase 
in the number of revisions (see Figure 2). Minneapolis' history 
of weak mayors and strong community involvement created a 
situation where organizational mobilization was an important com-
ponent of political life. Consensus building among civic organi-
zations, unions, downtown development groups, and, particularly 
in the later years, neighborhood and block clubs, was a prere-
quisite for subsequent policy action (McPherson, 1983). Thus, 
for seven of the ten the hypothesized model worked rather well. 
For the remaining three, Houston, Atlanta, and Indianapolis, 
the explanation appears to lie in more complex patterns 
involving state level political conditions. Reapportionment and 
the weakening of one-party control and party realignments changed 
the state political scene. Based on preliminary work, with the 
changes in the political structures even these fewer historical 
trends, contributed little to the state action. 
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In separate analyses that looked in more detail at the 
perceived influence of news media in the development of local 
policy, clearly the news media were perceived by local policy 
makers to play an important role as an organized interest. For 
example, in most of the cities a moderate to very strong rela-
tionship was found between the perceived importance of the media 
specifically and the general level of group involvement in the 
local policy process. The attribution of media influence 
appeared to operate in the same ways as that of other group 
interests. New spa per editors and publishers thus appeared to 
join in the local policy process--to be a part of it. 
The model of group capacity and newspaper attention as ante-
cedents of state legislative activity worked with varying degrees 
of success in nine of the ten cities in the study. Indianapolis 
needs further attention. While the overall model worked well 
there, explaining more than half of the variance, almost all of 
its power lay in the legislature's attentiveness to the histori-
cal trends in the state. The state's action seemed to be more 
attentive to general historical patterns, of which urban newspa-
pers took part.9 
IV. Summary and conclusions 
The overall model of the structure of interest group partici-
pation in legislative attentiveness to crime was supported in a 
number of tests in ten different jurisdictions from 1948 to 
1978. While many questions remain in order to specify the 
process fully, considerable evidence supports the idea that the 
level of interest group involvement in the political arena plays 
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an important part in stimulating action at the state level. 
Hence, the attention in a good body of literature to the pro-
cesses in the halls of the state legislatures, emphasizing the 
traditional elite support for the growing power of government, 
may need to be changed. Apparently the actors who are most 
frequently named in the legislative histories may serve in part 
as couriers for a broader range of local interests. 
Thus, as the structure of interest group participation 
changed, so that more were active in the process, legislatures 
became more attentive to their concerns. As examples, a former 
corporation counsel in Boston indicated that his office kept 
close tabs on action in the state legislature powers, noting that 
Boston was generally successful in obtaining state action on city 
recommendations at least until the last years of the White 
mayoral administration. A member of the city council in that 
city pointed out that local groups went to their state represen-
tatives with their grievances rather than to a member of the 
council because the representatives were easier to get to know 
since they served smaller constituencies than did members of the 
council, who were elected at large (Heinz, 1982). 
Local developments appeared to serve as the preconditions or 
stimuli for mobilization of the law enforcement community, tying 
law enforcement actors closely to the local political scene. 
Such a theme ran through the histories of these cities during the 
period. From police chief/mayors to politically derived crime 
waves, law enforcement has been an important element of urban 
politics. 
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A second point of interest involves the role of the press. 
Berk et al., proposed that the role of the press might be best 
understood as that of an established interest group in the 
political process--and that that role was different from its 
information dissemination role. The data presented here indicate 
that both roles are important in understanding the legislative 
process although the dynamics differ among the cities. Perhaps 
this provides some validation of the idea that crime legislation, 
which is often symbolic in nature, is likely to occur when the 
demands for action come from widely dispersed, newly formed 
groups whose voting strength may be unknown (Hayes, 1981). As 
newspapers turned their attention toward the coverage of crime 
they have increased legislators' attention to the problem and 
produced revisions in criminal codes. Thus, the role of the news 
media may lie in their agenda role which is translated into 
legislative action through the work of organized groups, of which 
they are one. 
The findings presented here suggest that the states have been 
extending their reach through prohibitions and sanctions in con-
junction with an expanded network of interest group influentials 
and a rising awareness of the problems of crime. Thus, the state 
actions have not been unilateral. Rather, they have occurred in 
response to the changing structure of demands brought to the 
legislative arena. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1An extension of this notion is the idea that the density of 
group participation will explain the level of state action across 
a broad range of policy options. 
2The author is indebted to Robert Salisbury for pointing out this 
dilemma. 
3rn practice, this required making a decision about appropriate 
trend assumptions in the life of group participation during an 
incumbency. The same scores could have been repeated for each 
biennial period in the incumbency. The resulting stairstep line 
seemed unnecessarily crude in light of the developmental process 
likely to be involved. Instead, the author made the assumption 
that the most salient or characteristic pattern would be asso-
ciated with the end of the term. The difference in incumbency 
scores was then parcelled out equally among each of the inter-
vening biennial periods. Thus, if the group density score for 
Rizzo's term (which lasted six years) was 125 while for his pre-
decessor it was 100, the difference, twenty-five was divided into 
four segments so that an increment of 6.3 (twenty-five divided by 
four) was added to each period from the end of his predecessor's 
term to the end of his own. In this way, the slope of the line, 
which was linear within an incumbency, might change across incum-
bencies. Lacking any baseline information, the incumbency scores 
were used for each biennial period for the first incumbency. 
This technique may explain some discrepancies in jurisdictions 
with long first incumbencies--Atlanta and San Jose. 
4Two exceptions were Indianapolis where policy discussions about 
serious crime problems occurred in the late 1940s--juvenile 
loitering and speeding cars. This concern was reflected in 
knowledgeables' estimates that crime was a very significent issue 
in 1948 (Pepinsky and Parnell, 1981). New Jersey state officials 
mounted a major political assault on drug users, an issue about 
which local policy makers expressed little concern (Guyot, 1983). 
This concern was not found among local policy makers. (Pepinsky 
and Parnell, 1981; Guyot, 1983). 
5The history in two of the cities, Atlanta and San Jose, each of 
which had dynamic and highly visible political leaders--Mayor 
Hartsfield in Atlanta and San Jose's city manager, Dutch Hamann--
suggests that they consulted organized interests somewhat more 
frequently in the process of rapid economic development than did 
their counterparts in other cities of the period (Tucker, 1981; 
Betsalel, 1983). 
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6The changes in these selected criminal prov1s1ons increased at a 
much faster rate than did the overall enactment rate in these 
legislatures. A rough estimate is that the legislatures were 
enacting approximately one and a half times as many provisions in 
1977-78 as they did in 1949-50. (Book of the States). The 
figures show an average six-fold increase in the number of enact-
ments to the selected criminal sections between 1949-50 and 
1977-78. As a measure of the external validity of the data 
which used a limited number of offenses from the criminal code, 
Berk et al. (1977) report a similarly greater increase in crimi-
nal code revision in California from 1955-71 than for all revi-
sions. 
7The list is long in many cities: the Committee of 70, the 
Pennsylvania Economy League, the Pennsylvania Prison Society, the 
Civil Rights Congress, and the local bar association in 
Philadelphia; the Pulliam Press in Phoenix; union endorsements, 
the New Jersey Conference of Christians and Jews, NAACP, CORE, 
and neighborhood social clubs in Newark; unions, the Downtown 
Council Civic League, bar association, and League of Women Voters 
in Minneapolis; the Community Alert Patrol, ACLU, bar associa-
tion, and Police Officers Association in San Jose. 
8In Atlanta, the city council was extremely active revising their 
ordinances covering the same offenses. The substance of those 
changes often preceded similar state action (Vann Woodward, 1957; 
Heinz, 1982). In Indiana, the city-state relations were restruc-
tured in 1969 with the adoption of metropolitan government; 
beginning in the 1969 session the Indiana legislature adopted 
many more criminal code revisions. 
9Two studies have ranked Indiana's legislature as moderately 
innovative (Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969). Indiana was among the 
five states of the nine that adopted major sentencing and drug 
reform provisions in the 1970s. The state has acknowledged its 
reliance on regional inovators like Minnesota and Illinois in its 
code revisions (Revised Statutes, 1977). 
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Table 1: Multiple Regression Results for the Density of Group Participation, Percent of Newspaper Crime 
Stories, and Time as Predictors of Legislative Volume of Revisions. (a) 
Beta Weights 
Group %of 
] urisdiction R R2 Density Page= Crime Time 
San Jose .85 .72 (.001) .60 -.53 1.79 
Oakland .78 .61 (.002) .70 .16 Drop 
Phoenix .75 .56 (.02) -.67 .20 1.20 
Indianapolis .72 .52 (.03) -.06 -.11 .77 
Atlanta .67 .45 (.02) -.53 .30 Drop 
Boston1 .65 .42 (.08) .54 .11 .54 
Minneapolis .57 .32 (.18) -.21 .04 .74 
Houston .44 .19 (.25) -.08 .51 Drop 
Philadel~hia .42 .18 (.10) .42 Drop Drop 
Newark .37 . 14 (.39) -.25 N.A . .53 
All 3 .56 .32 (.000) .14 .20 .42 
Notes: 
Variable scoring: Higher values indicate greater group density, greater crime coverage, more recent time, and 
higher biennial volume of legislation. 
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1Dummy measure of time used to indicate lull in legislative attentiveness to criminal sanctions and criminaliza-
tion (1961-69). A most likely interpretation was that the state was active but not in the punitive prohibitions 
that occupied its attention at earlier and later periods. This was a time when the state removed some of the status 
offenses, introduced zoning procedures rather than criminal sanctions to regulate pornographic businesses, and 
rhe like. 
2News coverage was not coded for Newark press. 
3Test includes the nine cities for which complete data were available; Newark was omitted because of missing 
news coverage. 
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This paper is a revised version of one presented at the 1984 Annual 
Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Chicago, IL. 
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM 
Correctional practitioners have long acknowledged 
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the 
problems facing inmates in the transition from prison to com-
munity. One set of responses to these problems is the formation 
of transitional centers to ease the transition to parole. 
Transitional centers, however, are not only attempted problem 
solutions (as elucidated in their goals). They are also public 
organizations or pieces of larger ones. A number of organiza-
tional and political actors may not always agree that those tran-
sition problems of inmates indicate a void in correctional system 
structure that must be filed with new resources and commitments. 
Development of transitional centers is a threat to existing 
organizations and represents at least implicit criticism of the 
existing public organizations. If transitional problems are 
severe and frequent enough to justify a new organizational 
response, then, by implication, prison staff and programs have 
been ineffective in preparing inmates for release or parole 
programs and staff ineffective in accepting them. Even if a new 
program is seeded with "new money" and precautions are taken to 
assure the existing program that its resources are not being 
drained, those committed to existing programs are likely to cry 
loudly. New money allocated to transitional centers could just 
as well have been allocated to bolstering prison or parole 
programs and perhaps with the same results promised by the new 
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program. The new program, then, threatens not only technological 
competence but resource flow. Finally, some transitional 
programs may threaten institutionalized positions (Warren, Rose, 
and Bergunder, 1974), not only in the correctional process but in 
a number of established service networks. 
example, 
parole. 
find offenders in the community 
Transitional center staff may 
Parole officers, for 
who are not yet on 
compete with parole 
officers for available referrals, and center residents may com-
pete with parolees for available jobs and community program 
slots. Those transitional programs that effectively shorten time 
served in prison may be perceived as treading on the judicial 
prerogative in setting minimum sentence. Similarly, these 
programs, by exercising prison release discretion, threaten the 
traditional domain of parole boards. 
The potential threats to mission are not limited to other 
criminal justice actors. Warren and his colleagues (Warren, Rose, 
and Bergunder, 1974; Rose, 1971) have vigorously documented the 
defensive posture taken by traditional community service organi-
zations against newcomers. While transitional centers may not 
threaten the institutionalized positions of these organizations 
as frequently as they threaten their own criminal justice 
cousins, the potential is there, particularly if the transitional 
centers and other community agencies differ over the perceived 
eligibility of clients or perhaps whether they are deserving. 
Those transitional programs operated by state agencies may 
attract professionals with liberal orientations on the one hand 
and may be removed from local political norms on the other. In 
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these instances, transitional centers are potential threats to 
local service networks as well as to criminal justice networks 
(Ohlin, Piven, and Pappenfort, 1956; Black and Kase, 1963; Reid, 
1964). 
Any transitional program will need to meet and overcome in 
some degree the challenges that arise from these threats. Which 
challenges will be the strongest and which will be most debili-
tating if not met satisfactorily depend on the type of transi-
tional program proposed and on the type of political field in 
which the program is initiated. 1 The actual program developed, 
in any case, may be explained by the cross products of differing 
organizational and political pressures and by the capacity of the 
transitional program organization to accommodate them. 
This study examines adaptations made by one transitional 
program from its inception in 1968 through its institutionaliza-
tion in 1978 as a regular part of the correctional process and an 
accepted member of numerous community service networks. The 
final shape of this program varied remarkably from its initial 
design. The central proposition of this study is that this pro-
cess of accommodation among organizational and political forces 
is patterned and potentially predictable, although generally 
unanticipated by the actors who propose and implement such 
programs. Additionally, variations in the nature of transitional 
programs are better explained by reference to these political and 
organizational forces than by references to the correctional 
goals of such transitional programs. 
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The Context of Community Placed Transitional Services 
As stated above, the intensity and the kinds of threats 
created by a developing transitional program, as well as the 
kinds of responses it might make, will vary depending on the 
nature of the inter-agency networks in which the new program will 
emerge. The context of this case history can be set with the aid 
of two diagrams that locate the emergent program within the 
correctional process (Diagram One) and within the continuum of 
local versus state resource and policy control (Diagram Two). 
Diagram One compares the location in the criminal process of 
four transitional programs with fairly equivalent goals. The New 
York State Department of Correctional Services and the New York 
Division of Parole, by a memorandum of inter-agency agreement 
have established pre-release centers in each of the state's major 
prisons. Each pre-release center is a separate non-re sidental 
unit in the prison staffed by a parole representative, a prison 
representative, and several inmate "resident counselors." Any 
inmate within three to four months of parole release may volun-
tarily attend the center daily and make use of its resources, 
which include New York State Department of Labor job listings, 
classes on preparing resumes and opening bank accounts, group 
sessions on dealing with loneliness and family adjustment, and 
seminars by community leaders on what to expect upon release. 
The Michigan Department of Corrections and the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Corrections operate a number of pre-release centers 
that provide for residence in the community of parole release for 
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somewhere between a half and three dozen inmates under super-
vision of a small (one to six) staff. Pre-release center 
residents actually reside in comunities, visit families, or seek 
and take employment, rather than write letters or ''practice" for 
these experiences, as is the case in New York. Finally, at the 
other end of the continuum, is a transitional facility model used 
in Minnesota. These Minnesota centers are community residences, 
but their residents are legally on parole. The goals of the 
Minnesota houses are identical to the goals of those in 
Pennsylvania and Michigan: easing the transition to parole. The 
facilitating process, however, takes place on the other side of 
the parole door. 
Diagram One About Here 
In addition, the questions of whether the proposed tran-
sitional program emerges before or after parole and prior to or 
after an inmate's transfer to a community setting, important 
questions arise concerning the relationship of the sponsoring 
agency to local constituencies that can support or retard program 
development. A tentative framework for ordering a variety of 
these other factors that impinge on transitional facility devel-
opment is provided in Diagram Two. Diagram Two is based on 
Warren's (1978) and Spergel's (1976) proposition that communities 
are an admixture of two principal dimensions: (1) the degree to 
which local units have access to centralized power and resources 
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and (2) the extent to which local units interact with each other. 
Specifying three particular points on these two dimensions, three 
basic political fields for transitional programs can be identi-
fied. On the left hand side of Diagram Two are correctional 
organizations ("community run" programs) with minimal formalized 
attachments to state authority. Financing, policy making, and 
legitimacy are primarily 
of a pre-release program 
local processes. 
of this type is 
A classic 
the Bucks 
example 
County, 
Pennsylvania work release center established by Major John Case. 
On the right hand side of Diagram Two are correctional organiza-
tions ("community placed" programs) with minimal formal attach-
Diagram Two About Here 
ments to other local units. Financing, policy making, and 
legitimacy issue primarily from a central or state authority. 
The Michigan 
this type. 
Community Treatment Centers 
In the middle of the figure 
are good examples of 
is a mix 
based" 
local 
organization) with 
community and to 
formalized attachments 
("community 
to both the 
centralized authorities. The 
Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, as reorganized by 
Jerome Miller, provides one example (Ohlin, Coates, and Miller, 
1978), and the Minnesota Community Corrections Act provides 
another (Blackmore, 1978). 
This case study will focus only on the right-hand side of 
Diagram Two (community placed systems) and the middle of Diagram 
145 
One (residential pre-release centers). These community placed, 
residential, pre-release centers are perhaps the most common form 
of transitional program (DeJong, 1980), and relatively complete 
historical data are available on one of them, the Pennsylvania 
Community Service Centers. 
A community placed pre-release center program has certain 
structural characteristics that are crucial to program develop-
ment. First, it is a program emerging from a central head-
quarters that operates the state prisons, if not parole as 
well. 2 This locus of authority assures a modicum of cooperation 
with the prison staff who initiate referrals to the centers. 
Such centers, then, are not likely to be starved for intake, a 
requisite for all developing programs. Pre-release, as a state 
agency commitment, also assures access to other state level 
executive and legislative officials. Relationships with central-
ized authority are built in and very helpful in terms of funding 
and attractiveness to experienced human service professionals. 
Community placed programs can usually count on continuing finan-
cial support and, compared to other types of programs, on 
educated and experienced staff. 
The position as part of a state agency, however, also 
heightens the political visibility of such centers. Community 
placed pre-release is a statewide social policy concerning prison 
transition problems. Every center in the state is thus 
vulnerable to the mistakes made at any other center. All centers 
are open to the changing and emotionally charged symbolic 
meanings associated with criminal punishment. 
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Therefore, the 
access to centralized power and economic resources is a double-
edged sword. It pressures central office oficials toward 
uniformity and standardization in pre-release practices in order 
that they can appear credible and in control when asked what the 
pre-release program is doing. However, the means by which 
central office officials increase their certainty about program 
operations will create inevitable problems for the department 
officials running specific centers at the local level. Some 
center directors, facing conservative local decision makers, will 
be forced toward practices that are more liberal than local or 
regional political coalitions usually tolerate. Other center 
directors, facing liberal local decision makers, will be 
restrained from practices that in their areas are not only 
tolerated but accepted. 
The state run, geographically dispersed system will be in 
constant tension between pressures for local and central control. 
Some degree of decentralization will always be present because 
central office administrators are cognizant of localized 
pressures and of the fact that central office policies will have 
varying and perhaps contradictory results across centers 
(McCleary, 1978). However, the question of which organizational 
dimensions can be centralized and which cannot will always be 
problematic. Moreover, previous decisions either to loosen up or 
tighten up may have long lasting effects on program substance, 
which in turn create new constraints on central office ability to 
command or let go and on local directors' abilities to respond. 
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Development of the Pennsylvania Community Service System3 
Convicted felons in 
bureaucracies, 
Pennsylvania 
the Bureau of 
are supervised by 
Correction (until separate 
recently), in the Department of Justice, which operates 
two 
very 
the 
state prisons, and the Board of Probation and Parole, a division 
of the governor's office, 
and administers parole 
which makes parole release decisions 
superv i sian. Transitional programs 
for 11 the were initiated under 1968 legislation that provided 
establishment of pri saner pre-release centers and work release 
plans" (Pennsylvania Statutes §§1051-1504). According to sub-
sequent administrative regulations, the residential pre-release 
programs provided "community living facilities for those former 
residents of regional and state correctional institutions who no 
longer require intensive custody. . By participating in this 
type of a program the resident facilitates his own transition to 
parole and subsequent release" (37 Pa. Code §95.111). The pre-
release centers were initially called "Community Treatment 
Centers, 11 presumably following the example set by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons which established its first center in 
Pittsburgh eight years earlier (Glaser, 1964). 
Plans for the initial center followed the federal model quite 
closely. These plans, as set forth in an inter-agency memorandum 
of agreement, called for joint administration of the centers by 
the bureau and the board. The bureau agreed to operate the 
physical plant and provide twenty-four hour supervision with 
staff called house managers. The board was to supply the coun-
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seling function by assigning one parole officer to each center. 
This officer would carry the center residents on his caseload. 
Very importantly, the board, not the bureau, also had control of 
intake, since all center residents were to be inmates who had 
already received parole dates. Center residence was originally 
designed to occur in the last ninety days of an inmate's prison 
term, which was roughly equivalent to the average period of time 
between pronouncement of parole acceptance and actual release to 
parole. Two centers opened under this inter-agency agreement, 
one in Harrisburg in 1969 and one in Wst Philadelphia in early 
1970. 
Informants in the bureau and the board differ about why this 
initial administrative agreement broke down, but they agree that 
it did not last long. Apparently, splitting the responsibilities 
for supervision of a residential program between two separate 
organizations was not an effective means to meet the diverse and 
immediate demands of the residents. Also, the bureau, if not the 
board, was 
capacity. 
seriously concerned with lack of speed in reaching 
The bureau saw half-empty houses as a threat to the 
viability of the new program. Bureau staff also asserted that 
decisions on intake to a residential program could not be made 
adequately by a detached parole board which is only concerned 
about a particular individual rather than about the social rela-
tionships in the center. Finally, actions taken shortly after, 
if not before, the breakdown attest to the bureau's commitment to 
expanding its community corrections functions, a province that 
until 1969 clearly belonged to the board. 
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At about the same time that the initial administrative design 
was breaking down, two significant events took place in 
Pennsylvania state politics. Significant amounts of federal 
dollars began to flow through the new state planning agency, the 
Governor's Justice Commission, and a new commissioner of the 
Bureau of Corrections, Alan Sieloff, was appointed. He was the 
first commissioner who was not previously groomed as a warden but 
instead had headed the Pennsylvania Council on Crime and 
Delinquency. Sielaff had a strong commitment to community 
corrections and the policy of reintegration championed by the 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Sielaff's immediate 
superior, the state attorney general, chaired the state planning 
commission. 
Sielaff quickly converted the two pre-release centers into a 
new Community Treatment Services Division in the bureau and 
appointed a strong central office director, Larry Barker, to run 
the division. He quickly gained the reputation as the "Jerry 
Miller of Pennsylvania." Sielaff and Barker immediately expanded 
the new division with an L.E.A.A. grant. By 1972, seven centers 
were open and totally staffed with bureau employees. Barker 
organized the centers into six regions, each with a regional 
director who was responsible not only for center administration 
but also for the development of new centers and the creation of 
other community corrections programs in the state. Each center 
was staffed with a director and two counselors as well as house 
managers. By design, the Community Treatment Services Division 
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did not accept staff transfers from prison but sought regional 
directors, center directors, and counselors with community 
service agency experience rather than prison experience. 
This period from 1970-1973 saw, then, not only rapid expan-
sion but a decided shift in ideology and public image. Barker 
traveled the state calling attention to what he saw as the 
cruelty of sentencing practices and openly challenging the power 
of judges. He painted the new mission of his division as one of 
emptying the prisons--a far cry from the initial inter-agency 
agreement for persons already approved for parole. In part icu-
lar Barker utilized the vagueness of the pre-release statute to 
make greater numbers of inmates eligible for center placement. 
By 1972, any inmate was eligible for consideration if he had 
served one-half his minimum sentence, had served at least nine 
months in an institution, and had no major prison misconducts for 
six months. The centers were quickly filled, in a few cases with 
residents who had as much as five years to serve prior to expira-
tion of minimum sentence. 
This rapid and fairly unruly expansion had some internal 
negative consequences. Center staff reported that their 
programs could not successfully supervise the same resident for 
several years. They observed that positive staff-resident 
relations lasted somewhere between six and eighteen months, but 
turned sour thereafter. Residents with long minimums still 
to serve began to see center rules and routine as unduly restric-
tive after this time period. Particularly if they were working 
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full time and attempting to carry on a normal family life, long-
term residents saw the return to the center each night as an 
unreasonable restriction. So, in fact, did most of the staff. 
Moreover, the centers had very limited capacities (ranging from 
twelve to thirty-six). Centers that had accepted many residents 
with long minimums were therefore stagnant, and other eligible 
prison inmates could not be served. Consequently a new program 
component called "out-residency" was added during this period. 
Out-residents were permitted to live elsewhere and report twice a 
week to the center. 
Out-residency not only solved the staff-resident relations 
problem, but expanded the capacity of the Community Treatment 
Division enormously. This innovation probably gave greater 
validity to Barker's claim that the centers were an alternative 
to incarceration and certainly a greater validity to his threat 
that he could empty the prisons. He and his staff had at least a 
functional equivalent of parole, except that they didn't wait for 
parole decisions. 
Despite the evidence of backlash from some conservative 
judges and strong concerns voiced by the Board of Probation and 
Parole, this liberal expansion continued unabated through 1973. 
By this time the bureau had assumed the total operational costs 
for seven centers and opened seven new ones with a new 1973-1974 
subgrant from the Governor's Justice Commission. By the end of 
1973 many of the centers were carrying more clients in out-
residency status than as residents. Each center had effectively 
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doubled its capacity without adding a bed. The system had grown 
like Topsy, although some of the effects of this expansion were 
not fully realized until political changes took place in 1974. 
Many of the most important characteristics of the current 
division program were born in this era, although these essential 
program features certainly did not resemble the original inter-
agency agreement and probably were not designed by Barker and his 
staff either. Instead, they were consequences first of the 
expansion and secondly of its rapid halt in 1974. In other 
words, some of these features probably could not even have been 
recognized until well after they were in place. Perhaps most 
significant were the following: ( 1) Unlike many other tran-
sitional programs, the Penmnsylvania 
control over their own intake process, 
centers gained virtual 
first by subventing the 
parole agreement and second by aggressively recruiting and 
selecting center candidates when prison counselors did not refer 
people quickly enough. (2) In the process of accepting persons 
with lengthy minimum sentences, the centers started a tradition 
of dealing with offenders with convictions for violent crimes. 
Programs in other states are often pro hi bi ted from accepting 
violent offenders either by law or through community resistance. 
(3) In these crucial formative years, the centers had extra-
ordinary luck in avoiding fatal mistakes. While some bureau 
and parole officials complained of unbridled discretion in the 
division, either 
rarely occurred. 
such mistakes were not documented or actually 
(4) Barker's charismatic, expansionist style 
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left many specific program decisions in the hands of regional and 
center staff. The staff rapidly developed their own programs as 
suited to their own skills and to the particuar characteristics 
of their respective communities. (5) The staff, while perhaps 
anti-prison in orientation, also developed their own self-
controls over expansionist excesses. Such a program could easily 
have gotten out of hand. However, alarmed by the negative 
climate produced by long-term residents, staff on their own 
discretion, cut back 
accept. Moreover, 
on lengths of stay they were willing to 
because they regarded out-residency as a 
capstone in a gradual release process, they took the supervision 
of out-residents seriously. Lastly, while each center's approach 
to services and counseling varied, all center counseling strate-
gies would have to be regarded as intense when compared to other 
pre-release programs. (6) Partly because of the rift with 
parole and partly due to the non-correctional experience of the 
staff, the center programs, with perhaps one exception, did not 
play "the paper game." In other words, center staff did not see 
it as their task to prepare residents to "make parole." The 
orientation was almost universally one of preparing the resident 
for independent life in the community, rather than one of pre-
paring the resident's file to meet parole board criteria for 
release. 
These elements were either solidified or completed by events 
occurring in late 1973. Commissioner Sielaff resigned to become 
commissioner in another state. Barker followed him. The 
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governor was running for re-election, and his challenger was a 
strong one who was believed to be preparing to use the community 
treatment expansion and out-residency in particular as a 
political issue. Backlash from criminal justice officials, which 
thus far had been successfully circumscribed, suddenly threatened 
to become a statewide political issue. 
The new commissioner, Stuart Werner, had been the deputy 
commissioner under Sielaff. He was appointed with orders to pull 
the correctional issues out of the gubernatorial campaign. This 
was done by placing an immediate moratorium on all new out-
residency placements. This move was successful from a political 
standpoint but caused a certain degree of chaos in the program. 
While the center staff had already begun reducing acceptance of 
residents with very long minimums, a substantial number of resi-
dents had as much as two years to serve prior to parole 
eligibility. Moreover, all current residents in January, 1974 
fully expected to gain out-residency status within a matter of 
months. Individual, family, and program plans suddenly came to a 
screeching halt with a few of the most liberal centers looking at 
virtually no resident turnover for a year or more. Inmates in 
prison who had requested transfers to centers began to hear 
rumors that the program was shutting down. While this was 
totally inaccurate, open center beds had suddenly became a very 
scarce commodity. 
This was the first of two major battles between the centers 
and the central office, but the moratorium on out-residency, 
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which effectively was cancelled eight months later 4 had rather 
unexpected effects. Rather than become a devisive force between 
residents and center staff, the out-residency ban, more often 
than not, united staff and residents against the central office. 
Center staff avoided the brunt of resident animosity by pointing 
to changes in regulations that were, accurately enough, out of 
their hands. 
Simultaneously, many centers, particularly in the western 
part of the state, adopted a significant shift in individual 
intervention strategy away from individual counseling and toward 
systematic and frequent use of services available from community 
agencies. 5 Additional reasons existed for the shift from an 
internal service to an external service focus by the center 
staff. 6 However, it was functional, if not planned, that the 
centers began to stress a resident's reliance on outside services 
at the very time when they could no longer count on actually 
living outside the center. 
The third significant "accident" in 1974 was the decision by 
the new commissioner not to replace Barker with another division 
director. Commissioner Werner, instead, elevated the six 
regional directors to the status of prison wardens and met with 
them directly. 7 The result was a very decentralized program. 
Not only individual case decisions but most policy decisions 
(with the notable exception of out-residency) were made at 
regional and center levels. Since the regional officers were 
either close to or housed in specific centers, participation of 
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center staff in management was high. 8 Compared to all other 
bureau units, the centers became grass roots democracies.9 
Measures taken in 1974 indicated that not only did the centers 
display ''healthier" social climates than either most prison units 
or community centers in other states, 10 but also in some centers 
virtually no gap occurred betwen the perception of climate 
reported by residents and that reported by staff. 
These simultaneous trends towards staff-resident unification, 
management democratization, and decentralization virtually 
completed the Division of Community Treatment Services program. 
The outcome was appropriately symbolized by a decision to change 
the name to the Division of Community Services. That these 
events, in effect, represented the final program outcome was 
"tested" two years later when the central office, influenced by 
another political change, attempted to "tighten up the ship." 
In 1976 the governor decided to seek the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination. He ran under the slogan that government should 
run as efficiently as business, an attempt to capitalize on his 
own business acumen and the 1974-1975 recession. 11 While his 
candidacy was short-lived, the immediate consequence for the 
bureau was yet another commissioner, previously the warden of the 
Allegheny County Jail. Commissioner Robinson's stated mission 
was one of efficiency and control. 
Robinson's first appointment was a new division director for 
community services. The new director, Tom Baier, had previously 
headed the program unit in the Allegheny County Jail. Baier 
was ideologically Barker's opposite. 
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While Barker had almost 
purposively sought chaos as a precursor to change, Baier sought 
efficiency, standardization, and central office control. After a 
lengthy planning process, most of his plans were announced at the 
division-1-1ide meeting in March, 1976. Policies covering twenty-
four separate program areas were announced, and directives on 
most of them were issued shortly thereafter. Most significant in 
terms of their impact were consolidation of six regions to three, 
controls on resident rent and savings accounts, additional 
furlough and out-residency controls, standardization of staffing 
patterns in the centers, controls on utilization of private half-
way houses, and standardization of time-to-parole during the 
intake process. 
The intentions of these and other polcies were clear: elimi-
nation of perceived slack resources, concentration of decision 
making at the central office, and uniformity across centers. 
Results were mixed. Anxiety in the centers was again rampant, as 
it was in 1974. The reaction to required staff control of resi-
dent finances was equivalent to the 1974 moratorium on out-
residency and in many respects handled the same way: staff 
unified against the central office. Resident anger, while 
intense, was generally directed upward rather than at center 
staff. For Commissioner Robinson, Baier was able to achieve (and 
in relatively short order) the appearance of control and effi-
ciency. The division budget was indeed cut, and resident rent 
money began flowing into the state• s general fund. In response 
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to almost any particular question about "how centers were doing, 
Baier could respond with the appropriate memo, directive or 
monthly report. 
The strong central office direction had some positive effects 
for center programs. In particular, Baier was able to renego-
tiate an inter-agency memorandum with parole, closing off old 
wounds, and, using the power of the commissioner, he was able to 
negotiate other agreements essential to the new external service 
style of the centers. For instance, by dealing directly with the 
commissioner of public welfare, Baier obtained formal recognition 
of the center residents• eligibility for public -assistance, a 
legal right the local county boards of assistance had long 
resisted. He 
directors and 
also engineered peace officer powers for center 
formal agreements with county sheriffs regarding 
detention of residents facing disciplinary charges. Both acts 
improved the capacity of center staff to institute greater due 
process in the center revocation process (see Duffee, Maher, and 
Lagoy, 1 9 7 7) • 
Some new policies had unexpected effects. For example, 
through 1975, centers had direct control of subcontracting 
arrangements with private halfway houses. These resources were 
used especially for inmates with alcohol or drug histories. 
These inmates were often transferred directly from prison to the 
private program, although they were carried on center caseloads 
as out-residents. Baier saw this situation as potentially 
hazardous as well as disorderly. A directive was issued 
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requiring all residents to serve six weeks in a state center 
before transfer to a private program. Since center staff saw the 
first six weeks as the most critical for these inmates and also 
saw the centers as incompetent to handle serious drug abuse 
problems, they simply stopped accepting referrals with histories 
of drug problems. While the apparent intention was both informal 
bureau licensure of the private programs and additional controls 
on out-residency, the effect was a reduction in the incidence of 
drug problems among center residents to 7% (compared to 30-50% in 
some other states). 12 
Many center and regional staff reported that their 
disagreements with Baier's actions were not so much substantive 
as procedural. They resented the unilateral approach, particu-
larly after three years of autonomy. The impact, however, was 
probably minimal or even positive. Surveys in 1977 reported 
staff relationships improved rather than deteriorated, as once 
again, they united against a central office threat. Power with 
some other local units such as sheriffs and welfare increased. 
Local center discretion concerning use of community service 
agencies, with the exception of group homes, was not altered. 
The unique styles of staff-resident interaction within centers 
remained unchanged. 
Arguably, centralization did not occur. While the average 
amount of discretion in policy making, as reported by center 
directors and counselors, went down somewhat in 1977 compared to 
1976, variability across centers actually increased. Reasons for 
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this were related to differential responses across regions and 
within centers to the uniform strategy from above. By 1977, the 
inter-staff relationships, staff-resident interactions, and 
center-to-human service system relationships of individual 
centers were so variegated that attempts to make all the centers 
more alike resulted instead in highlighting their differences. 
While continuation of the central office pressure for a 
longer period of time may have had different effects, that 
pressure was removed by Baier's abrupt resignation in the spring 
of 1977. He was replaced by the present division director, 
Charles Pagana, who took the postiion that most center problems 
were best handled at the center level. He operated by setting a 
general context for center activity but generally refused to 
prescribe particular actions. With some differences, the centers 
returned to their 1974-1975 mode of operation. 
When yet another commissioner was appointed, he retained 
Pagana, praised the centers for their effective work (the first 
such pronouncement from the commissioner level), and formally 
recognized the Division of Community Services as a mature com-
ponent of the bureau. 
to do what they had 
In his words, "The centers would continue 
demonstrated they could do well." The 
Division of Commuity Services had been institutionalized. 
Program Development and Program Success 
From the perspective of this analysis, the centers and the 
division as a whole had succeeded in weathering a number of 
political and administrative storms. They had done so by carving 
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out an institutionalized position with officials in the prisons, 
with the Board of Probation and Parole, with the Department of 
Public Welfare, with sundry service networks each operating under 
different local political norms, and with their own central 
office, which, from 1969 through 1977 regarded them as an experi-
mental weapon, at times aimed at conservative judges and the more 
conservative parts of the same bureau, and at other times as a 
weapon turned against its own developers. 
This achievement is in large measure attributable to the 
managerial and clinical skills of its staff, and in some measure 
to unanticipated consequences of purposive behavior, the peculiar 
ways in which unplanned (but not random) internal and external 
constraints combined, and random error (or luck). At the 
individual level in all phases of the program development, 
rational intent was evident but few chosen objectives were 
reached. At the level of the di vi sian as a system, no guiding 
purpose was evident but in general a drift toward an outcome that 
appeared functional for the division and probably for the indivi-
duals it served as well. 
The final organizational outcome bears little relationship to 
the ninety-day pre-release center concept that provided the ini-
tial agreement and little resemblance to transitional programs in 
other states. In comparison to many other transitional programs, 
the Pennsylvania centers are characterized by lengthy client 
stays, concentration on violent rather than property offenders, 
high use of external services, a large number of centers with 
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relatively small capacities, high per diem costs, low program 
failure rates, low parole failure rates, extreme selectivity in 
the program intake process and high control over that process by 
the program staff, a small proportion of prison releasees served, 
low staff turnover, high staff education and professional orien-
tation, and a non-correctional and at times anti-prison orien-
tat ion among staff. In comparison to other community placed 
systems, Pennsylvania shows a high degree of decentralization, or 
lower than expected central office control, and a higher degree 
of center interaction with other local organizations. 
In this case, the community placed pre-release program devel-
opment cycle appears to have developed in the following way. 
(1) In the initial stages of the pre-release program, 
central office concerns drove development because local 
ties had yet to be made, and centers were dependent on 
central support both for legitimacy and for intake. 
(2) Political issues at the central level, however, cycled 
more slowly than at the local level. Central office 
officials relaxed control in periods between significant 
statewide events (such as gubernatorial elections) 
seeking to control the diversity of center problems 
through decentralization. 
(3) Local officials used their greater room to maneuver to 
develop niches for their individual centers in local 
political and service networks. Diversity across cen-
ters increased tremendously, and the different charac-
teristics of the local niches reduced the ability of 
center staff to respond to central directives. 
(4) Significant shifts in policy at the central office level 
at later periods in program development required con-
siderably more drastic administrative action than pre-
viously, to get equivalent amounts of center response, 
and, in fact, central office policy change over time 
became more ceremonial than real. 
( 5) The transitional program, over time, reached a quasi-
stationary position, or the program outcome. 
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(6) This outcome is more accurately described with reference 
to the constraints built into the program during its 
first cycle of central-local accommodations than with 
reference to program proposals or program goals. 
Whether this outcome was "successful," in correctional 
terms, was probably a rna t ter of chance rather than a 
matter of design. But the program outcomes that 
appeared successful, in the correctional currency of 
the outcome period, were rationalized as intended. This 
program was then institutionalized but may not be 
replicable. 
In other words, the appellation of "success" to this program 
development is a label applied post hoc when a complex sequence 
of solutions to multiple constraints was functional internally 
and externally and pronounced to be efficacious. Observers can, 
in fact, look back toward the proposed goal of "easing transition 
from prison to parole" and say that the goal had been achieved. 
They cannot, however, say that the goal guided achievement except 
in the rough and ready sense that the initiating goal was instru-
mental in mobilization of resources at a particular point in 
time. The particular linkage of ends and means that were pro-
nounced efficacious were not built into the initial design but 
into that stage in the developmental process when the program 
became institutionalized. 
Whether that outcome can ever be used as a blueprint for the 
establishment of another successful program is a proposition that 
must be seriously questioned. Data about a successful program 
may be used to gather sufficient sentiment and economic resources 
behind a similar goal to begin another resource mobilization 
effort, but the effectiveness of a program may be less a function 
of what it is proposed or designed to do than what it goes 
through as it develops. To assume anyone could recreate the 
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constraints that led to success strains credibility. This 
assumption is a rationalization of history and a poor guide to 
implementation. 
If this version of community placed program implementation is 
credible, a rationalistic version of program success and failure 
is not viable, and decisions to fund programs on the basis of 
initial program design are naive. However, the practical result 
should probably be greater activism in program planning and 
development rather than the reverse. An arguable conclusion of 
this dynamic view of program development is that alma st any 
program starting point has a potential for success. The view 
that anything may work (and may, just as likely, fail) is better 
than taking the view that "nothing works." Exemplary projects 
may not be the best guides in selecting the next program, but 
program planners can learn as much from failures as successes, 
since attention should be focused on how a program can turn 
constraints into opportunities rather than on claims about how to 
ease the transition to parole. 
An example of a similar developmental process in community 
placed transitional programming but with a different program out-
come is the Michigan pre-release system. This system, initiated 
with the same goals, was shaped by different constraints. The 
program in Michigan also qualifies as a success in the sense that 
it has reached an institutionalized position. The Michigan pre-
release program is the second largest in the country in terms of 
residential capacity and in terms of proportion of inmates 
served. 13 Michigan, unlike Pennsylvania, has a unified prison 
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and parole administration. Consequently, Michigan has used a 
number of center staffing patterns unavailable in Pennsylvania. 
Larger Michigan centers have their own full-time staff, but 
centers in smaller population centers have been staffed with 
parole officers. 
While developed during the same period as the Pennsylvania 
centers, Michigan centers have gone in a different direction. 
While the Pennsylvania pre-release centers stress intense inter-
vention with individual clients, Michigan centers stress their 
utility as a screening device for parole selection (Johnson 
and Kime, 1975). That is, the Michigan Department of Correction 
takes the position that clients who successfully conform to 
center program rules are good risks for parole, and those who 
fail in centers are poor risks. The center stay it self is not 
seen as an intervention process but as a screening device. High 
program failure rates are tolerated under the assumption that 
persons unfit for parole have thus been eliminated from con-
sideration. 14 
While Pennsylvania centers have succeeded as a program that 
prepares a small, select group of pri saner s for parole, Michigan 
centers have succeeded as a program that tests whether a large 
number of prisoners are already prepared for parole. Both states 
began with the federal ninety-day pre-release model. Michigan 
retained it; Pennsylvania did not. Both programs succeeded in 
establishing domains but with contrasting proficiencies. 
Ironically, the Michigan success, which processes large numbers 
of offenders into community settings, developed under the rubric 
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of a conservative social defense ideology, while the Pennsylvania 
success, which processes a small number of offenders, developed 
under the rubric of a liberal, empty-the-prison ideology. The 
outcome in either case could not have been predicted from the 
starting points, but both successes are related to system capaci-
ties to adapt to changing constraints in their varying political 
fields. While both systems are pre-release, residential centers, 
as depicted in Diagram One, their differences can be explained by 
shifts in the political fields depicted in Diagram Two. Michigan 
remained a centralized, community placed ·system. The majority of 
decisions regarding client flow 'and program services are still 
made at the central office, and the primary transition function 
remains the one of transferring center residents to parole super-
vision. In contrast, the Pennsylvania system, at a critical 
point in its development, relaxed central control and permitted 
center staff the discretion to elaborate their programs in ways 
that maximized responsiveness in local service markets. Later 
attempts to reassert control had effects but often not the 
intended ones. As a result Pennsylvania ended up with intensive, 
change-oriented centers rather than parole screening devices. 
The Pennsylvania centers, in other words, formalized their 
relationship with local service networks and shifted from a com-
munity placed field to a community based field. While the goal 
of easing transition to parole initiated both programs, differing 
political and organizational constraints encountered during the 
developmental process have meant that success of the two programs 
was ultimately defined in very different terms. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Which kind of transitional program even reaches proposal 
stage is also, to be sure, influenced by these same factors. 
One could hypothesize, for example, that both Michigan and 
Pennsylvania state correctional departments were in better 
strategic positions than, say, the New York department to 
propose residential pre-release centers. This could mean 
they had greater power to resist localized opposition to such 
a program or could mean the departmental coalition (Zald and 
Berger, 1978) favoring such an innovation was stronger than 
the resistances in the department, relative to New York. 
Observation and anecdote would suggest both hypotheses are 
likely true. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, which focuses on changes in program development 
rather than factors that impede or facilitate a proposal. 
2. Whether the prison and parole administration is unified (as 
is the case in Michigan) or bifurcated (as is the case in 
Pennsylvania) is extremely important, since this variable 
determines whether domain conflict between pre-release and 
parole can be settled through appeal to higher authority or 
only through inter-agency negotiation. This point will be 
discussed briefly in the last section of this paper. 
3. This descriptive analysis is based on data collected between 
1974 and 1982. The quantitative data summarized in the 
following footnotes were collected between 1974 and 1977 when 
the author was the principal investigator in a series of 
evaluation contracts between the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Corrections and the Pennsylvania Governor's Justice 
Commission. A sries of seven technical reports was issued 
during the evaluation. These reports are available from the 
commission (now the Governor's Commission on Crime and 
Delinquency). Structured interviews were conducted with all 
staff in the bureau central office and in the centers in 
1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977. Questionnaires were administered 
to residents and staff in 1974 and 1977. Since the termina-
tion of the contract, the author has continued to maintain 
contact with both regional directors, center staff, and the 
division director. In addition to the quantitative data, 
extensive use has been made of program monthly reports, 
bureau directives, and policy statements and field notes 
based on hundreds of hours of observation and discussion with 
both central office and center staff. The author expresses 
his admiration and gratitude to the entire bureau staff for 
their openness and willingness to have their problems as well 
as successes discussed and analyzed in print. 
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4. Officially, the moratorium on out-residency was lifted eight 
months later in August, 1974, but the "reinstatement" 
included so many restrictions on placement that most resi-
dents were ineligible for out-residency. The central office 
required new out-residents to have medical justifications for 
living outside the center or documentations of family and/or 
employment complications that were difficult to complete. 
Centers found some new methods of dealing with this can-
cellation but not until 1977. Bitterness and disappointment 
about the out-residency policy changes were still strong 
among center staff three years later. 
5. One center went so far as to refer out not only vocational 
training, education, and employment problems, but also vir-
tually all traditional counseling functions. Said this 
center director, "We've shifted from rehabilitation to rein-
tegration. We don't want our residents becoming dependent on 
the center. If they need counseling, we'll help them get it 
from the local counseling center." This director shuddered 
at someone's suggestion that the center start a softball 
team. "The last thing we want," he said, "is for these men 
to find their friends and entertainment here--and I mean 
either staff or other residents. If they want to play soft-
ball, they should join teams at the Y." 
6. Not to be underestimated is simple maturation of the centers. 
Inter-organizational service arrangements are difficult to 
consummate. All centers improved their service referral 
linkages between 1974 and 1977, and a positive correlation 
was found between center age and strength of service linkage. 
7. Reasons for these decisions are speculative. Perhaps a 
strong central office division director was a more visible 
target for the governor's challenger in the 1974 race. 
Barker certainly would have been one. With the charisma gone 
and no one in the director's chair, conservatives had to 
point at six regional directors, none of whom symbolized a 
statewide program. Another possibility is that during this 
time of trouble, the commissioner decided to control the 
regional directors himself rather than through a central 
office director. That is, the decision to leave the division 
leaderless at the division level may have been seen as a 
centralization move. If so, it had exactly the opposite 
effects. 
8. A number of center and regional directors made conscious 
efforts to include not only counselors but at least full-time 
house managers in almost all decisions. One regional office 
allowed the secretary and student interns to vote on signifi-
cant decisions and to participate in supervision of cases. 
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g. Democratization had many facets, not the least of which was 
an ad hoc job enrichment. Center directors were not adverse 
to manning the reception desk while house managers were out 
in the field developing job contacts. 
10. Moos' Correctional Institutions Environment Scale was 
employed (Moos, 1975). The centers were less control and 
order oriented than Moos' community center norms and more 
practically oriented. Centers also showed high degrees of 
support and spontaneity. 
11. He was a self-made millionaire who had built an electronics 
empire before becoming governor. 
12. Comparative resident problem data are available in D. Duffee 
and D. Clark (forthcoming). 
13. In Michigan 40% of all paroles issued are granted to persons 
who previously resided in pre-release centers (Michigan 
Department of Corrections, 1978). 
14. The department points out, and probably correctly, that 
program failures are often less costly than parole failures. 
A program failure can be triggered by violation of program 
rules rather than commission of new crimes and returned to 
prison quickly (under Meachum v. Fane 96 S. Ct. 2536 (1976). 
Revocation from parole requires higher evidentiary standards 
of wrong doing. Wrong doing by parolees is also less likely 
to be observed, since parole contact is intermittent while 
staff-resident contact in centers occurs on a daily basis. 
The data on the Michigan development were collected in 
1977-1978. The author relied heavily on interviews with the 
department director of research and evaluation, the director 
of the community treatment centers, and the prinicpal 
trainer of center staff. In addition heavy reliance was 
placed on official documents and evaluation reports by 
Community Corrections Resource Programs (1974). Obviously 
these sources are not nearly so rich or varied as the data 
on the Pennsylvania developments, but the information 
regarding the significant differences in central office 
versus local center control and conservative versus liberal 
political regimes appears to be reliable. 
171 
REFERENCES 
Black, B. J., and H. M. Kase (1963 
rehabilitaion and mental health." 
37:26-32. 
"Intergaency cooperation in 
Social Service Review, 
Blackmore, J. (1978) "Minnesota's community corrections act takes 
hold." Corrections Magazine, (March):46-56. 
Community Corrections Resource Programs Inc. (1974) State of 
Michigan Corrections Centers, Analysis and Recommendations. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Community Corrections Resource Programs. 
DeJong, W. (1980) American Prisons and Jails, Volume 
Supplemental Report--Adult Pre-Release Facilities. 
DC: National Institute of Justice. 
V: 
Washington 
Duffee, D., J. Maher, and S. Lagoy (1977) "Administrative due 
process in community pre-parole programs." Criminal Law 
Bulletin, 13:5 (September/October):383-400. 
Duffee, D., and D. Clark (forthcoming) "The frequency and classi-
fication of the needs of offenders in community settings." 
Journal of Criminal Justice. 
Glaser, D. (1964) The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole 
System. Indianapolis, IN: Babbs Merrill. 
Johnson, P., and W. Kime (1975) "Performance screening--A new 
correctional synthesis." Lansing, MI: Michigan Department of 
Corrections (mimeographed). · 
McCleary, R., (1978) Dangerous Men: The Sociology of Parole. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Michigan Department of Corrections (1978) Annual Report. 
Lansing, MI: Department of Corrections. 
Moos, R., (1975) The Evaluation of Correctional and Community 
Settings. New York: Wiley. 
Ohlin, L., R. 
Correction: 
Ballinger. 
Coates, and A Miller (1978) Reforming Juvenile 
The Massachusetts Experience. Cambridge, MA: 
Ohlin, L., H. Piven, and D. Pappenfort (1956) "Major dilemmas of 
the social worker in probation and parole." National Probation 
and Parole Association Journal, II (July):211-225. 
172 
Reid, w., (1964) "Interagency coordination in delinquency preven-
tion and control.'' Social Service Review, 28 (March):418-428. 
Rose, S., (1971) Betrayal of the Poor. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. 
Spergel, I., (1976) "Interactions between community structure, 
delinquency and social policy in the inner city," in M. Klein, 
ed. The Juvenile Justice System. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Warren, R., (1978) Community in America, Third Edition. Chicago: 
Rand McNally. 
Warren, R., s. Rose, and A. Bergunder (1974) The Structure of 
Urban Reform. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Zald, M., and M.A. Berger (1978) "Social movements in 
organizations: coup d'etat, insurgency, and mass movements." 
American Journal of Sociology, 83:4 (January):823-861. 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY VS. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
by Dr. Dorothy Guyot 
Senior Research Associate 
Center for Policy Research 
173 
Acknowledgments: The welcome given to social science inquiry by 
George W. O'Connor has made this study possible. My thinking on 
the issues of political direction for police departments has 
benefitted greatly from the observations of Daniel P. Guido, an 
experienced police manager, and of Robert A. Stierer, an 
experienced city manager. Mary Stierer's clipping file has 
provided many useful details. For collegial criticisms I am 
indebted to Erika Fairchild, Fred Meyer, Samuel Walker, Mary Ann 
Wycoff, and Roger Parks. 
Police policy is public policy. Virtually no matters of 
a policy nature do not impinge upon the public. The 
involvement of the client in policy formation is an 
important goal (1976). 
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George O'Connor made this observation after having served in 
four departments, two of which he managed. This call for public 
policy voiced by increasing numbers of police managers is a break 
from the advocacy of freedom from political direction. Since the 
turn of the century, progressive police administrators have 
fought hardest to remove decisions on hiring, assignment, and 
promotion from the influence of powerful individuals outside the 
department and to end corrupt ties to political bosses. They 
were correct in their assessments that internal accountability 
was not possible in the face of pervasive political interference. 
In striving to insulate police departments from interference, 
however, they rebuffed all policy direction. Their protective 
wall was the fiction that policies were unnecessary because 
police departments simply and automatically apply the law to 
lawbreakers. The traditions of secrecy in policing and a long 
standing reluctance of many police chiefs to engage in public 
debate give reason to suppose that the prevailing low levels of 
political accountability are exclusively the fault of police 
leadership. Not so. This paper examines a decade of political 
events in a city where the police manager sought to develop 
accountability based on informed debate on police issues but met 
little success. 
When police policies are made by agencies or individuals out-
side the police department, power is being exercised over the 
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actions of police department members. Power is defined here as 
the ability to get someone to do something that otherwise he 
would not have done. As in daily speech, accountability is an 
appropriate and responsible exercise of power, and interference 
is irresponsible. This paper attempts to develop a reasonable 
set of criteria, appropriate to late twentieth century America, 
for distinguishing responsible from irresponsible exercises of 
power in directing municipal police. 
Political accountability occurs when governmental agencies 
and officials outside the police department formulate policy and 
obtain adherence to pol icy. 
will be excluded from this 
Direct accountability to citizens 
discussion. For example, when a 
citizen asks for and obtains traffic enforcement against speeders 
on his block or phones a sergeant to obtain an apology from an 
officer for a rude remark, that is direct accountability. When a 
citizen channels the same demands through a city councilman, that 
is political accountability. In contrast to both of these forms 
of accountability is internal accountability, by which super-
visors and managers within the police department make and direct 
the implementation of policy. This discussion excludes internal 
accountability in order to concentrate attention on policies made 
outside the department. The paper also omits consideration of 
personnel issues in order to concentrate on service issues. 
Distinctions Between Political Accountability and Interference 
The setting of priorities among goals is an act of political 
accountability. City executives and legislatures are appropriate 
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bodies to make the difficult choices of what problems to address, 
what levels of services to provide, what mix of policies to pur-
sue. In regard to specific policies, one may distinguish between 
accountability and interference by using a framework for perform-
ance measurement developed by the Indiana University Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis (Whitaker, Mastrofski, 
Ostrom, Parks, and Percy, 1980). Police policies may be measured 
against five different types of criteria: legality, effective-
ness, efficiency, equity, and fiscal integrity. A particular 
policy may meet the test of accountability on one criterion and 
fail the test on another. 
1) Legality is the requirement that all members of a police 
department obey the law. For most government agencies this 
requirement falls particularly upon individuals in policy making 
positions because they have most opportunity to break the law. 
Since in police work the greatest discretion is exercised by 
street level officers, the requirement falls most heavily upon 
them. Violations of the law include actions that are feared and 
despised: shooting citizens for no good reason, beating of 
prisoners in custody, placing under surveillance citizens who 
have broken no law, and taking bribes. Any directives by city 
officials for police officers to take illegal actions are politi-
cal interference. All policies that were legal meet this test of 
accountability, whether or not they are in other ways misguided. 
2) Effectiveness criteria are the ones most frequently used to 
assess policies and performance. Effectiveness may be viewed as 
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the ability of a policy to achieve a goal or to resolve a 
problem. A first distinction to be made is sorting out public 
debates over police effectiveness is whether the debate focuses 
on the nature and importance of the problem or on the techniques 
of the solution. This distinction between problems and solutions 
is far from clear because the very way in which a problem is 
formulated implies a solution. In general, when problems are the 
issue the demand is phrased, "Somebody do something!" When the 
solution is at issue the demand is, "Do it!" Depending upon the 
way a problem is identified, one or more organizations may be 
held responsible. If there is agreement that a particular 
organization is responsible for the problem, this is equivalent 
to saying that some goals exist for the organization's perform-
ance, however vague, and that the organization has not met those 
goals. That is, problems are specific instances of unmet goals. 
Sometimes, however, goals are muddled. Me surement of effec-
tiveness requires that the goals be clear enough so that an 
observer can discern whether they have been met. 
Every organization may be regarded as having goals in many 
different areas. Since an organization can be more or less 
effective in achieving the various goals, no single question of 
effectiveness exists but as many questions of effectiveness as 
there are goals (Whitaker, 1980; Hrebiniak, 1978). Moreover, the 
goals are defined by a variety of constituencies: management, 
staff, other organizations from which it receives inputs and to 
which it gives outputs, and consumers or clients. Any of the 
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constituencies may hold up a goal against which to measure 
departmental performance, and these goals may be in conflict. 
Among the welter of goals, the ones that actually influence what 
members of the agency do in their organizational roles are opera-
tional policy. 
When an organization is not effective in meeting a goal, four 
different factors may be operating singly or together. 
a. The goal is unrealistic; no techniques are known for 
achieving it. 
b. The organization is applying an inappropriate technique; 
that is, no matter how well the agency does X, it will 
not achieve Y because X does not cause Y. 
c. The organization has selected appropriate techniques, but 
they are implemented improperly. 
d. The organization is appropriately implementing tech-
niques, but the scale is too small to achieve the goal. 
If the last reason alone is preventing successful resolution 
of the problem, policy makers outside the police department can 
simply mandate "more of the same" and provide funds to expand 
current activities. However, if any of the other three factors 
are operating, then selection of an effective set of solutions 
requires expertise. City executives and city councils rarely 
have the expertise to assess the effectiveness of alternative 
solutions. They could hire staff with such skills, but lacking 
such staff they should focus their efforts on clarifying the 
nature of the problems and their priorities among them. If 
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decision makers adopt specific policies that are attempts to do 
the impossible, then the selection of these policies is no longer 
an exercise of political accountability but may appropriately be 
considered political interference. 
Political accountability is exercised when decision makers 
demand that specific problems be addressed. Identifying which 
problems are most important should not be left to a police 
department alone but is properly the substance of policy conflict 
among all constituencies of a police department. By this defini-
tion, two cities could have the same burglary rates, one police 
department could put little special effort into solving residen-
tial burglaries and the other expend great effort, and both 
departments be equally accountable. 
3) Efficiency is a measurement that compares two or more 
programs by the value of the inputs into the programs against the 
benefits of the program outputs (Simon, 1976; Whitaker, 1980). 
The term "efficiency" conveys precision, but in policing the 
precision is largely illusory. For a number of reasons 
efficiency is rarely demanded by citizens or city fathers. Among 
police managers efficiency is an often used criterion. For 
support services, such as record keeping or vehicle maintenance, 
efficiency is subject to fairly accurate measurement since the 
functions are basically similar to those in business where effi-
ciency measures have long been employed. Unfortunately, on 
issues of great public concern, such as the reduction of various 
types of crime, efficiency is both conceptually and practically 
difficult to measure. 
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When different sides dispute the effi-
ciency of a particular use of police resources, these claims are 
usually based on impressions, not precise measures. 
4) Equity is another criterion of utmost importance for 
policing. Everyone can agree that equity has been achieved when 
similar situations are treated similarly. However, the world is 
full of situations where people have honest disagreements about 
whether two situations are similar, and people frequently 
disagree on what are equitable ways of treating different 
situations. Here are three criteria identified by Whitaker and 
Mastrofsky, (1980, 1976) any of which could be employed to define 
an equitable distribution of service. 
a. A single, universal standard. 
the same service. 
Everyone should receive 
b. A demand criterion. All who ask shall recieve. 
c. A need criterion. Those who are less advantaged should 
receive more. 
Among competing definitions of equity, groups with divergent 
positions can claim that their particular solutions are the 
equitable ones. In general the decisions in public forums, such 
as budget hearings, do not address issues of equity. Neighbor-
hoods and interest groups tend to argue for their own pet 
projects without attention to how other groups fare. The city 
executive is more likely to employ some not ion of equity, based 
on a concern for the welfare of the city as a whole. The police 
manager, too, is in an excellent position to develop and apply 
consistent criteria of equity. 
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5) Fiscal accountability is maintained through a set of routine 
controls over the expenditures of public money. Auditors have 
well-developed techniques to detect abuses ranging from the 
trivial, such as borrowing from one account to pay bills in 
another, to the serious, such as stealing for personal gain. 
Contracts with kickbacks are by far the major drain on public 
treasuries. Since over 90% of police budgets are for salaries 
and related fringe benefits, opportunities for corrupt contracts 
are very limited. When a police department is corrupt, most of 
the illegal money is extorted directly from the public and thus 
falls outside this narrow criterion of fiscal accountability. 
Because fiscal integrity is by and large well established in the 
management of police departments, fiscal performance will be 
excluded from this discussion. Competition among city agencies 
for larger shares of the municipal budget are not questions of 
fiscal integrity but questions of priorities, which are properly 
decided by political direction. 
Various combinations of these criteria may be applied to a 
specific policy. Standards for judging whether a particular 
policy advances accountability or constitutes interference are 
summarized here. A policy directive to a police department is an 
exercise of political accountability to the extent that it is 
legal, addresses attention to the problem without imposing a 
solution, is not grossly inefficient, is equitable by some 
standard, and does not defy fiscal acountability. The less a 
policy directive meets any of these criteria, the stronger the 
political interference. 
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Settling policies for a police department is considerably 
more complex than this discussion has thus far indicated because 
attention has been limited to one policy at a time. Since 
departments are following multiple policies directed toward 
multiple goals, the likelihood of conflict is high and because 
the policies followed to achieve some goals make other goals 
harder to achieve. An abstract framework needs to be proven 
against the facts of political life. 
Political Volatility in an Eastern City 
The site for applying these criteria is Troy, New York, an 
old working class town of 55,000 which has experienced a long 
term decline in its industrial base and a consequent loss of 
population at the rate of 1% a year over the last two decades. 
Higher education is now the largest employer. Troy has higher 
than average unemployment rates, a substantial number of families 
living below the poverty line, and a high municipal tax effort. 
The 5% of the population that are black live mostly in a 
deteriorating neighborhood 
district. The people are 
adjoining the 
proud of their 
strongly with their neighborhoods. 
central business 
city and identify 
During the first half of this century Troy was governed by a 
strong mayor and council form of government dominated by the 
county Republican party. Mismanagement by the Democrats, who had 
won control in 1956, spurred various good government groups to 
ally with the Republicans to pass a referendum in 1960 on a new 
city charter establishing a city manager form of government to 
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take effect in 1964. The formal arrangements in the charter are 
standard. The city manager serves at the pleasure of the city 
council and exercises all executive powers, including authority 
to appoint and dismiss. The council's authority to set basic 
policy and pass legislation brings it into conflict with the city 
manager on where to draw the line between policy and implemen-
tation. The council majority selects a mayor from among their 
number to preside over meetings. 
The first city manager, a professional from out of state, 
chose to resign quietly in his third year rather than obey the 
order of the county Republican party to promote a particular 
police sergeant to captain. The second city manager made the 
promotion, arranged kickbacks to the county Republicans from 
contractors doing business with the city, and held office for 
seventeen months until forced out by a state criminal investiga-
tion. The third, a professor of management from a local college, 
served eleven months before being replaced by a professional city 
manager recruited from outside. This fourth manager had domin-
ated a city council split four to three Republican until the 
Democrats attained control of all seats through their 1971 elec-
tion victory. He atributed his stormy firing in early 1972 to 
his refusal to obey the Democratic county chairman's direct 
demand to place Democrats in appointed city positions then held 
by Republicans. John P. Buckley, an engineer native to the city, 
stepped from the head of a city department to acting city 
manager. Confirmed after some months, Buckley served a fractious 
council. The Republican majority fired him in mid-1977· 
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After 
the Democrats won all four council seats in the November, 1977 
election on the strength of their campaign slogan, "Bring Back 
Buckley,'' he consolidated his power, and Democrats continued 
their substantial majority on the council. 
The typology of municipal politics developed by Oliver 
Williams has a category that aptly fits Troy--arbitrator govern-
ment (Williams, 1961). The other categories are the provider of 
amenities, the booster where growth is the priority, and the 
caretaker where low taxation is the priority. In arbitrator 
government, energies are consumed in conflicts. Whenever a 
policy question arises, it immediately becomes a partisan issue 
as one party takes sides in an effort to derive some narrow 
advantage, and the other party swings to the opposition for the 
same reasons. The volatility of Troy's elections is promoted by 
the large proportion of voters registered without party 
affiliation, 42%, compared to 33% Republicans and 22% Democrats 
as of 1975. 
The police department of 125 officers in 1973 had had no 
coherent policy direction since at least 1956 when the Democrats 
had elevated a patrolman directly to chief. Although he had 
scored lowest of seven on the examination, he became promotable 
under the civil service rule of three when men ahead of him on 
the list were removed through receiving other promotions. Civil 
service tenure then froze him into the chief's position, but he 
never learned management. The captain of detectives, a 
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Republican, had had dictatorial control over his thirty-three man 
unit and also drafted departmental orders for issuance by the 
succession of Republicans who served as part-time commissioners 
of public safety. 
Now comes a long tale of accountability and interference 
covering the operation of three mechanisms for controlling muni-
cipal police: selection of the police manager, election of city 
officials, and city council directives. 
Accountability Through Appointment of a Police Manager 
A choice of managers provides the best opportunity to set new 
policy directions, whether in the world of business or govern-
ment. The city executive's power to hire and fire a police 
manager creates an overall political accountability through 
selection of an individual whose exercise of internal accounta-
bility creates policies that are legal, effective, efficient, 
equitable, and fiscally honest. The studies by the IACP and the 
Police Foundation in the mid-1970s suggest careful weighing of 
the candidates' abilities and the city's and the department's 
needs in the selection of a new head (IACP, 1976; Kelly, 1975). 
The events in the appointment and reappointment of George 
O'Conner as commissioner of public safety illustrate total lack 
of reasoned public participation in the selection and give 
examples of decisions entangled in other conflicts. Briefly, in 
1972 a management study funded by LEAA and conducted by a 
national consulting firm precipitated the retirement of the 
chief. City Manager Buckley asked the consultants to recommend a 
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professional, traveled to Washington to interview their nominee, 
and offered him the position. O'Conner accepted without visiting 
the city. When Buckley announced the appointment, the newspapers 
featured the consultants' blast at the department. Given 
everyone's ignorance of the new commissioner, the fearful 
leadership of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association circulated 
rumors that this outsider was a hatchet man. Commissioner 
O'Conner immediately stressed his intention to work with all mem-
bers of the department while criticizing department operating 
practices as belonging in the Smithsonian. 
The second opportunity for public debate on overall direction 
of the department occurred when O'Conner made nine promotions in 
May, 1973 but left the chief's position vacant. The PBA imme-
diately took the commissioner to court to force appointment of a 
chief. In July the county judge ruled that filling the vacancy 
was discretionary since the city charter stated that "the 
Commissioner of Public Safety may appoint a police chief." The 
city charter revision commission accepted a watered down version 
of 0' Conner's proposal that the commissioner have professional 
qualifications but, contrary to his recommendation, changed the 
language to "shall appoint a police chief." After the voters 
approved the referendum in November, the commissioner, with the 
concurrence of the city manager, appointed the chief from the top 
of the civil service list. 
The next opportunity for public debate on overall leadership 
of the department occurred after O'Conner informed Buckley in the 
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summer of 1975 that he would be resigning to take a position in 
Washington. The city manager delayed making the resignation 
public until after 0' Conner had left in September. Buckley had 
no intention of filling the commissioner's position, leaving the 
chief to run the department. The 1975 election, however, pro-
duced three new council members who obtained all the seats on the 
council's public safety committee. The one Democrat was a pro-
fessor of political science who aspired to bring back strong 
mayor government and to be elected mayor. In January 1976, the 
committee began an active interest in many aspects of department 
management. In March the murder of a 75-year-old woman brought 
100 citizens to a meeting of the council's public safety 
committee. The committee formally ordered Buckley to appoint a 
commissioner within six days. The choice was a former official 
of the state corrections commission who had campaigned for the 
Republican council candidates the previous fall. Buckley 
promised to meet the deadline, but when the favorite declined, he 
managed to avoid making the appointment. In November the failure 
of voters to favor either of the charter amendments that 
abolished the commissioner position rekindled the council's 
ambition to fill it. When the council by a four to three votEl 
inserted the position in the 1977 budget, Buckley again offered 
George O'Conner the commissionership. O'Conner accepted as his 
work in Washington had ended, and he was engaged in private 
consulting. He and his family had not relocated from the house 
purchased three years earlier. At the regular January council 
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meeting, the city manager replied to a councilman's question that 
he was working on filling the commissioner's position. Two days 
later he notified council members by letter that he intended to 
reappoint O'Conner. 
six to one majority 
Enraged at this failure to consult them, a 
of the council voted at their February 
meeting to put a referendum on the November ballot to abolish the 
position and to change the police chief and fire chief into 
department heads who serve at the pleasure of the city manager. 
The March council meeting included the public hearing on the 
referendum but only one citizen spoke, testifying that an outside 
commissioner was necessary. 
The referendum on police leadership was pushed to a back 
burner in July when the Republican majority of the council fired 
the city manager, and the Democrats eventually turned the firing 
into the main campaign issue. In September the commissioner had 
written the League of Women Voters offering to assist any inquiry 
or discussion on the governance of the public safety function, 
but the League only belatedly opposed the referendum on its 
wording. The issue surfaced in late October when a newspaper 
story reported the police union's vote at its monthly meeting 
running about nineteen to ten for abolishing the commissioner's 
position. 
collected 
Since all ranks belonged to the union, a captain then 
signatures on a petition from sixty-five members 
opposing union vote and specifically endorsing the retention of 
civil service tenure for the police chief. Note how the union 
leaderhsip had phrased its stand as an attack on the commis-
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sioner, while the membership petition was phrased as protection 
for the chief, although the issues were two sides of a single 
coin. When the union leaders refused the captain's request to 
hold a second membership vote on the issue, he made public the 
stand of the majority of officers against a "political head of 
the police department." The lone councilman outspoken for 
preserving the commissioner's post was not up for election. He 
observed that the referendum had been transformed from selecting 
governance structures into a vote on whether George O'Conner was 
doing a good job. His interpretation was supported by the few 
letters to the editor from citizens that urged abolishing the 
post in order to remove O'Conner. The Friday before the election 
the 11:00 p.m. TV news covered the issue by interviewing Commis-
sioner O'Conner. The same day the city's newspaper urgently 
opposed the referendum on the grounds that a commissioner is 
essential to prevent political interference in the police and 
fire departments and to protect elected officials from the power 
of the unions. Most people were completely uninformed on the 
issue. Of the 17,000 voters for city council seats, less than 
60% voted on the referendum, and they defeated it two to one. 
In 1983 the issue of selecting a department head again arose, 
due to the unexpected death of the chief. His vigor at age 45 
had given most command officers a reason not to bother taking the 
civil service examination for chief, and only the newest captain 
had passed it. Since the captain was one of the most capable 
members of the department, the selection of a new chief was the 
simple matter of promoting the only person on the list. 
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As the 
institutional arrangements now stand a police chief is mandatory, 
must be selected from within the department according to civil 
service procedures, and has tenure. The city manager retains the 
discretion to appoint and dismiss commissioners or to leave the 
position vacant. 
One city's use of the most powerful instrument of political 
accountability has been examined in some detail in order to 
illustrate some problems in its use. First, if the city execu-
tive witholds information from the city council and the public, 
then the accountability of the police department stops with the 
executive and does not carry over to those who may represent the 
diverse voices of the people. During the two decisions to select 
a commissioner, the city manager consulted no representatives of 
the public. Second, changes in institutional arrangements may be 
made for reasons completely irrelevant to accountability issues. 
The police union forced the appointment of a chief in 1973 in 
order to obtain a promotional position. In 1977 the city 
council, locked in a power struggle with the city manager, 
attempted to cut a police leadership position as a blow to the 
city manager, quite apart from the merits of the issue. Third, 
direction of the department can change hands without any debate 
or effort to create debate on the performance standards the 
public expects. Fourth, when the head of the police department 
must be selected from the inside, the small size of the talent 
pool makes luck a large factor. 
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Elections Stir Confusion without Providing Accountability 
The studies in recent years of public concern over crime and 
police protection have shown that these issues are tailor made 
for politicians aspiring to office and ill-suited to incumbents, 
who obviously have not "solved" the crime problem (Finckenauer, 
1978; Buffum and Sagi, 1983; McPherson, 1983; and Guyot, 1983). 
Scheingold (1984) has persuasively argued that fear of crime 
gives salience to the punitive strand of American culture which 
yearns for simple "cops and robbers" solutions, as on television. 
The decade of election campaigns in the city under examination 
fits so perfectly this pattern of the outs demanding action that 
a quick summary of the events is in order. 
Crime became as issue in the city in May, 1975. The third 
murder of the year on the north side touched off citizen protests 
against a crime wave. The city council voted five to two along 
party lines to hire ten more officers, against the advice of the 
commissioner and city manager. The voters, also displeased over 
the gaping holes where urban renewal had stalled, defeated the 
three incumbent Democrats while electing one Democratic and three 
Republican newcomers. In 1977 the Democrats won all four seats 
after they refocused their campaign in mid-October from develop-
ing the central business district to reinstating the city 
manager. The 1979 campaign had almost no issues, both parties 
vying for credit for the city's development. One incumbent from 
each party ran and won, while the addition of two Democratic 
newcomers continued the six to one Democratic majority. In 1981 
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the Republicans seized upon foot patrol and keeping the depart-
ment fully staffed as two major issues. The local daily ran a 
seven-part series on police manpower, painting a picture of an 
understaffed department. The Democratic council majority moved 
quickly to deprive the Republicans of the police issue by asking 
the state to conduct a study on the feasibility of foot patrol. 
The mayor also proposed an advisory commit tee to explore the 
possibility of establishing a neighborhood watch program. The 
Democrats won all four seats. In 1982 a charter referendum 
supported by the Republicans won by a huge margin. It overhauled 
the council to provide only three at-large seats and six new 
district seats. In the 1983 campaign candidates for the six 
district seats were grasping for issues and found crime. One 
Republican hopeful took this stand in his election flyer . 
. • . In the beginning I was concerned about crime. Then I 
became frightened. The more homes I visit, the more crimes I 
fi-nd have been committed. I am no longer frightened. I am 
angry--"mad as hell" is more appropriate. I cannot fault our 
police officers, who are under-staffed and who have one hand 
tied behind their backs. They share your frustration, CITY 
HALL does not. The Commissioner of Public Safety stated at a 
public meeting in the YMCA on September 8, "It is the City's 
policy to reduce crime to a tolerable level." You have my 
pledge that policy will change, and change fast!. • Let's 
all get angry together. THERE IS NO TOLERABLE LEVEL OF 
CRIME. 
The police union, which had endorsed some candidates in 
previous years, decided to forgo endorsement but to hold a public 
forum inviting all candidates to address the issues of crime and 
adequacy of police staffing. Twelve candidates agreed that the 
city needed more police officers, but when specifically asked 
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where they would find the funds, none bit the bullet of higher 
tax rates. On the Sunday before the election the union ran an ad 
proclaiming no confidence in Commissioner O'Conner. The voters, 
however, elected five out of six Democrats, thus supporting the 
city manager who supported the commissioner. The candidate who 
attacked the commissioner for tolerating crime lost by a larger 
margin than any other Republican or Democrat. 
This sequence of six council elections interspersed with two 
referendums provides not one example of informed debate on police 
issues. The events do provide examples of political interference 
through attempts to campaign on specific solutions. The least 
sensible campaign stand taken by a party endorsed candidate 
occurred in 1983 after a decade of effort by the police manager 
to increase public understanding. The candidate's message that 
there is no tolerable level of crime has the implication that 
police officers with their hands untied could wipe out crime. 
Here is a clear example of a department decried as ineffective 
because the goal is unrealistic. 
One major conclusion that the events here support is that the 
crime issue is perfectly tailored for the party out of power. 
Since any level of any crime can be considered too much, the 
opposition can point to the ineffectiveness of the incumbents' 
policies and promise to take decisive action. The specific 
promises are often more manpower, "a more of the same solution" 
that is likely to be less effective than alternative approaches. 
A second conclusion is that campaigning on fear of crime is not a 
194 
sure way to win office. During two campagins most focused on 
police issues, 1981 and 1983, the minority party won a total of 
two seats out of the ten contested. Part of the explanation may 
be that voters had no serious dissatisfaction with current police 
service. 
Interference and Accountability Exercised by the City Council 
This description of city council policy making for police 
traces the origin in a wave of fear and covers three intenesely 
active years. A fundamental reason why the council was 
particularly active in police affairs during 1976-78 was that the 
executive was weak. Everyone believed that Commissioner O'Connor 
had left for good in September, 1975. The chief at tempted to 
handle problems quietly inside the department while denying 
information to the press and consequently received a bad press. 
Within the department he referred to the council members as the 
enemy. The council found ways to harass him, such as taking away 
his city car when he moved to a house out of town. 0 1 Conner 1 s 
return in January, 1977 gave strength to the department, but by 
then Buckley was suffering severe attacks from the four to three 
Republican majority, culminating in his firing in August, 1977. 
The new acting city manager could not gain cooperation from key 
city hall employees and was out of his element in dealing with 
the city unions. 
Council policies on police matters listed in Table 1 show the 
application of the criteria distinguishing political account-
ability from interference. Accountability is a judgment that a 
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political body should make the decision; it is not an endorsement 
of the contents of the decision. 
(Insert Table 1 About Here) 
In May, 1975 public attention snapped crime into focus. 
Previously, there had been unease about burlaries, vandalism, and 
some muggings near the high school. A wave of fear surged when a 
high school boy murdered his friend; more than 200 citizens 
poured out to a previously planned neighborhood meeting with the 
commissioner. People demanded action. One candidate circulated 
a petition that the county sheriff patrol the neighborhood. The 
solutions poured forth: more police, attack dogs, a neighborhood 
police station, unmarked cars, auxiliary police. The PBA presi-
dent endorsed the call for ten more officers. O'Conner 
questioned whether the additional manpower would have a 
noticeable effect on crime. He explained that the misbehavior of 
youth was the primary cause for concern and suggested that the 
money might be better spent on recreation programs, youth 
centers, or employment training. The city council, however, 
directed the hiring of ten more officers against the explicit 
advice of the commissioner and the city. manager. When 0' Conner 
brought forward his plan for coping with the fears, a citizens' 
crime prevention council, it passed the city council due only to 
the absence of two members of the majority and was rejected at 
the state level. 
Throwing manpower at crime is an automatic solution, a reflex 
action. In this situation the city council started with the 
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vague notion that "crime has increased" and provided the vague 
solution of hiring more officers to do whatever it is they are 
supposed to do. This action was interference. In broader 
perspective, more manpower can be an appropriate means delibera-
tely chosen to address a specific crime problem. For instance, a 
patrol captain may assign an officer to foot patrol in the 
central business district during the Christmas shopping season 
with the knowledge that purse snatching can be expected to rise 
at this season and with the aim of using visible police presence 
to reassure shoppers and deter purse snatchers. A sergeant may 
work with his squad to increase surveillance of a school parking 
lot where a rash of vandalism is occurring. However, when crime 
problems are only vaguely recognized, then the solutions cannot 
be definite. When the leadership of a city decides to expand the 
police force, the hidden implication is that the additional offi-
cers will not solve the problem because the additional positions 
were not created as temporary positions but will continue into 
the indefinite future. The immediate difficulty with hiring as 
the solution to a current crime problem is that rarely will less 
than six months elapse before the new officers are out on patrol. 
The public safety committee of the council was the source of 
council policy on police issues. The councilwoman elected in 
November, 1975, who was soon to chair the committee, began to 
consider policy issues even before she took office. At her 
suggestion the Times Record published a brief questionnaire for 
citizens to clip and return that asked about the adequacy of 
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police and fire protection, the need for foot patrol, and 
willingness to pay for more protection. The December 30, 1975 
news story covering fifty replies to the survey began, "By a 
four-to-one margin, residents are not happy with their police 
department." One citizen's comment, that 70% of the officers 
were drinkers, particularly riled the union leaders. After the 
editor had refused to print a retraction, the PBA filed a $10 
million libel suit against the paper. 
In the city council the newcomers tended to cooperate, in 
effect the one new Democrat giving support to the slim Republican 
majority. The public safety committee worked as a team to probe 
into the performance of the police department. On January 1 a 
six-column story describing two arrests where officrs had 
employed force prompted the council committee to inquire whether 
the force had been excessive and whether the department had 
whitewashed the incidents. By mid-January the Democrat on the 
committee persuaded the Republicans to expand the inquiry by 
meeting with union members ·to hear their views on department 
management in general. The commit tee then pressed to obtain 
internal affairs records, a move widely interpreted as a fishing 
expedition. Buckley refused on the grounds that the records were 
exempt from the sunshine law. When the public safety commit tee 
persisted, the PBA obtained a court injunction. In sum, the 
council's directing departmental attention to excessive force 
complaints was setting priorities, clearly an exercise of 
accountability, but the attempt to read the internal affairs 
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files was interference in personnel matters, damaging to internal 
accountability. 
The need for foot patrol was a frequent note during this 
period, voiced by individual citizens, citizen groups, and 
council members. The chief was adamant that foot patrol was an 
anachronism and refused to make any assignments beyond the usual 
posting of a foot officer downtown during the Christmas shopping 
season. Since the chair of the public safety committee was the 
owner of a downtown coffee shop, she was particularly aware of 
the downtown merchants• desire for walking officers. 
Residents of the north end of town had been expressing a 
desire for a precinct station since the murder there had created 
the wave of fear. Since neighboring Albany had been operating a 
storefront as the headquarters for their single neighborhood 
police team, the request for a local building had become entwined 
with a request for team policing in that neighborhood. 
The city manager and police chief eased the pressure for 
change on three fronts by proposing that expert advice be sought 
from the state police training commission on appropriate depart-
mental discipline, team policing, and the vacant commissioner's 
position. In September, 1976 the state agency provided three 
reports answering the questions the way the police chief desired. 
The reports went on the shelf because they had already served 
their purpose of cooling the council. 
Union leaders initiated a formal request to the city council 
in late 1976, the first in four years. Three PBA officials met 
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with the public safety committee over officer safety and obtained 
an order to the chief to place shotguns in the cars. 0 1 Conner 
returned to the commissionership before this order was imple-
mented and ordered that the shotguns be placed in the sergeants• 
patrol van and only after officers had received training in their 
use. This command, "Do X! 11 , was interference. If the council 
had directed the city manager to develop means to increase the 
safety of officers even at the risk of increased shooting of 
citizens, this would be exercise of accountability. The 
advantage of switching a policy discussion from focus on a single 
means to the trade-offs among ends is that the broad consequences 
of a policy become clearer. 
In early January the city council proposed a police community 
relations board. The chief immediately opposed it on the grounds 
that it could become a civilian review board. This council 
initiative was an exercise of accountability whether it was to 
open a new channel of communication or to empower a separate 
review function. The intrinsic difficulty of reviewing police 
exercises of discretion makes likely that the operation of a 
civilian review board will interfere with internal accountability 
to the police manager. 
When O'Conner resumed the commissionership in January, 1977, 
the public safety committee presented him with a list of twenty-
seven i terns, twenty-one pertaining to pol ice and the rest to 
firefighting. One item asked for legislative and budgetary 
recommendations. 
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Five i terns called at tent ion to service 
problems: protection for the central business district, snow 
removal and parking, traffic safety, and community relations. 
Five were suggested solutions to service problems, such as meter 
maids issuing tickets for littering and a team policing grant for 
the north end of town. Ten items concerned operational direction 
of the department: revival of the narcotics division and the 
scuba team, the system of vehicle maintenance, the shift detec-
tives work, and the like. O'Conner met for two hours with the 
committee and two additional councilmen going over his decisions 
for each of the items. The council accepted his decisions. As 
part of his plan for downtown safety, he created a regular 
walking post, a clear case of accountability since the council 
set the priorities, and the commissioner developed the specific 
means. The council's solutions to five problems would have been 
interference if they had imposed them. Likewise, their ten 
operational directives were commands to "Do X!" but without any 
connection to service priorities. For the next months pressures 
on the police department eased as the council majority directed 
its attentions to criticizing the city manager. 
As the 1977 election season warmed, the issue of a storefront 
police station for the north side re-emerged. The woman who in 
1975 had organized a citizens group in the neighborhood decided 
to run for city council. When she approached Buckley with a plan 
for a storefront police station staffed by non-sworn personnel, 
he and O'Conner agreed. The Democrats unveiled their plan at a 
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press conference. The Republican councilwoman who had been 
pressing for a storefront for fifteen months learned of it in the 
newspaper. The Times Record, ordinarily highly supportive of the 
city manager, agreed editorially with the councilwoman's accusa-
tion that his motives "were totally political." Buckley had 
slapped a strong willed councilwoman at the same time that 
Republicans were receiving results from a privately commissioned 
opinion poll that indicated he was not popular. Given this 
impetus, the Republicans fired him. 
Commissioner 0' Conner presented a plan to the acting city 
manager in September for three public safety service centers to 
be located in fire stations and open afternoons and early 
evenings. The staff member at each center, paid through CETA 
funds, would offer information on crime prevention, fire preven-
tion, dog licensing, and social services, would register dogs, 
bicycles, and valuables, and would reo ieve citizen complaints. 
The centers would serve as locations for meetings with police 
officers and would remind people of the presence of safety forces 
in their neighborhoods. The councilwoman and the citizens' group 
from the north side liked the plan so well that they incorporated 
it into their storefront proposal but retained their original 
ideas for assigning there two juvenile officers and two addi-
tional police cars. In early October O'Conner told the acting 
city manager that he was taking on the councilwoman to prevent 
inequitable allocation of police personnel to the north side and 
to prevent the assignment of police officers to man the center. 
202 
Either the city manager should stay out of the fight or fire him. 
The acting city manager did neither. The plan as implemented 
placed the captain in charge of the crime prevention unit working 
out of the center three days a week. O'conner's explanation 
appearing in the Times Record was that the captain's assignment 
was not a concession to the union and the citizens group but to 
satisfy citizens' desire for a larger uniformed police presence. 
The captain would be of sufficient rank to make the police 
patrols respond to a problem brought to him at the center. 
O'Conner also changed two detective assignments from generalist 
to juvenile, salving a sore point of police officers and some 
citizens unhappy over his abolishing the juvenile unit six months 
earlier. As O'Conner had predicted the center was a lonely 
place, averaging two visitors a day. Since the police business 
that can be conducted from inside a building is providing infor-
mation and channeling requests for service, the telephone makes 
local centers unnecessary. 
Election day came and went, the Democrats sweeping all seats 
on the promise to restore the city manager. The rump session had 
the responsibility of levying higher taxes to pay for costs 
incurred through inflation and previously negotiated contracts. 
In a quiet decision the council chose to cut 5% from every 
departmental budget. This police department, like many, allo-
cated 95% of the budget to personnel, 3% to supplies, 2% to 
contractual services, and 1% to equipment. The only source of a 
substantial saving was personnel. The commissioner chose to give 
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up the nine vacant police officer positions, thus reducing the 
department's authorized sworn strength to the level before the 
furor over crime. Amid the drama of the change in council 
majorities and city managers, this important policy decision was 
unnoticed. The council was exercising accountability in deciding 
not to raise taxes, however unwise in failing to set priorities 
among services to be cut. 
The struggle over team policing had already bugun before the 
end of 1977, making the episode over the storefront into a pre-
1 iminary test of strength. During the summer of 1977 O'Conner 
had persuaded Buckley that his long considered plan for changing 
the structure of the department to team policing was right for 
Troy. The telling argument was that team policing would place 
more men on the street. In July O'Conner submitted an applica-
tion for a $74,000, eighteen months' extension of the current 
LEAA crime prevention grant to plan and then implement neighbor-
hood team policing throughout the city in April, 1978. The six 
objectives were to increase citizens' sense of personal safety, 
citizen cooperation with officers and participation in setting 
neighborhood priorities, departmental coordination, command 
personnel's contribution to department operations, investigative 
effectiveness, especially for crimes against the person, and the 
productivity of individual officers by enhancing personal 
commitment and developing greater peer concern. The means to 
accomplish all this was to restructure the delivery of service so 
that primary coordination took place on a geographic basis rather 
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than a shift basis. A part-time resident coordinator for each 
team would work out of his or her home to facilitate communica-
tion with the community and among team members. Officers at all 
levels would be involved in the planning, and, after implementa-
tion, monthly team meetings would address local problems. The 
largest budget item, $36,000, was for police overtime for the 
planning task forces and the team meetings. 
A change machine, a term Egon Bittner coined to describe the 
$5,000,000 Police Foundation project with the Dallas PD, aptly 
labels the police union perception of team policing. A change 
machine is a highly publicized process of change promoted by 
outside experts and outside funds. The development of a large 
evaluation gave credence to the union's depiction of team 
policing as an alien intrusion. Initially, the author had 
designed an evaluation costing $700, but the availability of LEAA 
funds set aside for intensive evaluation provided an attractive 
opportunity. The final design was a two-year evaluation 
employing extensive survey research at a total cost of $500,000 
in LEAA funds. 
Commissioner 0' Conner had distributed a copy of his team 
policing proposal to every member of the department when the 
action grant was submitted, but few had commented. An underlying 
source of officer discontent was that the PBA contract had run 
1975-76, but the terms of the new contract were in binding 
arbitration, finally announced on May 12, 1978. When PBA held 
its 1977 fall election of officers, the leaders polled membership 
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opinion with a signup sheet headed, "Team policing, yes or no." 
The sheet obtained 90 no's and not one yes. O'Conner proceeded 
with the planning by offering all members opportunities to par-
ticipate in task forces with overtime compensation for the time 
invested. Initially only eighteen officers singed up. The union 
leadership decided that only a watch dog committee should attend, 
without participating. One young, highly respected officer who 
had not understood the message went to a meeting and gained the 
reputation of hurting the men, a canard which took several months 
to live down. 
The union success with the city council in obtaining air con-
ditioned cars at the time they demanded shotguns had given them 
confidence that they could find allies in the council without 
provoking types of political interference they opposed, such as 
the demand for internal affairs files. A city council legisla-
tive hearing was the climax of the union's campaign against team 
policing. The drama was held on two consecutive evenings in 
early April. Fifteen officers presented eloquent testimony that 
team policing would ruin a good department. The council 
deliberated a week and decided five to two. Democrats against 
Republicans, that the commissioner should proceed with team 
policing on a trial basis and decide jointly with the union 
whether to permit the evaluation. In response to this adverse 
decision about fifty off-duty police officers picketed city hall 
and distributed leaflets criticizing the city council for playing 
partisan politics in disregard of the security needs of the com-
munity. 
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Their specific criticisms of team policing were that it 
equaled the elimination of a narcotics unit, the stripping of the 
detective bureau, the elimination of the traffic department, and 
the stripping of the juvenile bureau. The union directly accused 
the council and the city manager of not listening to the people. 
Within the department the union leadership and the chief 
pressured officers and command staff to ostracize the com-
missioner, with considerable success. Meanwhile the complexity 
of the evaluation grant had slowed LEAA' s preparation of the 
grant contracts, which finally arrived in early July. The city 
manager refused to sign them, ending the evaluation. 
Team policing operated all summer while some members of the 
department felt rancor, and others despaired that the struggle 
had not yet ended between the commissioner and the union. O'Conner 
kept close watch on all indicators of productivity, noting that 
output on easily measurable performance such as response time and 
arrests had remained good. At the end of the summer the com-
missioner developed a replacement for team policing, worked out 
with the city manager, the chief, and the captains. In September 
after 0' Conner announced the termination of team policing, he 
said flatly in a television interview that political interference 
had taken place and that he had been disappointed that community 
groups had not been more active in support of team policing. All 
parties to the conflict cooled down and eventually resumed good 
working relationships. Stung by the union criticism, city coun-
oil members put some distance between themselves and union con-
cerns. 
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The city manager exercised more p01-1er vis-a-vis the 
council because the· Democratic majority continued to be elected 
on their pledge to support him. Neither the scope nor the inten-
sity of council policy making for police has recurred in this 
city. Since 1981, the new chairman of the council public safety 
committee has explicitly left operational questions to the pro-
fessionals. 
Conclusions 
Three generalizations help to explain the predominance of 
political interference over political accountability. 
1. The smallness of the attentive public for police affairs and 
the episodic nature of attention by a broader public leave the 
stage to police management and the police union. 
2. In the public debate on policies the union and the police 
manager usually stake out the two sides to issues. 
3. The larger the number of citizens participating in a policy 
decision, the more likely the union is to win and the police 
manager to lose. 
Many other mechanisms exist for policy making by agencies 
outside police departments which have not received attention 
here. The city executive is the major source of policy direction 
from outside the department. Union contracts often set policy in 
ways that interfere dramatically with internal accountability, 
such as seniority rights to positions and minimum manning and 
maintenance of standards clauses. The budget process is little 
used to set priorities because program budgeting has not been 
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adopted. Some civil service commissions and personnel depart-
ments exercise great power over position definition, personnel 
selection, and promotion. In addition the specialized review 
processes may be utilized such as the Seattle audit to review 
political intelligence gathering and civilian review boards. 
Prosecutors and courts routinely review the legality of arrests. 
Federal and state civil suits are brought with increasing 
frequency as a means of forcing particular policy decisions. The 
tests of interference and accountability developed here appear 
useful in judging these exercises of power as well. 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1976 
1976 
1976 
1977 
1977 
1977 
1977 
TABLE 1 
JUDGMENT OF CITY COUNCIL POLICIES AS 
ACTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY OR INTERFERENCE 
Issue 
Ten more officers 
Directing department attention to 
charges of excessive force 
Council to read internal affairs files 
Foot patrol 
Shotguns in patrol cars 
Community relations board 
Downtown safety and four other problems 
Five solutions to problems 
Ten operational directives 
judgment Grounds for Judgment 
Ineffective, not a question of scale. 
A Set priority. 
Personnel matter. 
Ineffective, X docs not causeY. 
Ignored effect on other priorities. 
A Create new communications channel. 
A Effectiveness, set priorities. 
Ignored effect on other priorities. 
Ineffective, no service goals. 
1975-77 Neighborhood police station Ineffective, X does not causeY. 
Equity not addressed. 
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1977 Cut budget 5% A Global priority between services and taxes. 
1978 Hearing on team policing 
1977-83 More foot patrol 
A= Act of political accountability 
I =Act of political interference 
Ineffective, confused service goals. 
Ineffective, not a problem of scale. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEATTLE POLICE INTELLIGENCE ORDINANCE 
By 
Introduction 
Samuel Walker 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
In 1979 the Seattle, Washington, City Council enacted a 
municipal ordinance to regulate intelligence gathering by the 
Seattle Police Department. 1 The law was the outgrowth of 
revelations in 1974 that the Seattle police had maintained 
intelligence files on an estimated 750 local citizens. The 
subjects of these files ranged from black and Hispanic community 
leaders to prominent Republican politicians, including one 
assistant U.S. attorney. The campaign to control police miscon-
duct was lead by the Coalition on Government Spying (COGS), a 
coalition of over 40 community groups, with the active support of 
one key member of the Seattle City Council. 2 
The Seattle Police Intelligence Ordinance represents a unique 
approach to the control of pol ice misconduct (Paul sen, 1970; 
Potts, 1983). Over the past decade revelations of illegal police 
spying have occurred in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Memphis, and by the Michigan State Police and the F.B.I. (Center 
for National Security Studies, 1981 ; u.s. Senate, 1976). 
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"Illegal" spying, in this context, refers to police maintaining 
intelligence files on persons and/or organizations who are not 
suspected of any criminal activity. The subjects of this illegal 
spying have generally sought recourse through the courts, seeking 
civil damages and/ or court-ordered controls over police mi seen-
duct. Seattle is the only instance of legi sla ti vely enacted 
controls. The Seattle ordinance takes on larger significance 
with respect to the F.B.I. It has been offered as a model for a 
legislative "charter" for the bureau (U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 1979) although, ironically it is based on a model proposed 
for control of the F.B.I. in the first place (Berman, 1976; 
Revelle, 1979). 
This article examines the nature and impact of the Seattle 
Police Intelligence Ordinance. It reviews the essential feature 
of the law and its impact during its first four years. Particu-
lar attention is given to the operations of the auditor, the pro-
cess for monitoring compliance with the law. 
Essential Features 
The purpose of the Seattle police intelligence ordinance is 
"to permit the collection and recording of information for law 
enforcement purposes," while at the same time protecting the 
rights of citizens guaranteed by both the U.S. and Washington 
constitutions. These include traditional First Amendment rights 
and the right to privacy. To achieve this balance, the ordinance 
contains three essential features: a definition of restricted 
activity, civil penalties, and a monitoring mechanism. 
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1. Restricted Activity 
The Seattle ordinance restricts three activities of the 
Seattle Police Department: the collection of information 
pertaining to a citizen's political, religious, or private sexual 
matters; the use of police infiltrators and informants; and the 
disclosure of non-public police information. 
Two categories of information are subject to restriction. 
The category of "restricted information" includes information 
about: 
(i) an individual's political or religious associations, 
activities, beliefs, or opinions; political or religious 
associations, activities, beliefs, or opinions; (ii) the 
political or religious activities, beliefs, or opinions and 
the membership, mailing, subscription, or contributor lists 
of a political or religious organization, an organization 
formed for the protection or advancement of civil rights or 
civil liberties, or an organization formed for community 
purposes; or (iii) an individual's membership or partici-
pation in such an 1organization, or in a demonstration for community purposes. 
The category of "private sexual information," meanwhile, includes 
"any information about a person's sexual practices or 
orientation." 1 
The law does not prohibit the collection of such information 
but only regulates collection and usage. Private sexual infor-
mation, for example, may be collected if "the information 
involves a reported or observed sex crime," and in three other 
situations related to criminal activity. Restricted political 
and religious information may be collected "if the subject of the 
information is reasonably suspected of criminal activity or the 
information relates to the reliability of a victim or witness.•• 1 
Regulations take several forms. 
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First, the collection of 
restricted information must be authorized in writing by a super-
visor of the rank of lieutenant or above. Such authorizations 
must contain detailed information about the crime under investi-
gation and expire after ninety days. Written authorizations are 
not required, however, for the collection of private sexual 
information. This distinction reflects the recognition "that 
thousands of cases every year required legitimate collection and 
use of sexual preference information" (Bernstein, 1979: 86). On 
this point, members of COGS made a major concession to arguments 
advanced by law enforcement and prosecutorial members of the 
ordinance drafting committee. 
The issue of protecting visiting dignitaries raised other 
serious questions. This section of the ordinance was, in the 
words of City Attorney Bernstein (1979: 100), "especially 
difficult to draft." Potential threats against the safety of 
such dignitaries would come, almost by definition, from politi-
cally oriented individuals or groups. Investigation of such 
potential threats would, therefore, come very close to violating 
the letter or the spirit of the ordinance. The resulting compro-
mise follows the form of the general exemptions permitted. The 
police may collect otherwise restricted information, but it must 
be maintained in a separate file, may not be collected until the 
department has official notice that a particular dignitary will 
visit the city, shall be available only to those officers 
assigned to dignitary protection, and must be purged within sixty 
days after collection is authorized. 
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The ordinance restricts the use of infiltrators and infor-
mants. This provision is notable since only a few American law 
enforcement agencies have developed internal policies governing 
the use of informants. Infiltration of an organization must be 
authorized in writing by the chief of police and is permitted 
only to collect restricted information pursuant to the other 
provisions of the ordinance. Finally, the chief of pol ice is 
required to establish procedures for the review of any use of 
infiltrators. Paid informants are specifically prohibited from 
participating in unlawful acts of violence, using illegal 
techniques to obtain information, initiating or planning criminal 
acts, or participating in criminal activities. An exception to 
the latter point permits participation where it "is necessary to 
obtain information needed for purposes of prosecution." 1 
Finally, the ordinance restricts the disclosure of infor-
mat ion to five narrowly defined situations. 3 The question of 
exchanging information with other law enforcement agencies was 
especially problematic and created the only serious problem in 
implementing the law (see below). 
2. Civil Penalties 
Any person injured by a violation of the ordinance has a 
cause of action against the City of Seattle for civil damages of 
$500. An organization subject to illegal infiltration has a 
cause of action for damages of $1,000. The city is not liable 
for actions taken by any official acting in good faith, although 
the meaning of this concept is not specified in detail 
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(Bernstein, 1979). The Coalition on Government Spying originally 
defined criminal penalties as one of its primary goals but was 
not able to achieve this provision (Taylor, 1983). 
3. Implementation and Monitoring 
Section 35 of the ordinance requires the chief of police to 
promulgate rules and regulations to guide police department 
personnel in the conduct of investigations and in the use of 
informants and infiltrators. The chief promulgated these rules 
and regulations in a seventeen-page memo, and all members of the 
police department received fourteen hours of training related to 
the ordinance (Seattle Police Department, 1979). 
The most important provision of the ordinance creates an 
auditor to monitor compliance with the law at 180-day intervals. 
The auditor is appointed by the mayor, subject to confirmation by 
the city council. Somewhat ironically, the concept of an auditor 
had originated with then Police Chief Hanson in 1975-76 who 
proposed it in an effort to avoid legislatively imposed controls 
(Seattle Post-Intelligencer, November 23, 1975; Seattle Times, 
June 6, 1976). 
With only 
responsibility 
five exceptions4 
to review all 
the auditor has the power 
police department files. 
and 
The 
auditor is specifically required to review each authorization for 
the collection of restricted information, review other files at 
random, and all files designated for purging. Following each 
audit, the auditor is to submit a preliminary report to the chief 
of police for review and comment and then submit a final report 
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to the mayor and city council. Additionally, the auditor must 
notify by certified mail any person about whom restricted 
information had been collected in possible violation of the 
ordinance. 5 
The Police Intelligence Ordinance in Action 
The following analysis of the Seattle Police Intelligence 
Ordinance examines it from the perspectives of its supporters, 
the police department, and the auditor, respectively. 
1. The Supporters' Perspective 
From the standpoint of its supporters, the Seattle Pol ice 
Intelligence Ordinance represents a major victory, with national 
as well as local significance. The ordinance was based on a 
proposal originally designed for control of the F.B.I. and is now 
itself viewed as a model for the control of other local, state, 
and federal law enforcement agencies (CNSS, 1979). 6 
The ordinance is not regarded as a complete victory, however. 
Coalition chairperson Kathleen Taylor (1979: 124, 1983) states, 
"We are not fully satisfied. 
" 
In their view the ordinance 
contains several weaknesses. The collection of restricted 
information is not prohibited absolutely. Imaginative police 
officers could easily develop justifications for the collection 
of restricted information couched in terms that would satisfy the 
requirements of the law--or at least do so in such a way as to 
fool the auditor. The good faith defense is a potentially large 
loophole.7 The visiting dignitary exemption, meanwhile, allows 
the collection of restricted information on individuals and 
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groups that would be politically oriented almost by definition. 
Finally, the ordinance does not contain criminal penalties. 
Especially problematic is the potential for willful viola-
tions of the ordinance by police officers who conceal restricted 
information from the auditor. This could easily be accomplished 
by simply maintaining the files in their personal possession 
rather than in the department. Precedent for such behavior is 
ample. J. Edgar Hoover maintained a secret "do not file" set of 
memos, the existence of which has just come to light. In Los 
Angeles detectives hid in a private garage files ordered 
destroyed by the Los Angeles Police Commission. Gary Marx (1982) 
puts this problem in a broader context, arguing the formal rules 
governing police conduct may only encourage imaginative forms of 
evasion. Creative evasion of the exclusionary rule has been 
noted by some observers. 
The current auditor concedes that the police could certainly 
fool him if they really wanted to. He adds, however, that the 
likelihood of this is greatly diminished because of the indirect 
effects of the ordinance. In his view, the ordinance not only 
''sensitizes" the police to the importance of respecting the right 
of privacy but also establishes the principle of openness and 
scrutiny by outsiders. He also points out that sustaining 
systematic violations over any length of time without word of 
them leaking out would be difficult. The fear of such leaks 
would serve to ensure compliance. In short, the ordinance may 
have a general deterrent effect on police misconduct (Hoff, 
1983). 8 
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2. The Police Perspective 
From the standpoint of the Seattle Police Department the 
ordinance represents both an unprecedented restriction on 
investigative techniques traditionally regarded as essential to 
effective law enforcement and an intrusion by a legislative body 
into matters long regarded as the exclusive province of law 
enforcement officials. Also, the law institutionalizes a review 
of police activities by civilian authorities. Heretofore, police 
departments have been subject to such outside review only on an 
ad hoc basis and in extreme situations, usually as a result of 
litigation or a special investigation growing out of a widely 
publicized scandal. The Seattle police auditor has the power and 
authority to inspect all investigative files, not just those per-
taining to a particular allegation of police misconduct. 
Despite these extraordinary features, the police were unable 
to prevent enactment of the ordinance. This is particularly 
surprising when viewed from a national and historical perspec-
tive. Police departments have been extremely successful in pre-
venting such intrusions into their activities. The police have 
been able to mobilize considerable political suport, even in the 
face of scandalous revelations. Elected officials have been 
reluctant to appear to be "anti-police" (Ruchelman, 1974). 
Generally lacking detailed knowledge about the administrative and 
operational aspects of policing, they have been content to take a 
"hands-off" approach. The exceptions to this rule are, for the 
most part, white or black mayors responsive to black constituen-
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cies (Juris and Feuille, 1973). Apart from a few recent excep-
tions, however, (Littlejohn, 1981) the police have been able to 
defeat significant legislative or administrative controls over 
their activities. 
Three factors appear to have undermined political support for 
the police. First, the well-documented revelations about police 
spying threw them on the defensive--a position from which 
they never recovered. 9 Second, the political weakness of the 
police was compounded by the active participation of one key 
council member, Mr. Revelle, in support of a restrictive 
ordinance. Participants agree that the ordinance would not have 
been passed without his support (Taylor, 1983). Third, partici-
pants in the campaign for the ordinance believed that Seattle has 
a strong tradition of "open government." This tradition, in 
their opinion, consists of a high degree of participation by the 
citizenry and a feeling among that citizenry that government 
should be accountable to the public (Taylor, 1983; Hoff, 1983; 
Locke, 1983). Whether or not the political culture of Seattle is 
substantially different from that of other cities is an 
unverified assertion. Police experts generally concede that 
differences in "political culture" do exist and that these 
differences have an important impact on local policing (Wilson, 
1973). Nonetheless, the fact that so many participants in the 
police spying episode feel that Seattle's politics are uniquely 
"open" suggests that it might have some validity--if only on the 
basis of W. I. Thomas's (1951:81) famous maxim "If men define 
situations as real they are real in their consequences.n 10 
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The political context of police issues in Seattle is highly 
ambiguous, however. In the midst of the police spying contro-
versy, a parallel controversy over the use of deadly force arose. 
In 1978 Mayor Royer directed the Seattle Police Department to 
develop new and more restrictive guidelines on when to shoot 
(Seattle Times, December 21, 1977; February 8, 1978; March 30, 
1978; May 2, 1978). The police union took the issue to the 
voters and, by referendum, succeeded in replacing the mayor's 
restrictive policy with a far more permissive one (Seattle Times, 
April 22, 1978; August 29, 1978; November 8, 1978). The November, 
1978 election was a political curiosity. Seattle voters approved 
a resolution opposing forced busing for school integration, voted 
down an anti-gay rights resolution, and approved the police spon-
sored deadly force policy. Thus, the police lost political sup-
port on the question of spying but not on the use of deadly 
force. The new deadly force policy essentially permits shooting 
at fleeing burglary suspects and runs counter to the recent 
national trend that permits the use of deadly force only in the 
defense of life (Seattle Police Department, n.d.: 
2.09.030; Geller, 1982). 
Section 
Despite their basic hostility to the ordinance (Fitzsimons, 
1982), members of the police department have apparently complied 
fully with its letter and spirit. 11 In some respects, they have 
made an effort to over-comply. Police Chief Fitzsimons permitted 
the auditor to inspect his perssonal papers, including items in 
his safe, despite the fact that the ordinance specifically denies 
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the auditor authority to inspect these materials. The auditor 
indicated that members of the police department were cordial and 
cooperative during his initial audit and that the police chief 
made it clear that he expected full cooperation by all members of 
the department (Hoff, 1983). In compliance with the ordinance, 
the police chief developed a seventeen-page memorandum setting 
forth guidelines for implementing the ordinance, and all Seattle 
police officers have received fourteen hours of formal instruc-
tion in the content and meaning of the ordinance. 
The only serious problem with the ordinance involves police 
relations with other law enforcement agencies. Because the ordi-
nance opened police files to outside inspecton, the Seattle 
Police Department was expelled from the Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Unit (LEIU). Additionally, on its own initiative 
the department did not apply for admission to the Western States 
Information Network (WSIN) ( Ruxlow, 1980). The LEIU is a 
national organization of police officials which conducts the 
exchange of criminal intelligence information (General Accounting 
Office, 1980). The WSIN is a regional organization sharing 
information related to narcotics trafficking. Law enforcement 
officials regard these organizations as means of overcoming the 
historic fragmentation of American law enforcement. Critics 
charge that these organizations are unregulated and routinely 
engage in improper dissemination of information about individuals 
and organizations engaged in purely political activities (Center 
for Research on Criminal Justice, 1977). 
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The ordinance created two specific problems regarding infor-
mation exchange. First, some information received from the 
LEIU/WSIN networks would fall with the definition of "restricted 
information" or "private sexual information." The Seattle police 
department would violate the law by possessing it. Second, 
information received from other agencies would be open for 
inspection by the auditor. This would violate the expectation of 
the other LEIU/WSIN agencies that the information was 
confidential. 12 
Following expulsion from LEIU, Seattle police officials 
argued that the ordinance hindered effective law enforcement 
(Fitzsimons, 1982). They argued that they could no longer 
obtain important and necessary information from other law 
enforcement agencies, particularly about narcotics trafficking, 
organized crime, and political terrorism. Whether non-membership 
in WSIN/LEIU in fact hindered law enforcement in Seattle is an 
open question. To answer that question affirmatively is to argue 
that WSIN/LEIU and the other information sharing networks provide 
useful information to the cooperating agencies. This point is 
very much in doubt. City Attorney Bernstein conceded that the 
ordinance did not even cover "most of the work of a metropolitan 
police force" (Bernstein, 1979: 94). Reviews by the Detroit 
Police Commission (1979), the Michigan House of Representatives 
(1978), the General Accounting Office (1979), and the Office of 
Technology Assistance (1982) all raised questions about the 
quality and utility of the information in the LEIU files and 
those of similar organizations. 
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The Seattle Police Department's view was supported by edi-
torials in both Seattle daily newspapers (Seattle Times, April 8, 
1982; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 3, 1982). Members of the 
coalition responded by arguing that there was no evidence that 
the Seattle Police Department had ever received any information 
of use in criminal investigations through LEIU. Furthermore, it 
noted that other law enforcement agencies had experienced audits 
of their LEIU files (Detroit, New York City, Chicago, Memphis) 
without being expelled from LEIU (Coalition on Government Spying, 
1982). 
In June, 1982 the Seattle City Council amended the original 
ordinance to exempt files received by the Seattle Police Depart-
ment from LEIU and WSIN from the auditor's review. This exemp-
tion covered only those files related to organized criminal 
activity and narcotics trafficking. The auditor retained the 
authority to review all other files received from LEIU and WSIN. 
The chief of police assumed the responsibility for auditing the 
LEIU and WSIN files exempted from the auditor's review. 
Whether this exemption represented a substantial weakening of 
the original ordinance is not clear. While it created another 
potential loophole, the original ordinance contained ample 
loopholes if the police were determined to subvert the letter and 
spirit of the law. The significance of the 1982 modifications is 
perhaps more political than legal or administrative. After being 
on the defensive for eight years, the Seattle Police Department 
recovered support for their point of view from a majority of the 
city council and both of the daily newspapers. 
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The police department's stated objections to the operation of 
ordinance pertained almost entirely to the problems of relations 
with other law enforcment agencies. The department has not 
argued that the ordinance has hindered its own investigatory 
worl<--that is, to develop information on its own about criminal 
activity in the city of Seattle. City Attorney Bernstein (1979: 
94) adopted this view even before the ordinance took effect. He 
observed, "It was recognized during the legislative process that 
most of the daily work of a metropolitan police force would not 
be in the restricted information area, and, therefore, most of 
the paperwork and administrative burdens should be avoided." 
3. The Auditor's Perspective 
The Seattle police auditor reported full compliance with the 
ordinance during the law's first years. A personal interview 
with the auditor confirmed the impression given by his official 
reports: that compliance is high and the auditing process itself 
has settled into an uneventful bureaucratic routine. The first 
audit took several days, but more recent ones have taken only 
half a day. In sum, the present auditor feels that the ordinance 
is a reasonable device for controlling police conduct and that it 
has been effective in achieving its purposes. In particular, the 
law has a "sensitizing" effect on the police (Hoff, 1983; Seattle 
Police Auditor, 1981). 
The selection of an auditor presented a delicate political 
problem. The ordinance specified that the auditor be a person 
with, among other qualities, "a reputation for integrity and 
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professionalism," "a commitment to and knowledge of the need for 
and responsibilities of law enforcement, as well as the need to 
protect basic constitutional rights," and "the potential for 
gaining the respect of departmental personnel and citizens of the 
City of Seattle." 
past president of 
The person selected as the first auditor was a 
the Washington State Bar Association and a 
practicing securities attorney with a large Seattle law firm. 
This individual represented a political compromise as he was 
deemed acceptable to both the coalition and the Seattle police. 
Hoff brought to his job no background experience with police 
matters. In a personal interview he suggested that this was 
probably a virtue, given the fact that anyone with direct 
experience with police matters would, by virtue of that 
experience, have previously formed attitudes or personal 
contacts. Previous experience as either 
defense attorney, attorney for plaintiffs 
prosecutor, criminal 
in police misconduct 
cases, or police union attorney would, in addition to possible 
previously formed ideas or contacts, not be perceived as being 
neutral toward the police (Hoff, 1983). 
The lack of experience with police matters does raise the 
question of whether the auditor could be misled by police 
officers. This point was raised with the current auditor. His 
view is that the police could indeed hide information from the 
auditor if they were determined to do so. He feels that the 
auditing process, however, has a general deterrent effect on 
misconduct. It sensitizes the police both to the importance of 
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complying with the law and the principle of review by an out-
sider. The risk of disclosure by leak or some other process 
deters misconduct (Hoff, 1983). 
The initial audit found a high level of compliance with the 
provisions of the ordinance. The auditor reported "(a) no 
substantial violations of the ordinance, and (b) a good faith 
effort by the Seattle Police Department to comply with the ordi-
nance in all respects" (Seattle Police Auditor, 1981: 10). The 
police department made little use of the provisions of the ordi-
nance. In the first year, only eleven authorizations for 
collecting restricted information were issued. 
"political authorizations" and three were 
Eight were 
"religious 
authorizations." None was extended beyond the original time 
frame and none resulted in criminal prosecutions. No authoriza-
tions for dignitary protection were issued nor were any infiltra-
tors or informants authorized (Fitzsimons, 1981). 
The auditor did note one ambiguity concerning the role of 
that office. On a few occasions police officers solicited his 
advice about the propriety of particular actions. These requests 
placed the auditor in the de facto role of police legal advisor 
which meant giving prior approval to actions that he would 
subsequently have the responsibility of moni taring. The current 
auditor feels that this represents a serious role conflict and 
that the auditor should not be called upon for legal advice 
(Seattle Police Auditor, 1981; Hoff, 1983). 
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Conclusions 
After four years of operation, the Seattle Police 
Intelligence Ordinance appears to be a success, although certain 
questions and ambiguities remain. 
On the positive side, the ordinance establishes two important 
principles: first, that police intelligence activities should be 
regulated by formal rules and that a legislative body can 
properly formulate those rules (Halperin, 1976); and, second, 
that police activities should be subject to regular review by an 
independent, external investigator. Unlike virtually every 
existing police review mechanism in the United States, which 
responds only to a complaint about police misconduct (Paulsen, 
1970) the Seattle auditing process reviews routine police 
activities on a regular basis. It may be described as 
"proactive" rather than "reactive" and resembles the institution-
alized inspection process in the U.S. military and the inspection 
of local police agencies by the British Home Office (Critchley, 
1973). The ordinance does not appear to have hampered the legi-
timate criminal investigative activities of the Seattle police. 
Finally, the auditing process may well have a general deterrent 
effect on police misconduct. 
Several questions remain, however. The first concerns the 
matter of willful violations by the police. Although the 
ordinance goes further than any existing mechanism in controlling 
police misconduct, the potential for willful evasion of the law 
and subversion of the auditing process remains (Marx, 1982). 
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Finally, the viability of the ordinance as a model for other 
agencies in the United States is problematic. Seattle partici-
pants appear unanimous in their belief that the local political 
environment was uniquely receptive to this pioneering ordinance. 
This environment includes a strong tradition of "open government" 
and the leadership role assumed by one key member of the city 
council. The political environments of the Congress, the fifty 
state legislatures, and the many city governments are not 
presently as supportive. The viability of the Seattle ordinance 
as a model for other law enforcement agencies depends largely on 
changes in these various political environments. 15 
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FOOTNOTES 
1
seattle City Council, Ordinance #108333, July 2, 1979. For the 
sake of brevity, particular sections of the ordinance are not 
cited in this article. 
2The history of the spying scandal and the development of the 
ordinance is found in U.S. House of Representatives (1979). 
3(1) to other criminal justice agencies "in the performance of 
their official functions"; (2) persons ''with a legitimate 
interest consent"; (3) persons with a lawful right to know under 
statute, regulation, or court order; (4) persons conducting 
academic or law enforcement research who give assurances of 
confidentiality; and, (5) regulatory agencies with a legitimate 
right to know. 
4 (1) department personnel fields, (2) department internal 
investigations of its own personnel, (3) four categories of 
confidential communications as defined in the ordinance, (4) the 
personal files of the chief of police, and (5) specific case 
files which the King County prosecutor certifies in writing that 
must be withheld from the auditor because they involve investi-
gations of government officials or might involve a conflict of 
interest on the part of the auditor, or investigations of orga-
nized crime. 
5This is to permit the individual to inspect his or her file and 
make a determination about suing for damages. 
6Even Seattle Police Chief Fitzsimons (1980) believes that the 
ordinance's supporters were more interested in the national 
impact of the law than the local. 
1see the relevant argument in James J. Fyfe (1982) with respect 
to the exclusionary rule. 
8
ordinance supporters prefer the term "chilling effect" to 
characterize the law's impact (Taylor, 1983). 
9city Attorney Bernstein (1979: 86) indicated that once the 
drafting process began it was a foregone conclusion that an 
ordinance would be passed and his strategy was to "minimize the 
adverse effects" of such a law. 
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10
stuart Scheingold's (1984) current research on the politics of 
law and order in Seattle may yield some answers to this 
question. 
1111 It is the policy of the Seattle Police Department to cooperate 
fully with the Investigations Ordinance auditor.'' Seattle 
Police Department, n.d.: Section IX, A.) 
12The anticipated passage of the ordinance led to another scan-
dal. The lieutenant in charge of the Seattle Police Department 
intelligence unit transferred the LEIU intelligence cards in 
the department's possession to the Santa Clara Police 
Department on the grounds that he "could no longer guarantee 
their security" (Schoener, 1978). The chief of the Santa 
Clara Police Department was then president of LEIU. This 
unauthorized action by the head of the intelligence unit came 
to light and aroused a small scandal. A departmental investi-
gation officially exonerated the lieutenant in question, but he 
was transferred to the personnel unit, a move that represented 
an apparent slap on the wrist (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
July 1, 1978). 
13ordinance #110640, June 17, 1982. 
14
some tentative evidence suggests that the advent of black 
political majorities in a number of major cities has changed 
local environments. With respect to Detroit, for example, see 
the concluding remark in Littlejohn (1981). Developments in 
Atlanta, Washington, DC, and San Francisco (which involves the 
gay community as a major political force) merit investigation 
from this perspective. 
234 
REFERENCES 
Berman, J. (1976) "A model statute for a charter for the F.B.I." 
Washington, DC: Center for National Security Studies. 
Bernstein, P. (1979) Testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Judiciary 
Committee, 96th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. Hearings on H.R. 5030, 
Legislative Charter for the F.B.I. 
Center for National Security Studies (1979) First Principles, 5 
(October):1. 
(1981) First Principles, 6 (March April): 1-2. 
Center for Research on Criminal Justice (1977) The Iron Fist and 
the Velvet Glove, 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: Center for Research on 
Criminal Justice. 
Coalition on Government Spying (1982) Memorandum, "Modifications 
to the police intelligence ordinance" (April 5) 
(n.d.)a. "LEIU/WSIN Memo.'' 
(n.d.)b. Principles for Effective Legislation. 
Seattle: Coalition on Government Spying. 
CNSS (1979) First Principles V: 2 (October). Washington, DC: 
U.S. House of Representatives. 
Critchley, T.A. (1973) A History of Police in England and Wales 
2nd ed. Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith. 
Detroit Board of Police Commissioners (1979) "An inquiry into the 
Detroit Police Department's membership in the Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Unit." (February 22). 
Fitzsimons, P. (1980) "Interview," Law Enforcement News (April 
7). 
(1981) Letter to Mayor Charles Royer (March 25). 
(1982) Personal interview. 
Fyfe, J. (1982) "In search of the bad faith search," Criminal Law 
Bulletin, 18 (May-June): 260-264. 
Geller, W.A. (1982) "Deadly force: What we know," Journal of 
Police Science and Administration, 10:2: 151-177. 
Halperin, M. (1976) The Lawless State. New York: Penguin Books. 
235 
Hoff, D. (1983) Personal interview. 
Juris, H. and Feuille, P. (1973) Police Unionism. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books. 
Littlejohn, E. (1981) "The civilian police commission: a 
deterrent to police misconduct," Journal of Urban Law, 59 
(Fall): 5-62. 
Locke, H.G. (1983) Personal interview. 
Marx, G. (1982) "Who really gets stung?: some issues raised by 
the new police undercover work," Crime and Delinquency, 
(April): 165-193. 
Michigan House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Privacy (1978) 
Memorandum, "The operation and organizational structure of the 
law enforcement intelligence unit." (September 6). 
Paulsen, M.G. (1970) "Securing police compliance with constitu-
tional limitations: the exclusionary rule and other devices." 
In Law and Order Reconsidered. New York: Bantam Books. 
Potts, L. (1983) Responsible Police Administration: Issues and 
Approaches. University, AL: University of Alabama Press. 
Revelle, R. (1979) Testimony in U.S. House 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 
Committee, 96th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. 
Legislative Charter for the FBI. 
of Representatives, 
Rights, Judiciary 
Hearings on H.R. 5030, 
Ruchelman, L. (1974) Police Politics: A Comparative Study of 
Three Cities. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Ruxlow, T.R. (1980) Letter to Patrick S. Fitzsimons, Chief of 
Police, Seattle Police Department. (October 29). 
Scheingold, S. (1984) The Politics of Law and Order. New York: 
Longmans. 
Schoener, R.G. (1978) Letter to Mr. Stan Carey, Santa Clara 
Police Department. (April 11). 
Seattle Police Auditor (1981a) 18-Month Report to the Mayor and 
the Seattle City Council. 
(1981b) Report of Police Intelligence Auditor 
(February 4). 
Seattle Police Department (1979) "Training Bulletin 79-3" 
(August). 
(n.d.)a. Policy Manual. 
--~~~----(n.d.)b. "Rules and Regulations for Investigations 
Ordinance." 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (November 23, 1975). 
Seattle Times (April 22, 1978; July 1, 1978; August 29, 1978; 
November 8, 1978; April 8, 1982; June 6, 1976; December 21, 
1977; February 8, 1978; March 30, 1978; May 2, 1978). 
Taylor, K. (1979) Testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Judiciary 
Committee, 96th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Hearings on 
H.R.5030, Legislative Charter for the FBI. 
(1983) Interview. 
236 
Thomas, W.I. (1951) Social Behavior and Personality. New York: 
Social Science Research Council. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1980) The Multi-Statem Regional 
Intelligence Projects: Who Will Oversee These Federally Funded 
Networks? Report #GGD-81-36 (December 31). 
(1979) The Interstate Organized Crime Index. Report 
#GGD-79-37 (May 25). 
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights (1979) Judiciary Committee, 96th Cong., 
1st and 2nd Sess. Hearings on H.R. 5030, Legislative Charter 
for the FBI. (September 12: 31-151). 
U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1977), 94th Cong. 1st 
and 2nd Sess. Hearings and Final Report. 
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1982) An Assessment of 
Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History 
System (October). 
Wilson, J.Q. (1973) The Varieties of Police Behavior. New York: 
Atheneum. 
